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My dissertation, “Sexed Being and the Limit: Writing Transgender Subjectivity,” 
draws on French medieval and early modern literature, contemporary United States 
memoir, and the discourses of gender studies, Lacanian psychoanalysis, and queer 
theory, to argue for an understanding of “transgender subjectivity” that would be 
irreducible to the fields of “sex,” gender identity, or gender expression.  I suggest that 
we may read the cross-dressed or “transgender” characters of the French medieval 
texts I consider as allegorical subjects, or subjects whose “subjectivity” is manifested 
in the texts’ portrayals of these characters’ encounters with the limits of language.  By 
“the limits of language,” I mean to refer to the ways in which language introduces into 
subjective existence both an intractable limit and, at the same time, an excess which 
language itself cannot fully treat.  Each medieval text, I argue, stages its inability to 
explain the “sexed being” of the trans character in question in scenes that explore the 
limits of language (scenes of voice, silence, naming, re-naming, or deception, limits 
that are both painful and enabling).  I suggest that transgender subjectivity can be 
understood as a particular response to language’s inability to explain the “sexed 
being” of the subject, a response which orbits the paradoxical status of language and 
its limits.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Subject: Medieval, Modern, Trans 
At Least Two Frames 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is perhaps fitting (albeit, as ever, awkwardly fitting) that a project about 
“transgender subjectivity” should resist framing.  Fitting, too, to be led to a hesitation 
– is the aim really to frame the thing at all or, instead, to provide some perhaps 
contingent point of entry into the content or the project’s own “corporeal contingency” 
(Paul Verhaeghe, “Lacan’s Answer to the Classical Mind/Body Deadlock: Retracing 
Freud’s Beyond” 114)?  Are the two any different?  The metaphors can be thought 
oppositionally (structure and contingency, form and content; frame and entry, 
epidermis and pore), but need not be; likewise, they can seem to warrant differing 
methodologies.  In general, this project seeks, and is in many ways about, a balance 
between such pairings.  Drawing from the polyvalence of a word like “corpus,” it errs 
toward a structuralism infused with corporeal contingencies, where fond and forme 
might coil and uncoil in “circular but nonreciprocal relation” (Verhaeghe 110).1   
                                                 
1 This could be read as a definition of structuralism itself.  In outlining the differences between 
structuralism and formalism, Claude Lévi-Strauss defines structuralism as a discourse where there is no 
opposition between the “abstract” and the “concrete” or the “structure” and the “content”: “The 
supports of structural analysis in linguistics and in anthropology are often accused of formalism. This is 
to forget that formalism exists as an independent doctrine from which structuralism – without denying 
its debt to it – separated because of the very different attitudes the two schools adopt toward the 
concrete. Contrary to formalism, structuralism refuses to set the concrete against the abstract and to 
recognize a privileged value in the latter. Form is defined by opposition to material other than itself. But 
structure has no distinct content; it is content itself, apprehended in a logical organization conceived as 
property of the real” (Structural Anthropology, Volume 2 115).  Later, he adds, “[Vladimir] Propp 
divides oral literature in two: a form, which constitutes the essential aspect because it lends itself to 
morphological study; and an arbitrary content to which, because it is arbitrary, I think he only gives an 
accessory importance. We will be permitted to insist on this point which sums up the whole difference 
between formalism and structuralism. For the former, the two domains must be absolutely separate, 
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 Above all, it seems fitting that at least two frames come to mind, and that they 
should imperfectly overlap.  In the first place, this project considers transgender 
subjectivity with respect to debates between gender studies2 and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis about sex, gender, and sexual difference.  In the second, it considers 
transgender subjectivity as a point of fractious contact between French medieval and 
contemporary theoretical and narrative accounts of gender, “sexed” being, and 
subjectivity.  The terms in these two lists differ for reasons I will try to delineate, but 
suffice it to say for the moment that these differences already index the extent to 
which these discourses only imperfectly overlap.  In both instances, I hope 1) to 
explore what these divergent discourses might, through disagreement, dissymmetry, 
and the occasional happy accident, offer to each other and to contemporary imaginings 
about subjects’ solutions to the impasses of “sex,” “speaking,” and “being”; and 2) to 
map out some thoughts on how “transgender subjectivity” allows us to ask differently 
the question of subjectivity itself.   
 To begin with the first frame noted above: I attempt to stage a debate between 
gender studies and Lacanian psychoanalysis around the categories of sexual difference 
and transgender subjectivity, categories which have served as points of contention for 
the two discourses, but which also constitute dense sites of contestation in 
                                                                                                                                            
since form alone is intelligible, and content is only a residual deprived of any significant value. For 
structuralism, this opposition does not exist. There is not something abstract on one side and something 
concrete on the other. Form and content are of the same nature, susceptible to the same analysis. 
Content draws its reality from its structure and what is called form is the ‘structural formation’ of the 
local structure forming the content” (131).  Structuralism, in other words, loves it objects, while, 
according to Lévi-Strauss, “Formalism destroys its object” (132).   
2 “Gender studies,” however, is not one thing.  I use the term “gender studies” here to outline rather 
loosely the study of sex, gender, and sexuality, such that it might also comprise both “queer theory” and 
“transgender studies.” However, these three fields are not ideologically assimilable and do not 
constitute monolithic structures in and of themselves either.  I will try to signal which “gender studies” I 
mean as I go. 
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contemporary debates about kinship, marriage, and family, hate crimes and 
nondiscrimination policies, and persons’ legal status as such.3  In response to concerns 
expressed by theorists Judith Butler and Joan Copjec regarding the incompatibility of 
gender studies’ and Lacanian psychoanalytic approaches, I argue that these approaches 
may hope for meeting grounds precisely around the topic of “sexual difference,” and 
that, more specifically, questions about transgender subjectivities afford a point of 
entry for thinking through the impasses and political purchase of a necessarily 
contestatory meeting of these two domains.  “Sexual difference,” I argue, following 
Lacan, refers not to “biological sex” or “gender” but to a subject’s position with 
respect to language.  Sexual difference in this account would be a logic and a mode of 
inscription, one whose effects may be traced to diverse phenomena.  “Biological sex” 
or “gender,” by contrast, would appear as manifestations of the imaginary body, or 
that body which comes into being for the subject itself through what Lacan describes 
as the mirror stage.4  This is the body of ideology, composed of images and ideals, the 
body imagined as container or whole, which forgets itself as a sack of flesh, holes, and 
                                                 
3 As Paisley Currah, Richard M. Juang, and Shannon Price Minter write in the Introduction to 
Transgender Rights, “In short, while gains won by the U.S. transgender movement are impressive, most 
transgender people still are deprived of any secure legal status. In the eyes of the law in most states, 
they are nonpersons, with no right to marry, work, use a public bathroom, or even walk down the street 
in safety” (xiv).  
4 To be sure, “[a]n image, for a human being, is always an image correlated with and regulated by the 
symbolic function” (Marie-Hélène Brousse, “The Imaginary” 122), meaning that no purely imaginary 
body exists.  In Chapters Two and Three, I discuss identification and its various means of alienation 
(particularly, in these chapters, with respect to gender).  For a discussion of Freud’s concept of the 
bodily ego and how it might be useful to thinking transgender subjectivity, see Gayle Salamon, “The 
Bodily Ego and the Contested Domain of the Material” in Assuming a Body.  For a discussion of the 
difference between the “real” “organic” body and the psychoanalytic “real,” see Geneviève Morel, 
“Psychoanalytical Anatomy.”  Morel’s account, however, presents the problem of imagining 
transsexuality in a transphobic manner.  For a discussion of the political uses of rethinking the 
imaginary (body), see Kaja Silverman, The Threshold of the Visible World.  For a critique of the 
usefulness of rethinking the imaginary, see Tim Dean, Unlimited Intimacy: Reflections on the 
Subculture of Barebacking, especially pages 21-28.   
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drives; this is the body as basis of the ego, which “will only asymptotically approach 
the subject’s becoming” (Lacan, “The Mirror Stage” 76), meaning, roughly put, that 
no matter how close the two – ego and subject – may appear in space, they will never 
converge.       
 I further argue for an understanding of “transgender subjectivity” which also 
transcends both “gender identity”5 (or “gender expression”) and “biology.”  According 
to this understanding, the transgender subjectivity of interest to this project6 would be 
one possible response to what Lacan calls “the failure of the sexual relation,” which 
can also be glossed as “relationality’s failure as such” (Tim Dean, “Homosexuality” 
137).  In Chapter One, I suggest that we might read transgender subjectivity as 
equivalent to what Lacan names a “hysterical,” “feminine,” or “not-all” position 
                                                 
5 In this way, I see my work articulating in part with the move, cited by Susan Stryker, Paisley Currah, 
and Lisa Jean Moore in their Introduction to WSQ’s issue on “trans-”, to move beyond discussions of 
“trans-” centered exclusively on gender: “While gender certainly – perhaps inevitably – remains a 
primary analytical category for the work we sought to publish in this feminist scholarly journal, our aim 
in curating this special issue specifically was not to identify, consolidate, or stabilize a category of class 
of people, things, or phenomena that could be denominated ‘trans,’ as if certain concrete somethings 
could be characterized as ‘crossers,’ while everything else could be characterized by boundedness and 
fixity. It seemed especially important to insist upon this point when addressing transgender 
phenomena… In seeking to promote cutting-edge feminist work that builds on existing transgender-
oriented scholarship to articulate new generational and analytical perspectives, we didn’t want to 
perpetuate a minoritizing or ghettoizing use of ‘transgender’ to delimit and contain the relationship of 
‘trans-’ conceptual operations to ‘-gender’ statuses and practices in a way that rendered them the 
exclusive property of a tiny class of marginalized individuals” (11).  It is interesting to note that, in such 
conversations, “gender” is being dislodged, to a certain extent, from its position of primacy; as they 
state, “we have assembled in this special issue of WSQ work we consider to be ‘doubly trans’ in some 
important sense – work that situates ‘trans-’ in relation to transgender yet moves beyond the narrow 
politics of gender identity” (15).   
6 Throughout, I will try to be consistent in speaking of “the transgender subjectivity of interest to this 
project,” not “transgender subjectivity as such.”  I will sometimes omit the extra words in the interest of 
narrative flow.  My reason for distinguishing between the two concepts should be clear: I am not trying 
to offer a definitive understanding that would be applicable to all transgender people.  First of all, it 
would be impossible to define “all transgender people”; second, people who identify as transgender 
may or may not find that they have anything in common with the issues considered herein (the 
interrogation of gender; uncertainty; encounters with the limits of language; experiences of the effects 
of language on the body).  Finally, people who may not identify as transgender may find that they do 
have something in common with the issues considered herein.  
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within language.7  For subjects thusly positioned in language, “gender” often emerges 
as an object of intense inquiry: the hysteric asks, “Am I a man, or am I a woman, and 
what does that mean?”  Gender, in other words, emerges as a privileged vehicle 
through which the feminine/hysterical/not-all/transgender subject interrogates that 
failure of relationality that institutes the subject as desiring.  Gender emerges as a 
plane on which the question of sexual difference can be interpreted, interrogated, or 
embodied as problem.  However, gender is not for this reason equivalent to sexual 
difference.  The conceptual differences between “gender” and “sexual difference” 
constitute difficult terrain, as the two seem endlessly to collapse into one another 
(even, sometimes, in psychoanalytic discourse, which insists on the difference); this 
difference is hard to think.  The hysteric’s question brings into blazing focus, however, 
both how counterintuitive and how critical it is to think the two apart.  We might say 
that the hysteric thinks gender and sexual difference together, but uncomfortably; 
he/she/ze exposes their difference or incommensurability even as he/she/ze seeks to 
answer the question of sexual difference (What does it mean to be a [divided, 
castrated/desiring] subject [in language]?) by means of a question about gender 
(Which of these social identities might explain me as a subject?).   
 In this initial sketch of what I mean by the term “transgender subjectivity,” I 
would like to stress three points.  First, it is worth restating that sexual difference is 
not equivalent to gender.  To break down the difference to its simplest expression, we 
might state it thusly: sexual difference, for Lacan, is a position within language (to be 
“all” or “not-all” “under the phallic function” [Encore 79-80]) and gender is not.  Of 
                                                 
7 Hysteria and femininity are not exactly the same things for Lacanian psychoanalysis; for the 
differences between them, see Chapter One.    
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course, one’s gender identity or expression expresses something about an individual’s 
position within language, where language stands for not only language as such but the 
social positions it bestows.  We have learned how gender, along with race, class, 
sexual orientation, age, and ability, impact one’s position within language as it is 
thusly conceived from feminists as variously situated as Dorothy Allison, Gloria 
Anzaldúa, Hélène Cixous, bell hooks, Audre Lorde, Aileen Moreton-Robinson, Leah 
Lakshmi Piepzna-Samarasinha, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Susan Stryker, Riki 
Wilchins, and Monique Wittig.  Gender identity or expression expresses something 
about an individual’s position within language to the extent that social norms to date 
have dictated that “men” – particularly white, middle class ones – have occupied a 
more secure site than “women” within language.  Likewise, white middle class women 
have occupied a more secure site in language than poor and working class women and 
women of color.  But the kind of language at issue in each of the above examples is a 
rather different sort of language than the one Lacan is describing when he speaks of 
the phallic function. 
 While gender communicates something about an individual’s position within 
language, gender does not in and of itself constitute a question of subjective position 
within language, whether the language in question be that aligned with Lacan’s phallic 
function or something closer to what feminists such as Cixous and Lorde describe.  
This is the case because gender norms can, after all, be variously expressed.  We can 
imagine a society where one’s gender expression would have no bearing on one’s 
status within language – a society where all the available forms of gender expression 
would render subjects equally fragile or equally secure within language.  This would 
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not be a society without difference; instead, it would be one where the kinds of 
difference that made the difference – those differences that positioned some subjects 
securely within language and other subjects more tenuously (or, in the terms of 
Copjec, the differences that would position some subjects “on the side of the 
symbolic” and others “on the side of the void” [“The Fable of the Stork” 72]) – would 
not have anything to do with gender.    
The second point I would like to stress is the following: not all “not-all” 
subjects ask the question of sexual difference in the guise of a critique of or question 
about gender.  The subjects of interest to this study – or, more appropriately, the 
literary characters of interest to this study, which I qualify as allegorical subjects, a 
point to which I’ll return – will concern themselves, to greater or lesser degrees, with 
problems of gender; however, subjects may ask the question of sexual difference in 
many different ways.  Certain questions thus lurk in the background of this project: 
Why does gender emerge as a privileged vehicle through which the “not-all” subject 
interrogates the failure of relationality?  How will the question of sexual difference – 
or the question of the failure of relationality – transform as the sense and status of 
gender transform too?  Will the question – “Am I a man, or am I a woman” – retain its 
psychic and cultural hold?  Will it fade?  Will it become even more widespread?  In 
this area, Patricia Ghoervici’s recent clinical work on hysteria and transgender proves 
invaluable, as she argues in Please Select Your Gender: From the Invention of 
Hysteria to the Democratization of Transgenderism that hysterics today ask not “Am I 
a man, or am I a woman?” but “’Am I straight, or am I bisexual?’” (xii).  What does 
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this shift mean?  And what does it mean if the hysteric’s question is transforming at 
the very moment that transgender is emerging as an increasingly visible identity?   
 Finally, while I speak throughout of “transgender subjectivity,” this is, 
psychoanalytically speaking, a resounding misnomer, for the subject has no 
demographic.  To speak of a subject with a gender – even an ambiguous one – is to 
bring the world of images and ideals, identities and social being, into the much queerer 
space of the subject; again, according to Lacan, the ego “will only asymptotically 
approach the subject’s becoming.”  This, however, is partly why the structure of 
hysteria is so interesting, for hysterics, again, seem to think gender and sexual 
difference, or social identities and that which necessitates their failures, together 
precisely because they are sensitive to their incommensurability.  In speaking of 
“transgender subjectivity,” I am attempting to push the word “transgender” beyond its 
traditional connotations, in order to argue that transgender (in the sense here 
considered, one instantiation of hysteria) figures in discourse something that is 
germane to subjectivity as such – notably, the notion that to be a sexed subject is to be 
subsumed in an irreducible uncertainty.  In a certain sense, the transgender subjectivity 
of interest to this project poses a question which is, at a certain level, present for all 
subjects, no matter their seeming genders and no matter their degree of gender 
certainty or, as Gherovici writes, “happy uncertainty” (185).  This is a point I will 
return to.  While this suggests that there is a way of thinking subjectivity as such as 
transgender, the stories I consider feature characters who explore this question at the 
level of the social, bringing the singularity of their experience of the impossibility of 
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sexed being into the fields of gendered embodiment, social relations, and, in some 
cases, political engagement. 
While Lacananian psychoanalysis furnishes the provocative idea that “sexual 
difference” might be understood as a position within language rather than a gender-
based identity, it is the field of gender studies (in its many forms) that explores gender 
as an object of inquiry.  It is gender studies and not, generally, psychoanalysis which 
treats the diverse phenomena of gender to bold and careful consideration.  It is gender 
studies which is both interested in and – in many instances if not all – sympathetic to 
transgender phenomena (or the visible manifestations, social repercussions, and 
critical theories of gender ambiguity, transition, transgression, and non-normativity) 
and transgender subjectivities.  To my mind, those of us who are interested in posing 
the question of (trans)gender do so in part in order to ask the same question that Jess 
Goldberg addresses to hir old friend Duffy at the end of Stone Butch Blues, Feinberg’s 
groundbreaking trans narrative, namely: “’I came to ask you if you think it’s possible 
to change the world?’” (299).  This project builds from the premise that such a pursuit 
requires at least two levels of labor: in the words of psychoanalytic thinker Charles 
Shepherdson, “the symbolic is not a set of conditions external to the subject, and…, as 
a result, the subject who labors to change the world is already its product. The notion 
of a ‘change in the symbolic,’ understood as ‘outside’ the subject, must therefore be 
supplemented by a ‘change in the subject’ as well” (Vital Signs 39).    
 If psychoanalytic thinkers have been, by and large, unwilling to think 
transgender, those narrating and/or theorizing transgender have not, for their part, 
called upon psychoanalysis either;  this means, among other things, that these latter 
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have neither offered an account of the limits of language nor made use of the resources 
of a theory of the subject.8  This observation is not in and of itself unique: 
psychoanalytic critics like Copjec and Tim Dean have already critiqued gender 
theorist Judith Butler, for example, in this capacity.9  While I will address what as I 
read as the resources of a theory of the subject in this Introduction, I will not directly 
address what I mean by the expression “the limits of language” until Chapter Five, 
where I will respond to Copjec’s critique of Butler.  In the essays where Copjec and 
Dean engage in the aforementioned critiques, neither one is particularly interested in 
nor sympathetic to transgender subjectivity.  Consequently, they do not experiment 
with bringing these categories to bear with respect to critical theories of transgender or 
to transgender narratives more generally.  I hope to respond to that lacuna, with the 
understanding that psychoanalysis and transgender – each in its own way having to do 
with the impasse of “sexual difference,” and in this way potentially mutually 
authenticating discourses – have much to offer one another.  In this way, I see my 
work as conversant with that of gender theorist Gayle Salamon, who argues, in 
Assuming a Body: Transgender and Rhetorics of Materiality, that “psychoanalysis, 
                                                 
8 As Susan Stryker rightly observes in her introduction to Charles Shepherdson’s “The Role of Gender 
and the Imperative of Sex” in The Transgender Studies Reader, “While psychoanalysis has a great deal 
to offer in terms of understanding how the human organism becomes a gendered subject, the perceived 
dilemma of the psychoanalyst treating the transsexual patient reveals a profound struggle. Whose sense 
of meaning and reality, the analyst’s or the analysand’s, should have the power to actualize itself? The 
analyst, situating himself or herself as a voice of cultural authority, insists that his or her body means 
differently, and wants the body to acquire a social and cultural meaning that corresponds with a 
subjectively held gender identity. It is this impasse that creates such antipathy toward psychoanalysis on 
the part of so many transgender people, whose struggle to control their own bodies has been far better 
served by medical service providers willing to change the soma, and not try to change the self” (94). 
9 For Dean’s most sustained critique of Butler, see “Bodies That Mutter” in Beyond Sexuality.  I will 
outline Copjec’s critique of Butler in Chapter Five.  Butler, of course, for all her influence, does not 
represent the last word on transgender phenomena.  See Jay Prosser’s Second Skins: The Body 
Narratives of Transsexuality for an extensive critique of Butler.  See Salamon’s “The Bodily Ego and 
the Contested Domain of the Material” in Assuming a Body for a response to Prosser’s critique.   
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perhaps more than any other discourse, has provided the most thorough and detailed 
examination of the elaborate set of mechanisms by which a subject ‘knows’ her own 
body, and psychoanalysis can give us a richly productive way of describing that join 
between the psychic and the material – if its more homophobic and transphobic 
tendencies can be curbed” (3-4).10   
 While Salamon thoughtfully rethinks the materiality of all bodies, pointing out 
that “the body one feels oneself to have is not necessarily the same body that is 
delimited by its exterior contours, and… this is the case even for any normatively 
gendered subject” (3), my own project puts more weight on the textual.  I turn to 
literary texts as objects of study, leaving open the question as to whether or not there 
might be any “subjects” in literature, in order to track literary ways of grappling with 
and portraying the impact of language on (trans) subjectivity.  I argue that the impact 
of language on (trans) subjectivity is explored in the texts’ preoccupation with bodily 
effects, as well as in the (trans) characters’ own use of language.  If there are no (trans) 
subjects in literature – a view which I do not easily endorse, to the extent that it relies 
on a clear divide between something called “literature” and something called “not-
literature,” but a view whose common sense force I neither deny –, there are 
nonetheless trans poetics, forged out of these texts’ depictions of trans characters’ 
encounters with the limits of language.  Moreover, these – the impact of language on 
                                                 
10 Salamon calls on psychoanalysis, queer theory, transgender theory, and phenomenology to think 
embodiment, the material and the phantasmatic, and the productive ways in which all bodies experience 
rupture and disjunction in being called upon to construct their own “felt sense.”  As Salamon explains, 
“I rely on the notion of the phantom or ambivalent presence to complicate suppositions about the nature 
of the bodily being, where that phantom is sometimes textual and sometimes material” (2), for “those 
immaterial structures which subtend the body’s materiality, such as the felt sense that delivers the body 
to consciousness, cannot be accounted for within a theory that understands the body to be a plenitude of 
materiality and meaning” (3).   
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the body, the limits of language and how one will position oneself with respect to this 
– constitute, in Lacanian terms, matters of the subject.  I would like to suggest, 
therefore, that we may read the transgender characters of the French medieval texts I 
consider as allegorical subjects, or characters whose “subjectivity” is poetically 
manifested – or fabulated – in their encounters with the limits of language and with 
language’s impact on the body.   
 
I. “Sex” and “Gender” in Medieval France 
 
This project also represents an attempt to think medieval literary representations of 
transgender subjectivity with Lacanian psychoanalysis.  But, as already noted, are 
there literary representations of transgender subjectivity?  Are there literary 
representations of subjectivity as such?  And why turn to French medieval literary 
texts for an articulation of transgender subjectivity – why with psychoanalysis? – 
when these (transgender, psychoanalysis) are clear anachronisms and, therefore, 
concepts and methodologies that could travel anywhere, anytime?11  If we can say, 
                                                 
11 For a wealth of excellent scholarship addressing the relations amongst history and structure; 
medievalism, historicism, and psychoanalysis; and medievalism and contemporary critical theory at 
large, see for reference Teresa Brennan’s History After Lacan; William Burgwinkle’s Sodomy, 
Masculinity, and Law in Medieval Literature: France and England, 1050-1230; Brigitte Cazelles and 
Charles Méla’s Modernité au Moyen Âge: le défi du passé; Andrew Cole and D. Vance Smith’s The 
Legitimacy of the Middle Ages: On the Unwritten History of Theory; Joan Copjec’s Read My Desire: 
Lacan Against the Historicists; Carolyn Dinshaw’s Chaucer’s Sexual Politics and Getting Medieval; L. 
O. Aranye Fradenburg’s Sacrifice Your love: Psychoanalysis, Historicism, Chaucer and “We Are Not 
Alone: Psychoanalytic Medievalisms”; Bruce Holsinger’s The Premodern Condition: Medievalism and 
the Making of Theory; Jean-Charles Hûchet’s Littérature Médiévale et Psychanalyse; Sarah Kay’s 
Courtly Contradictions: The Emergence of the Literary Object in the Twelfth Century and Subjectivity 
in Troubadour Poetry; the work of Alexandre Leupin in general; Erin Felicia Labbie’s Lacan’s 
Medievalism; Gayle Margherita’s The Romance of Origins; Elizabeth Scala’s “Historicists and Their 
Discontents: Reading Psychoanalytically in Medieval Studies”; Shepherdson’s “Derrida and Lacan: An 
Impossible Friendship?”; Paul Strohm’s Theory and the Premodern Text; Eugene Vance’s 
“Medievalism: Testing Ground for Historicism(s)? Round table discussion with Peter Haidu, Alexandre 
Leupin, and Eugene Vance”; and Paul Zumthor’s Toward a Medieval Poetics.   
For scholarship addressing both psychoanalysis and transgender, see for reference Patricia Gherovici’s 
Please Select Your Gender: From the Invention of Hysteria to the Democratizing of Transgenderism; 
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with medievalists like L. O. Aranye Fradenburg, that “’psychoanalysis is simply in 
medieval studies now, in a variety of acknowledged and unacknowledged ways’” (qtd. 
in Erin Felicia Labbie, Lacan’s Medievalism 9); if we can say in turn, with Erin Felicia 
Labbie, that “[m]utual implication will lead to an inversion of Fradenburg’s statement, 
‘psychoanalysis is in medieval studies,’ to say as well that medieval studies is in 
psychoanalysis” (10); and if we can say, with Andrew Cole and D. Vance Smith, 
challenging philosopher Hans Blumenberg, that “’[m]odernity and postmodernity have 
defined themselves toward the Middle Ages and they will never let it go’” (“Outside 
Modernity” 24) – if we can say all these things, what can we say about transgender, 
psychoanalysis, and the medieval?   
 I turn to French medieval literary representations of transgender subjectivity 
for two primary reasons.  First, medieval stances on “sex” and “gender,” as Joan 
Cadden shows in Meanings of Sex Difference in the Middle Ages, do not constitute any 
sort of unified discourse: “authorities” on the subject are numerous and dispersed; 
those very authorities draw on eclectic sources; and those sources are, themselves, 
oftentimes syncretistic.  To my mind, this makes of French medieval attempts to 
grapple with the question of “sex” and gender particularly compelling, for they are, in 
a sense, “real” attempts, as in, attempts with no secure center, attempts which do not 
have a hegemonic discourse to which to respond.  Given that I am interested in 
narratives that bring to light the idea that to be a “sexed being” as such is to be 
                                                                                                                                            
Dean’s “Transcending Gender” in Beyond Sexuality; Millot’s Horsexe; Salamon’s Assuming a Body: 
Transgender and Rhetorics of Materiality; and Shepherdson’s “The Role of Gender and the Imperative 
of Sex” in Vital Signs.   
For scholarship addressing medieval literature and transgender, see Masha Raskolnikov’s 
“Transgendering Pride.”  Jumping ahead to scholars working on the 17th and 18th century, see Lewis 
Seifert’s “Border Crossings: For a Transgendered Choisy.”  For Seifert’s approach to the problem of 
anachronism, see page 211. 
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subsumed in an irreducible uncertainty, then narratives dating from a time period 
where a discourse rendering gender a matter of certainty is not easily at hand, renders 
that uncertainty all the more palpable.  Second, I am interested in pursuing the 
proposition made by Peter Haidu that the modern Western subject was invented in the 
European Middle Ages; for Haidu, this is in no small part a literary invention that has 
also to do with the origins of the modern state.  But what does the subject that Haidu 
finds in the European medieval state have to do with the subject as it is conceptualized 
in Lacanian psychoanalysis?   
 To begin with the first of these: Cadden’s invaluable study on medieval views 
of what she calls, for the most part, “sex difference,” carefully amasses and analyzes 
countless sources, beginning with ancient Greek texts that proved significant to 
medieval thinkers and moving on to medieval medicine, natural philosophy, scholastic 
philosophy, moral philosophy, Christian doctrine, and literature, with the heaviest 
emphasis on the first two of these.  Cadden suggests that her eclectic approach to the 
gathering of “questions, information, and methods” is, itself, medieval; it “mirrors the 
habits of medieval natural philosophers and medical writers” (4).  Her wide berth also 
leads her early on to distinguish her aims and conclusions from the ideas about 
medieval sex, gender, and sexuality rendered familiar by Michel Foucault and Thomas 
Laqueur.  As she notes, “Foucault used the Middle Ages mainly as a foil…” (8); with 
respect to Laqueur, she explains, “Though there is much evidence in the present study 
that fits [Laqueur’s] ‘one sex’ model, medieval views on the status of the uterus and 
the opinions of medieval physiognomers about male and female traits suggest 
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evidence of other models not reducible to Laqueur’s” (3).   The refrain of Cadden’s 
own view, by contrast, is nicely captured in the Introduction:  
 There is no coherent set of concepts that can be said to constitute the medieval 
 gender  framework. Similarly, the vast and evolving body of knowledge which 
 constituted medieval medicine and natural philosophy – the repository of much 
 of what we would call ‘science’ – did not offer a single model of the sexes, 
 much less one which could be said to shape or to be derived from a clear 
 system of gender roles (2).     
 
Lacking a “coherent set of concepts” on medieval gender does not prevent Cadden 
from explaining a number of patterns, of course, and her Conclusion is confident: 
certain principles guide medicine and natural philosophy in their explorations of and 
varied conclusions about sex difference.  These include “the operations of heat… the 
concepts of moderation and balance, with their attendant notion of purgation, and the 
sets of ideas associated with teleology and value hierarchies, such as the conviction 
that regular operations in nature are purposeful and good” (280).   
 If, as Cadden cautions, medieval stances on sex and gender cannot in any way 
be summarized, medieval views on what we might today call “transgender” 
phenomena are just as difficult to encapsulate; however, according to Cadden, “The 
notion of a masculine female or a feminine male is not uncommon in the late Middle 
Ages” (201).  Similarly, there are theorizations of so-called “hermaphrodites,” such as 
in “the doctrine of the seven-celled uterus” (198): 
 The uterus, so the theory goes, is divided into seven cubicles, three on the left 
 side, three on the right side, and one in the center. A conceptus housed in one 
 of the cubicles on the left, the cooler side, would, of course, be a girl; on the 
 right, a boy. A fetus that developed in the middle cell would be a 
 hermaphrodite. The anatomists of twelfth-century Salerno secured a place in 
 medieval medicine for the theory by presenting it in their general anatomical 
 tracts… (198).   
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Cadden emphasizes that there are “middle terms admitted by medical theory” (202) – 
middle terms that could be applied not only to person but “to plants and planets, cruel 
mothers and kind confessors” (202) – but that these middle terms also “worked to 
contain experience and expression within the two-term system” (202).  Furthermore, 
Cadden notes that the acknowledgement of “naturalistic explanations” (209) for 
“[p]hysically ambiguous organisms and behaviorally ambiguous individuals” (209) 
did not prevent both of the above from being met with “less acceptance than 
discomfort or even hostility” (209).   
 Cadden turns to the twelfth century writings of Alan of Lille to demonstrate the 
hostility and discomfort with which non-normative bodies were encountered.  As 
Cadden notes, there is a certain medieval “tolerance of sexual ambiguity and gender 
mixes” (209), but, to Cadden’s mind, this tolerance is restricted to the world of 
“cultural abstractions” (209): “If Jupiter and Ganymede can sleep together, asked the 
philosopher and poet Alan of Lille in the twelfth century, why are men condemned for 
sexual relations with each other? Because (he had the character Nature answer) poetry 
and allegory are not to be taken literally and have entirely different rules from those of 
everyday life” (209).  Yet even ostensible real-life examples of transgender are not, it 
would seem, to be taken literally: “neither Joan of Arc, to take a lay example, nor the 
bearded Saint Wilgefortis12, to take a religious one, could be held up as a literal model 
for ordinary women” (212).    
                                                 
12 One of septuplets, Wilgefortis is thought to have been a hermaphrodite; like the saint in the story we 
will study in Chapter Two, Wilgefortis runs away from marriage to devote herself to God instead and 
eventually grows a beard and mustache (Cadden 203-204).   
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 Just as Cadden resists generalizing about medieval views on sex and gender, 
we might hesitate to generalize about medieval views on what we might today call 
“transgender” phenomena.  That said, it seems safe to say, at a minimum, that 
medieval European literature evidences a fascination with cross-dressing and the 
possibility of sex and/or gender change.  Does it also evidence a certain surprising 
comfort with both of the above?  It certainly seems to in literature.  Alan of Lille 
seems to suggest this too, even as he then moves, through the character of Nature, to 
insist on the proper jurisdiction of poetry and allegory: what is permissible in poetry is 
not acceptable to everyday life.  The textual traces of these phenomena are various: for 
example, according to Valerie R. Hotchkiss, “In the Middle Ages, female cross 
dressing was a common literary device and a significant, although rarely recorded, 
historical phenomenon” (Clothes Make the Main 3).  She adds that “[f]emale 
transvestism occurs so frequently in medieval texts that feminine stereotypes, 
women’s roles in literature, and the perception of women in the Middle Ages warrant 
reexamination in light of it” (3-4).  To this I would add that, given that the 
phenomenon is so common, it also asks us to consider the possibility that “female 
cross dressing” is not only a reflection on the status of “women” but, indeed, on the 
“men” – or “transmen” – these “women” become, as well as on medieval views on 
embodiment and social identification as such.   
 If it is not, in the European Middle Ages, universally decided how sex or 
gender come to be, it seems logical that variations on sex and gender might figure in 
debates and discussions about sex and gender, and that these questions and variations 
would find a place in the medieval imaginary and medieval literature.  To my mind, 
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the variety of trans narratives in medieval texts, the befuddling mix of medieval 
theorizations of sex and gender, and the unexpected tones of acceptance with which 
cross-dressing and sex/gender change are encountered in some of these texts, make of 
medieval Europe a propitious environment for the exploration of transgender 
subjectivity.  Yet there have been very few studies linking medieval “transgender” 
phenomena to modern transgender phenomena.  This project is an experiment in 
forging that link.   
 The lack of a unified discourse on sex and gender gets played out in different 
ways in the narratives I consider.  In the case of Heldris de Cornualle’s thirteenth 
century romance the Roman de Silence, debate over the trans main character Silence’s 
gender is quite literal: the allegorical figures of Nature and Nurture vie for his/her/hir 
body and identity.  By contrast, the anonymous thirteenth century saint’s life the Vie 
de Sainte Euphrosine says little about Euphrosine/Esmerade’s gender as such: 
Euphrosine makes the decision to cross-dress fairly easily, in order to escape an 
unwanted marriage and devote him/her/hirself to God.  Yet Euphrosine/Esmerade’s 
identity is just as radically in question as is Silence’s – indeed, we might say, more so, 
and more poetically so.  The vita offers a series of metaphors and possible 
identifications to describe the character, most of which are only ambiguously related 
to gender: he/she/ze is a rock, a flower, a beast, a gem, a jewel, a creature, a thing, a 
eunuch, a monk, a bride, a saint, a boy – and, apparently, all these at once.  What these 
medieval tales have in common is a provocative inability: they are unable to explain 
Silence’s or Euphrosine/Esmerade’s “sexed” beings.  In the case of the Roman de 
Silence, this inability is playfully worried over throughout the romance.  In the case of 
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the Vie de Sainte Euphrosine, this inability is unrolled into the crafting of an elusive 
sort of being, making of Euphrosine/Esmerade, as we shall see, in Karmen 
MacKendrick’s terms, a perfect saint.      
 The above speaks to the meeting of transgender and medieval literature, but 
not to that of transgender, medieval literature, and psychoanalysis.  Here, the linchpin 
lies, I think, in the tenuous category of subjectivity itself and its variously charged 
relations to language and literature; it lies in a certain way in which French medieval 
literary explorations of transgender subjectivity – flowering at the same time as the 
celebrated “courtly love” phenomenon – imagine, in literature, sites for a form of 
subjectivity otherwise not quite possible.  While I recognize that, in a certain sense, 
there are no subjects in literature, I would like to suggest that French medieval literary 
texts carve out a space for a kind of subjectivity that the social did not quite allow for; 
these texts bring trans subjects into narrative “being.”  Thus while we do not encounter 
the language of an actual transgender subject in the fictional texts I will consider, we 
do encounter a literary attempt at materializing a space for the subject outside of the 
social, and a space for a very particular sort of subject.  The textual residue or poetic 
materialization of the social impossibility of transgender subjectivity can be found in 
the texts’ very spatiality: the stories take place outside the law, in forests and 
monasteries.  The residue can also be found in a certain preoccupation with the very 
humanity of the trans characters in question: the word “chose,” or “thing,” appears in 
all of the literary texts I consider as a means of describing or interrogating the trans 
character(s) in question.   
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 Medieval questions about the humanity of trans characters ring, of course, 
disturbingly close to home for those of us interested in gender in the United States 
today: Currah, Juang, and Minter remind us that transpeople in the U.S. today “are 
nonpersons, with no right to marry, work, use a public bathroom, or even walk down 
the street in safety” (xiv).  The medieval texts I consider do not frame the question in 
precisely the same terms, but they ask a series of questions which stretch across time.  
First: What is a human and what is a thing?  Gender studies and these medieval 
literary texts cross paths here, asking after the extent to which the human is only 
intelligible as something other than a “thing” to the extent to which it is gendered.  
These medieval texts also cross paths with psychoanalysis here, opening together onto 
further questions, notably, what is “thingly” about the human?  And what is “thingly” 
about a human that can and in fact must be articulated in art rather than in the social?  
If psychoanalysis and medieval literature cross paths here, they do so not only, as 
Lacan noted, in courtly love poetry, but in these stories, stories about a very particular 
sort of impossible subject – the transgender subject. 
 
II. The Subject Medieval/Modern: Peter Haidu 
 
If subjects are subjects, as Lacan asserts, because of the fact of language, this is as true 
of the medieval period as it is today.  In this sense, the subject is transhistorical.  
However, subjects are not transhistorically the same kinds of subjects: as medievalist 
William Burgwinkle writes with respect to the subject positions available to twelfth 
century monks,  
 If individuals only accede to subjectivity through interaction with the Law – 
 ideological forces that are attempting to harness and dominate them – then it is 
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 logical to assume that  the medieval clerks and monks who wrote these (largely 
 homophobic) texts were subjects in this modern sense, even if, given the 
 different forms that those ideological forces took, the subject positions 
 available to them were not identical to our own (9, emphasis added).   
 
Although Burgwinkle focuses on the significance of “the Law” – rather than language 
more generally – to subjectivity, his explanation applies to the context of this project 
as well: subjects are subjects according to the kinds of subject positions available to 
them.  They may be “subjects in this modern sense,” but the solutions to the fact of 
subjection to language are themselves historical.  What kinds of subjectivities, then, do 
medieval subjects embody?   
 Haidu, in the first sentence of The Subject Medieval/Modern, asserts that “[t]he 
modern subject was invented in the Middle Ages, such is the thesis of this book…” 
(1), and for Haidu, literature is central to this invention.  Specifically: “[a] new 
subjectivity is generated by textual and political practices, starting in the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries, initially affecting only a few and slowly spreading as the center of a 
new mode of collective life – a culture and ‘civilization’ – of which state structures are 
the central armature” (5).  It is this claim that I would like to explore.  If the modern 
subject finds its origins in forces at work in the Middle Ages, who is this 
medieval/modern subject, what are the salient points of connection, and what are those 
forces, according to Haidu?  How, in other words, are medieval and modern subjects 
in some sense the same sorts of subjects?  What subjective positions are available to 
medieval subjects that are also available to modern ones?  And what is the role of the 
literary? 
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 Haidu identifies the formation of the state – “one very particular, historical 
form of governance” (2) – as a key component in the formation of the medieval-
subject-turned-modern.  According to Haidu, the state’s beginnings “are found in 
France and England in the eleventh and twelfth centuries” and constitute “the first 
foundations of what would become ‘modern’ states” (2).  While the state’s beginnings 
are only one “somewhat more visible aspect of the transformation in European 
civilization” (2), its beginnings are, for Haidu, integrally tied to the formation of the 
medieval subject.  The invention of the medieval subject and the medieval state are of 
apiece with one another: Haidu states that the “constitution of the subject is an integral 
part of medieval state-formation, with its increasing reliance on ideology and 
discipline” (4); he further states that “’literary’ texts and historical practices from the 
Middle Ages participate in the cultural invention of the subject as part of the political 
invention of the state” (2).  The newly emerging state thus both depends upon and 
produces a certain kind of subject and literature’s role in the production of this subject 
is integral as well: “Above all, …practices modernity categorizes as ‘literature’ – a 
modern institution with no medieval equivalent – do the ideological work of their 
polity in exploring and constituting subjectivity by providing performative models of 
human comportment” (5).   
 The medieval state, subject, and literature surface early on in Haidu’s account 
as densely intertwined, in a classic “which came first, the chicken or the egg?” 
narrative.  Haidu’s explanation of the subject as an entity constituted in two different 
phases helps somewhat to clarify the root of these connections.  Haidu speaks to two 
phases of the subject, passive and active: “In the passive phase, [the subject] is the 
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object of manipulations of its parents, its own unconscious, and a world of 
representations that gather ideological value” (3).  The second, active phase 
“recognizes the efficacy of the unconscious, but encounters the demand of social 
action as the world springs the necessity of making choices – often binary and framed 
by external conjunctures over which the subject has no immediate control – on the 
individual. This is the necessity of narrative…” (3).  The subject becomes the place 
where contradictory demands necessitate difficult choices:  
 In historical societies, ideologies and disciplines are multiple: the individual is 
 a site of multiple traversals, constituted in the disruption, breaking, and 
 reknitting of multiple semiotic strands, his or her subject position(s) targeted 
 by multiple interpellations. In that manifold, interferences and contradictions 
 necessarily occur. Individual encodings are interrupted, requiring choices 
 among the multiple interpellations (3-4).   
 
Haidu quotes philosopher Alain Badiou’s definition of the subject in order to 
emphasize the staccato rhythm of this understanding of subject-formation: “’A subject 
is that term which, submitted to the rule which determines a place, punctuates it with 
the interruption of its effect’” (4).  Haidu offers this gloss on Badiou’s definition: “It is 
in that interruption, in that disjunctive moment, when interpellation fails, and the 
subject is forced into excess over its cause, that subjectivity is attained and that text is 
formed, in the burdensome, enforced freedom of making choices” (4).   
 The subject, in other words, is (in) the text; it is the excess of its cause, wholly 
subjected, “site of multiple traversals,” but part (unwilling?) detractor, “forced into 
excess over its cause.”  The subject becomes a “narrative, historical agent” (4) to the 
extent that he or she is subjected to a certain set of (ideological) choices and 
constraints, which Haidu situates at both conscious and unconscious levels, and then 
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acts.  Action and narrative are wedded here – “subjectivity is attained and… text is 
formed” – but is all subjective action equivalent to narrative?  Is inaction narrative 
too?  And what does the action/narrative equivalence mean about the possibility of any 
sort of textual specificity?  Is there any?  In other words, what is the difference 
between (subjective) action/narrative in narrative and (subjective) action/narrative 
outside of a text?  Or, what is the difference between subjectivity in narrative and 
subjectivity outside of a text?  Is there one for Haidu?    
 Ultimately, it seems that the frame for Haidu’s subject is rigorously textual: 
subjectivity for Haidu is an “enforced freedom,” a project and a construction: it is 
“constructed by the choices the subject makes as narrative, historical agent” (4).  
Subjectivity is not pre-given, and its attendant fragility is, according to Haidu, of 
specific interest to medieval texts: “…the contemporary discovery of subjectivity’s 
fragile nature makes of it more a goal, a hope to be attained, than the stable 
ontological assumption of political life: subjectivity is always under construction. It is 
constructed by the choices the subject makes as narrative, historical agent. It is this 
latter, active phase of the subject that medieval texts explore” (4).  In other words, 
medieval texts depict not a stable subject but a paradoxically active and fragile subject 
which constructs itself out of the choices available.  Again, “This is the necessity of 
narrative…”  Thus it seems that we can conclude that, for Haidu, subjectivity is 
narrative, necessarily; medieval literature is particularly interested in the subject’s 
narrative construction; and medieval narratives of subjective construction play an 
important role in the production of both the subjects of the state and the state itself.   
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 Haidu maps out this fragile, active, literary subject through expansive readings 
of epic, hagiography, romance, and lyric and a multitude of historical phenomena 
ranging from the Oaths of Strasbourg to the King’s Peace, from the rise and fall of the 
principality to medieval forms of surveillance.  Amidst the many analyses proffered by 
this daunting study, I wish to consider more closely two moments: in the first of these, 
Haidu briefly engages with some of the implications of the fact that “’literature’” is “a 
modern institution with no medieval equivalent” (5).  In the second, he recounts 
Chrétien de Troyes’s Yvain’s lesson for modernity, a lesson of subjectification which, 
requiring literature, is, to Haidu’s mind, “recognize[d] with difficulty” (114) by 
psychoanalysis and deconstruction.   
 The first point is, of course, generic: Haidu reminds readers that the “generic 
distinction between ‘history’ and ‘the novel’ is modern” (97): 
 The twelfth century was sophisticated enough to know the difference between 
 veracity and the lie, between a recital of events that had taken place and 
 simulacral representations that had not… They were sophisticated enough to 
 grasp that the simple binarism ‘truth-or-lie’ hid the more subtle category of 
 ‘fiction’… ‘roman’ refers both to ‘true’ histories and to texts whose fictionality 
 was patent… (97). 
 
Lacking generic distinctions between “history” and “fiction” does not mean that the 
Middle Ages is ignorant of the distinction between “truth” and “lie,” but it does 
suggest that, at the textual level, the aforementioned categories – truth, lie, history, 
fiction – are neither neatly delineated nor entirely discrete.  As Haidu suggests, the 
Middle Ages was “sophisticated enough to grasp that the simple binarism ‘truth-or-lie’ 
hid the more subtle category of ‘fiction.’”  While Haidu indicates that the fictionality 
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of some texts was “patent,” he problematizes the notion that contemporary literary 
categorization would make the same sort of sense in medieval Europe.   
Ultimately, the subject with whom Haidu is concerned is not precisely the 
same subject of interest to this project.  Haidu directly addresses what he regards as 
the distinction between his understanding of subjectivity and a Lacanian one in the 
second point referenced above.  Reading Chrétien de Troyes’s Yvain, the Knight of the 
Lion, Haidu considers the implications of the fact that “[o]ur perception of Yvain is 
almost entirely external” (114), and this in a narrative that Haidu reads as structured 
entirely around the question of subjectivity (105).  Indeed, according to Haidu, “The 
subject is the topic of all Chrétien de Troyes’s work” (100).  Yet there is barely an “I” 
in Yvain, and the “text rarely enters into [Yvain’s] putative interiority” (114):  
 in this narrative, all about the destruction and reconstruction of subjectivity, 
 what is not represented are the psychic workings of an individual ego… At 
 precisely the points where a modern rhetoric of fiction would anticipate entry 
 into the internal world of subjectivity, a wall of conventionalism faces the 
 reader. For the latter, the narration seems to betray the narrative. It aims at 
 subjectification, but recounts only action (114).   
 
This, however, is precisely Yvain’s lesson for modernity: a field has been forgotten: 
“Subjectivity is not only an ocean of inchoate feelings, from terror to orgasmic 
pleasures of the sublime, awash in an individual interior. Nor is it only symptomatic 
enunciations of an unconscious substituted for subjectivity. Subjectivity is a 
potentiality for action inscribed by ideologies, the multiple systems of value abroad in 
the culture” (114).  Haidu clarifies that “[e]motions and the unconscious are not 
irrelevant to such potentials for action, but they do not exhaust the field of 
subjectivity” (114).  Haidu criticizes the idea that subjectivity would be either a vast 
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oceanic interiority or locatable only in the rupturing enunciations of the unconscious, 
insisting that Yvain tells a tale of a subject, without, however, offering much by way of 
either of the above.   
 Haidu’s concern seems to rest not only in remarking how medieval texts 
inscribe their own brand of subjectivity, but in finding therein the traces of an 
understanding of subjectivity which makes space for – indeed, depends upon – social 
action, a space occluded, to his mind, by psychoanalytic and deconstructionist theories 
of the subject: “Psychoanalysis and deconstruction recognize with difficulty the 
ultimate necessity that besets the individual, of eventually taking action within a social 
and political sphere, action that has further constitutive effects of subjectification: the 
relations of subject and society are marked by loops, dialectic as well as repetitions, 
each constitutive of the other” (114-115).  These constitutive loops find expression not 
in “descriptions of interiority or structures of the unconscious” (115) but in subjects’ 
actions, such as Yvain’s actions, produced by, within, and as narrative.  Here we find 
the answer to the question posed earlier about the equivalence of action and narrative: 
“In a textuality focused on the narration of action, the hero does not figure a radical 
individualism. The individual is a necessity of narrative, not necessarily an ontological 
existent” (115).  (Individual?, narrative?) action trumps the individual, and the subject 
is born.  
 
III. Lacan’s Medieval Subject?  
 
Lacan, too, finds a salient correlation between medieval subjectivities and modern 
ones.  Famously, Lacan turns to lyric poetry to explore the concept of sublimation, 
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seeking, in that “distant affair,” “something that has happened to us, relative to the 
Thing” (Ethics of Psychoanalysis 112-113).  He claims that  
courtly love was, in brief, a poetic exercise, a way of playing with a number of 
conventional, idealizing themes, which couldn’t have had any real concrete 
equivalent. Nevertheless, these ideals, first among which is that of the Lady, 
are to be found in subsequent periods, down to our own. The influence of these 
ideals is a highly concrete one in the organization of contemporary man’s 
sentimental attachments, and it continues its forward march (148).   
 
 While Lacan thus gives support to the notion of a certain connection between 
medieval and modern subjectivities, it does seem that the subject as it is defined by 
Lacan is not quite equivalent to the subject Haidu finds in medieval texts.  Haidu 
ultimately defines subjectivity as “that reserved and necessary possibility of making 
choices among contradictory constitutive ideological codes, plus the psychic space to 
accommodate that function: a possibility of encompassing the terms of a contradiction, 
a stretch of dubiety and hesitation” (328).  For Lacan, on the other hand, the subject 
(in one of its formulations) is,  
 something that comes to us from the structural necessities, something humble, 
 born at the level of the lowest encounters and of all the talking crowd that 
 precedes us, at the level of the structure of the signifier, of the languages 
 spoken in a stuttering, stumbling way, but which cannot elude constraints 
 whose echoes, model, style can be found, curiously enough, in contemporary 
 mathematics (Four Fundamental 47).   
 
There are resonances between Haidu and Lacan’s definitions of subjectivity: both 
definitions speak to something outside, “contradictory constitutive ideological codes” 
and “all the talking crowd that precedes us… languages spoken in a stuttering, 
stumbling way”; both describe the subject as a space subject to constraints, as “that 
reserved and necessary possibility of making choices,” that “which cannot elude 
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constraints” (constraints which Lacan, however, affiliates with contemporary 
mathematics and Haidu with discipline and ideology).   
 While both thinkers point to the impact of external factors, Lacan also, 
however, insists upon certain differences between the social actor, or the ego, and the 
subject: “Naïve mouth,” Lacan notes, addressing an imagined objector, but also, in a 
sense, the subject as such: “The subject goes far beyond what is experienced 
‘subjectively’ by the individual; he goes exactly as far as the truth he is able to attain” 
(“Function and Field” 219).  The question, of course, is what is encapsulated in this 
cryptic description of a truth to be attained.  What does it mean to say that the “subject 
goes far beyond what is experienced ‘subjectively’ by the individual”?  And what 
might that mean with respect to Haidu’s suggestion that we think the subject as one of 
action/narration?   
 Lacan specifies that the subject is “not the soul, either mortal or immortal, 
which has been with us for so long, nor some shade, some double, some phantom, nor 
even some supposed psycho-spherical shell, the locus of the defences and other such 
simplified notions” (Four Fundamental 47).  Rather, the subject is that which is at 
home in the dream (44).  Lacan quotes Freud: “Wo es war, soll Ich werden. This does 
not mean, as some execrable translation would have it, Le moi doit déloger le ça (the 
ego must dislodge the id)… Where it was, the Ich… the subject, must come into 
existence” (44-45).  The ego (Ich, moi) is not privileged in Lacan’s reading of the 
Freudian quote; instead, the subject of the unconscious is – the subject which is, again, 
at home in the dream.  As psychoanalytic theorist Tracy McNulty explains, Freud’s 
formula  
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 had been interpreted by the proponents of ego psychology to mean that the ego 
 must come to dominate or subsume the id… But Lacan understands his 
 comment very differently. Instead of implying the colonization of the id by the 
 ego, it points to the necessary expropriation of the ego by the id: there where 
 ‘it’ was – the es or id – the subject shall come into being as a subject of the 
 unconscious, and not as a self-possessed ego (The Hostess xxiii).   
 
This is not to say that, after analysis, ids shall roam free, pure death drives which/who 
have cheerfully subdued their accompanying, spent and humiliated egos; but it does 
suggest that Lacan might protest to Haidu that not all of the actions taken by the ego, 
operating within the social, reference the subject, or reference it in the same way: as 
McNulty points out, the ego tends to repress the subject of the unconscious; the 
subject of the unconscious “appears only as a rupture in the world…” (“Demanding 
the Impossible” 1).  What “goes far beyond what is experienced subjectively by the 
‘individual’” thus would seem to entail an incompletion of knowledge of which 
Haidu’s subject of action/narration remains at least partly innocent.   
 Still, for both Haidu and Lacan, the subject is “something humble,” “a stretch 
of dubiety and hesitation.”  Ultimately it is the uncertainty of the subject that is of 
principal interest to me in reading these medieval transgender narratives.  The 
transgender subject’s uncertainty recalls the difference outlined above between the 
subject and the ego, for certainty is the pursuit of the ego, not a project of interest or 
value to the subject.  Psychoanalytic theorist Ellie Ragland-Sullivan recalls Lacan’s 
play on words – maître/m’être (master, to be me) – in defining the ego (the moi, the 
me) as “a fiction complicitous with its own deceptions” (“The Sexual Masquerade” 
71).  According to Ragland-Sullivan, “In this sense the ego might be called the site of 
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ideology in the sense that ideology is narcissistic, a master (m’être) discourse whose 
goal is certainty and closure: ‘to be me’” (71).   
 
IV. The Subject of Uncertainty 
 
We come, then, to the crux of this project: uncertainty.  If certainty is the hallmark of 
the ego, then (the ideal of) gender certainty may be the most culturally trenchant of the 
trademark gestures of the contemporary, Western ego.  This, it seems to me, would be 
generically true: gender certainty is the prerogative of all sorts of people, whether or 
not the gender of which they feel certain is the one that was assigned to them at birth.  
This is one of the primary reasons why I find the subject/ego distinction elaborated in 
psychoanalysis – and thus the vocabulary of “subjectivity” as such – both so intriguing 
and so useful.  The subject/ego distinction allows us to think not only gender identity 
as an iterative performance more or less destined to fail at times, not only the ego as 
such as an object of fantasy aiming at coherence, but the subject as a localization of 
desire whose discontinuities  index a loss about which we can only hypothesize.  In 
Chapter One, I define “transsexuality” as the experience of identifying with a gender 
that is not consonant with the gender assigned at birth.  I further suggest that, 
inasmuch as an ostensibly “transsexual” person identifies with one gender or another 
with a degree of certainty, he/she/ze is psychically no different than ostensibly 
“nontranssexual” persons who also identify as one gender or another with a degree of 
certainty.  The transgender of interest to this project, by contrast, is that which is 
marked by an irreducible uncertainty: on the one hand, such a transgender is common 
to subjects as such, constituting the scene of undecideability described by Freud as our 
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aboriginal bisexuality.  But, in the stories explored here, that scene of undecideability 
is staged, expressed, interrogated, and poeticized.   
 Voices in queer theory in both medieval and modern literary studies have 
expressed reservations about, not only – as historically – psychoanalysis, but the 
vocabulary of “the subject” as such.  Michael Snediker, for example, explains, in the 
introduction to Queer Optimism, his preference for “persons” over “subjects”:  
 My theoretical preference for persons over subjects extends from questions of 
 how personhood – as formulated within the poems on which subsequent 
 chapters’ arguments depend – might be characterized, removed from the 
 columbarium of subjectivity… Far from invoking persons freed from 
 discursive necessity, Queer Optimism scrutinizes the conundra of discursivity 
 at its most local – rather than importing a set of subjectival  stipulations 
 extrinsic from the discursive system of a given poem (3).   
 
Similarly, Raskolnikov notes, in the introduction to Body Against Soul: Gender and 
Sowlehele in Middle English Allegory, that her “approach offers a return to the 
question of the self with a new twist,” resisting the urge to “present[  ] a prehistory of 
that vague entity ‘the subject’ …” (8).  
 I agree that “the subject” has often been a fabulously “vague entity,” and these 
vagaries beg certain questions.  For example, has the subject, for some, been the 
individual all along?  When and for whom has it been something other?  When has it 
been the subject of the unconscious, and what would that really be?  While I agree 
with Raskolnikov’s characterization of the subject as a vague entity, I don’t hope to 
correct “the subject’s” conventional vagueness – this is not what Raskolnikov is 
asking for, of course, but how would one, after all, define the subject or subjectivity 
once and for all?  McNulty nicely captures that quality of elusiveness characteristic of 
subjectivity, suggesting that it could in fact be read as intrinsic to the subject itself: 
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“The subject is itself an ‘impossible object’ in this sense, a pure hypothesis that cannot 
be observed scientifically or explained as a product of culture” (“Demanding the 
Impossible” 4).   
The subject may indeed be, in a certain sense, a vague entity, but I part 
company with Snediker’s characterization of subjectivity as “columbarium” (although 
I appreciate his uniquely poetic use of language throughout Queer Optimism); with 
this word, Snediker seems to wish to vanquish the subject to a site of theoretic 
irrelevance, to strip it of its suspect and elitist veneration.  While I do not hope to 
evacuate the provocative aspects of the subject’s vagaries, I do hope to articulate the 
genealogy I have in mind in my own use of the term, and the vague but venerated 
subject is not, I hope, the one that I will be dealing with here.   
 In some sense, these tales respond to Snediker’s appeal that we consider “what 
is coherent” in the self: “It seems crucial, in affirming what is incoherent in oneself, to 
understand likewise what is coherent and, furthermore, crucial to have a vocabulary as 
adequate to coherence as to coherence’s disruption. Why take coherence for granted?” 
(Queer Optimism 25).  Snediker points to the lack of attention to coherence in and of 
itself, suggesting that it – like optimism and, later, like love – are glossed over and 
reduced, encountered as theoretic anathema and therefore left without vocabulary or 
specificity.  These tales are preoccupied, however, not precisely with what is coherent 
but with what is supposed to be coherent, what aims at coherence: Silence’s heart is 
divided, and he suffers for it; Esmerade is quartered off from the other monks for fear 
of the disruptions that his incoherent medley of possible identifications might cause.  
For psychoanalysis, the vocabulary of coherence is the ego’s aim and its terrain.  
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These tales map the distance between the wistfulness of the ego, here represented as 
gender identity, and the buzz of contrariety, the subject’s disruption, indeed, the 
subject’s complaint.  But these tales are, I think, equally concerned with both pieces of 
the puzzle, with both the ego’s drive to coherence and certainty (which of these social 
identities might explain me as a subject?) and the subject’s momentum in the opposite 
direction.  Snediker wishes for “the cultivation of a vocabulary of coherence that more 
precisely does justice to the ways in which coherence isn’t expansively, unilaterally 
destructive, reductive, or ideological” (26).  Lacan might respond, “Wo es war, soll 
Ich warden,” calling for the displacement of the ego by the subject of the unconscious, 
the latter of whose hallmark is, again, indeed, disruption, a disruption embraced by 
certain psychoanalytic-leaning strands of queer theory which Snediker describes at 
one point, unfavorably, as “[t]he pain-machine” (122).  But as Ragland-Sullivan 
reminds us, “Lacan taught that giving up on harmony, on the ideal, opens us up 
paradoxically, to greater freedoms” (68).  In other words: if the not-all or transgender 
subject formulates the question of the failure of relationality (the fundamental question 
of subjectivity) in terms of a question about the ego’s coherence (specifically, that 
hegemonic coherence known as gender identity), then in a way, the not-all/transgender 
subject frees one bird with two stones.  For this displacement of coherence is not 
(only) a “pain-machine,” but “opens us up paradoxically, to greater freedoms.”   
 I would like to suggest that these medieval literary accounts of transgender 
subjectivity answer to unresolved issues in Lacanian psychoanalysis.  If, as I argue in 
Chapter One, transgender subjectivity can be read as one of the most fundamental 
expressions of human subjectivity as such, then why, when it is accompanied by 
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elements of gender non-normativity, is it met in the psychoanalytic community with 
silence and/or transphobia?  Silence and transphobia have profoundly limited 
psychoanalysis’s engagement with transgender.  Fortunately, literature has spoken 
where psychoanalysis hasn’t.  The texts I consider address some of the questions that 
psychoanalysis, so far, has not, for while these texts share with Lacanian 
psychoanalysis a preoccupation with subjectivity, the medieval texts are far more 
willing to delve into how and why the problem of subjectivity gets elaborated in terms 
of a radical question about gender identity.  Ostensibly, this is the core of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis as well: both Freud and Lacan elevated the hysteric’s question to the 
status of an axiom.  Yet neither Lacan nor his followers – with the important exception 
of Gherovici – have confronted the existence of transgender phenomena as a 
manifestation of this axiom.  They have not, in other words, regarded transgender 
phenomena as having anything to do with the (hysterical) question of subjectivity 
itself.  They have not explored why one of the fundamental questions of subjectivity 
itself takes the form of a question about gender identity.   
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The texts I have chosen to consider in my project feature what I read as transgender 
characters.  In Chapter Two, “Eunuch, Not-Eunuch: Failures of Correspondence in the 
Vie de Sainte Euphrosine,” I turn to the anonymous thirteenth century saint’s life the 
Vie de Sainte Euphrosine, which has been most famously analyzed by Simon Gaunt.  
One of the two extant Old French saints’ lives featuring a cross-dressing saint, the 
anonymous text has received, as Gaunt points out, very little critical attention; 
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however, cross-dressing saints were a popular motif in the European Middle Ages.  In 
the tale, Euphrosine runs away to escape an unwanted betrothal.  She presents as a 
eunuch to gain entry into a monastery and is known by the gender-neutral name 
Esmerade (Emerald).  Esmerade encounters his father Panutius again when, devastated 
by the disappearance of his daughter, Panutius turns to the monastery for spiritual 
guidance.  Panutius fails to recognize the monk before him as the daughter he lost, and 
the two strike up a friendship that lasts 38 years, until Esmerade reveals with his dying 
breath that he is, in fact, Panutius’s daughter.  Dating from around the year 1200, 
Euphrosine emerges at a time when the dominant discourses on kinship are in a state 
of conflict and negotiation.  I suggest that the vita rejects available models of 
understanding of human exchange, but not relationality as such.  Indeed, Esmerade’s 
abandonments allow him to open onto a tender relationship with his father, one 
founded on the unstable ground of misrecognition, “sweet words,” and unfulfilled 
promises.  I argue that both Esmerade’s failures to correspond to pre-determined 
gender categories and his “un-credible” words provide a vantage point from which to 
approach the relational possibilities borne of failure, and that these in fact constitute 
the basis on which he is able to forge a tender tie with the father who does not 
recognize him.   
In Chapter Three, “Beyond ‘A Pure Passing’:Transgender Voices in Joy 
Ladin’s ‘The Voice’ and Heldris of Cornualle’s Roman de Silence,” I turn to Heldris 
Cornuälle’s thirteenth century romance the Roman de Silence and Joy Ladin’s 
contemporary essay “The Voice.”  Silence, born a “girl,” is raised as “boy” for reasons 
of inheritance.  At a certain age, he is made aware by his father that he is not exactly 
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like the other boys, and he begins to be visited by Nature and Nurture, allegorical 
figures who vie for his body and gender identity.  I look in particular at Heldris’s 
portrayal of the “grant tencon” (great tension) between Nature and Nurture, arguing 
that the romance suggests that neither is sufficient to account for Silence’s (sexed) 
being and that that very insufficiency can be read as the condition of Silence’s 
embrace of voice.  I compare this medieval account of a “transgender voice” to that 
described by Ladin in her contemporary tale of vocal transition, arguing that, while 
Ladin is able to access a voice that would represent an “authentic self,” Silence’s 
remains inauthentic, deferred, and at a distance.   
In Chapter Four, “Signifying Without Limit: The Isle des Hermaphrodites,” I 
turn to Thomas Artus’s seventeenth century travel narrative the Isle des 
Hermaphrodites.  Generally read as a satire of the court of Henri III (1574-1589), a 
king accused of bisexuality, sodomy, effeminacy, and hermaphrodism, the novel tells 
the story of a shipwrecked Frenchman who, wandering around an island of 
hermaphrodites, marvels at their artistic wonders, laws, and customs.  I suggest the 
novel depicts a different take on transgender subjectivity from that analyzed in the rest 
of the project.  The hermaphrodites approach the symbolic as a site of ruse to be 
exposed for its laughable shortcomings: they expose all social structures in their lack 
of foundation, and their laws prescribing infinite invention and linguistic play 
represent a caricatured form of those gender studies’ perspectives according to which 
language has no limit. 
In Chapter Five, “Beyond the Grammar of the Norm: Transgender Subjectivity 
and the Limit(s) of Sexual Difference,” I consider a set of gender studies and 
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psychoanalytic texts where the limit of sexual difference is at issue.  For some, the 
limit of sexual difference is identified and/or critiqued as normative and disciplinary: 
we are constrained to become only certain kinds of “sexed” bodies.  For others, that 
limit is “natural”: bodies are given only as “male” and “female,” and this limit is 
unimpeachable.  For Lacan, however, the limit of sexual difference is logical – but 
what kind of limit is this?  Why is this impasse what sexual difference “is”?  And how 
does transgender subjectivity relate to it?  In dialogue with texts by theorists like 
Judith Butler, Joan Copjec, Geneviève Morel, and Gayle Salamon, I find that the 
various forms the limit of sexual difference may take – normative, organic, or logical 
– sometimes slip, and that this slippage can be found particularly in those moments 
when authors are dealing, whether implicitly or explicitly, with transgender 
subjectivity and transgender and gender non-normative embodiment.  I suggest that 
this slippage is problematic in those psychoanalytic texts where the logical limit of 
sexual difference lapses into a normative or organic one.  It is here that I suggest that 
sexual difference might be apprehended as a language for thinking about how subjects 
position themselves with respect to the limit, and more specifically, their own limits, 
and that transgender subjectivity’s experience of this limit may be illuminating, 
inasmuch as it situates that limit as a moving target.    
In the Vie de Sainte Euphrosine, the young heiress Euphrosine runs away to 
live as Esmerade the monk.  In the Roman de Silence, Silence, born a “girl,” is raised 
as “boy” for reasons of inheritance.  In each of these tales, gender appears in the mode 
of a questioning, and often this questioning shades quickly in to other dilemmas and 
uncertainties, such that the questioning of gender conjugates poetically diverse 
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semantic fields and multiple epistemological puzzles – “‘U fut ceste trovee?’” 
(Euphrosine 205) (in Simon Gaunt’s lovely translation, “Where was this creature 
found?” [“Straight Minds” 448], ask the astonished monks when Esmerade appears in 
the monastery, suggesting that Esmerade’s humanity as such is open to debate.  
(Importantly, the monks are responding with wild desire to this potentially inhuman 
creature.)  Humanity is similarly in question with the “hermaphrodites” of Artus’s 
travel narrative: as the narrator remarks in describing his first encounter with an elite 
hermaphrodite, “Je n’avois encore veu ce que c’estoit qui estoit dans ce lict” ‘I had not 
yet seen what it was that was in this bed’ (Isle 60, my translation, emphasis added).  
For Silence, being as such is at times configured as a perilous category: “Et cuers s’est 
une creäture / Mervelles d’estrange nature… ses pensers le tormentoit / Et il le sentoit 
et sofroit. / … Silence ot le cuer diviers” ‘And the human heart is a creature / that has 
a strange and peculiar nature… his thoughts tormented him, / and he felt this and 
suffered from it… Silence’s heart was divided against itself’ (Sarah Roche-Mahdi, 
Silence 124-127).   
From the telling homonyms of the Roman de Silence to the paradoxical 
prophecies of the Vie de Sainte Euphrosine, each text explores how language inscribes 
(itself on) trans characters and how these characters may creatively sustain themselves 
in relation to these inscriptions.  Thus, these stories foreground the significance of 
language, and its limits, to “sexed” being.  “[L]anguage’s transformative promise” 
(Victoria Pitts-Taylor, “Editors’ Note” 9) is also one of the categories called upon by 
those engaged today with questions of “trans-” “across disciplinary borders, across 
spatial and temporal planes, moving as well among public and private, academic and 
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personal, mind and body, and troubling those distinctions” (Pitts-Taylor 9).13  For 
example, Susan Stryker, Paisley Currah, and Lisa Jean Moore, in speaking to the 
“critical deployment of ‘trans-’operations and movements” (13), and the “new social 
ontologies” (14) that may be occasioned “by putting ‘trans-’ in the place that Foucault 
assigned to sexuality” (14), ultimately describe the “movement between 
territorializing and deterritorializing ‘trans-’ and its suffixes” (14) as an “essentially 
poetic practice through which radically new possibilities for being in the world can 
start to emerge” (14, emphasis added).  Their call for trans-poesis looks forward, but, 
as Raskolnikov points out, some of this desire that we now sometimes call trans is also 
very old: people have “been concealing, queering and changing their sex since time 
immemorial” (“Transgendering Pride” 157) and “[t]he term ‘transgendered,’ like the 
term ‘queer,’ is a term conceived broadly enough to potentially include medieval 
people” (158).  Putting Raskolnikov in dialogue with Stryker, Currah, and Moore, 
then, yields something like this: medieval narratives of transgender may participate, 
and have already participated, in the “essentially poetic practice through which 
radically new possibilities for being in the world can start to emerge.”  These medieval 
narratives are our future anterior: they will have been trans poetics.   
 My hunch, though, is that the analogy between contemporary and medieval 
accounts of transgender is only partly about legacies of “concealing, queering and 
changing… sex”: it has just as much, if not more, to do with the category of 
                                                 
13 It is interesting that Pitts-Taylor makes reference to the psychoanalytic notion of “transference” in the 
Editors’ Note opening on to WSQ’s special issue on “trans-” while explaining the “reading experience” 
of the issue: “We called this reading experience a trans-action, to emphasize the extent to which this 
issue is a call to action, yet the model of a trans-action perhaps suggests too much finality, as if you 
read the articles and then you’re done. Perhaps the trans- we need is ‘transference,’ the name for the 
mistake that makes psychoanalysis possible, but in addition the name for a relationship that is also a 
gift, as in transferring something among us: the readers, writers, and editors” (9-10).   
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subjectivity as such.  This shift is important, for it spells out part of the difference 
between what is at stake in a psychoanalytic account of sexual difference and, indeed, 
what is at stake for the philosophical vocabularies on which Stryker, Currah, and 
Moore draw in this citation.  When they describe the “movement between 
territorializing and deterritorializing ‘trans-’ and its suffixes” (14), they are calling on 
the terms of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and Deleuze and Guattari soundly 
reject the notion of castration:  
We know very well where lack – and its subjective correlative – come from.  
Lack (manque) is created, planned, and organized in and through social 
production… It is never primary; production is never organized on the basis of 
a pre-existing need or lack (manque). It is lack that infiltrates itself, creates 
empty spaces or vacuoles, and propagates itself in accordance with the 
organization of an already existing organization of production. The deliberate 
creation of lack as a function of market economy is the art of a dominant class 
(Anti-Oedipus 28).   
 
Put most minimally, the difference between a psychoanalytic account of sexual 
difference and the philosophical vocabulary referenced above is one of limits.  It is the 
narration of limits that I believe these extremely old transgender narratives offer as 
something new to contemporary critical theories of (trans)gender: these limits are not 
found along the contours of a sexual difference which would be reduced to a “genital 
difference”; they lie elsewhere and they take different forms depending on the 
narrative and the character in question: for example, for Silence, it emerges in the 
scene wherein the allegorical figure of Reason tells him that to live as a girl once again 
would be for him a form of death.  For Esmerade, it emerges in his progressive 
physical deterioration upon being cut off from the other monks of the monastery.  It 
even emerges for the hermaphrodites, who, in their pursuit of limitlessness, 
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nonetheless keep bumping into strange obstacles.  While what I am grouping under the 
name “the limit” thus takes different forms in each of the texts I consider, some sort of 
limit is always present; in this last sense, these limits are intractable even as they are 
moving targets.   
 In her account of Lacan’s “not-all” subject position, Copjec approaches and 
then retreats from the assertion that “not-all” or “feminine” subjectivity – what, then, I 
am calling “transgender subjectivity” – would be in some sense the fundamental 
expression of human subjectivity.  She writes,   
 We are not going to begin our reading, as is customary, on the left, but rather 
 on the right, or female, side of the formulas. As opposed to the fairly common 
 prejudice that  psychoanalysis constructs the woman as secondary, as a mere 
 alteration of the man, the primary term, these formulas suggest that there is a 
 kind of priority to the right side. This reading of the formulas is consistent with 
 the privilege given the mathematical  antinomies by Kant, who not only deals 
 with them first but also grants the mathematical synthesis a more immediate 
 type of certitude than its dynamical counterpart. In Kant’s analysis, it is the 
 dynamical antionomies (the ‘male side’ of the formulas, in our reading) that 
 appear in many ways secondary, a kind of resolution to a more fundamental 
 irresolvability, a total and complete impasse manifested by the mathematical 
 conflict… (Read My Desire 217).  
 
I will address the details of Copjec’s reading of Lacan’s formulas of sexual difference 
in Chapter Five, but for the moment, I would simply like to point to her identification 
of the “feminine” (as she writes, “female”14) subject position as having “a kind of 
priority,” such that the “masculine” position would constitute “a kind of resolution to 
a more fundamental irresolvability.”  The emptiness and irresolvability faced by the 
not-all/transgender subject – the absence of any signifier that can account for such a 
subject’s, any subject’s, “being” – means that such a subject is (silently) called upon to 
                                                 
14 I will address what I regard as problematic in Copjec’s equation of “feminine” subject positions with 
“femaleness” in Chapter Five.  
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sustain him-, her-, or hirself, as Copjec writes, “from the side of the void” (“The Fable 
of the Stork” 72).  Those subjects Lacan describes as “masculine” would be, in 
Copjec’s terms, on “the side of the symbolic” (72); but those on the side of the void, 
anxious and creative, seek signifiers, too.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Transgender Subjectivity and the Logic of Sexual Difference 
 
  
Introduction 
Perhaps it could be argued that gender studies and Lacanian psychoanalysis read each 
other askew; indeed, they read each other, and reach for each other, rather queerly.  
Provisionally defining gender studies as the study of the stakes of sexual identity, 
sexuality, and their multifarious disruptions, it is easy to see that Judith Butler, at least, 
one of the foremost thinkers in the field, has a certain profound investment in thinking 
through psychoanalytic claims about sex and sexuality.15  Her texts Antigone’s Claim 
and Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex, demonstrating a 
deconstructivist approach that takes seriously Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s remark 
that “[t]he critique in deconstruction [. . .] is the critique of something that is 
extremely useful, something without which we cannot do anything” (qtd. in Bodies 
27), deal with almost nothing but the questions and vocabulary of Freudian and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis.  In this way, she enters into a reputable history of thoughtful 
feminist and critical encounters with psychoanalysis, a list that includes the likes of 
Simone de Beauvoir, Hélène Cixous, Jacques Derrida, and Luce Irigaray. 
 Conversely, contemporary Lacanians from time to time return gender studies’ 
attention: Butler’s texts in particular have stimulated acute readings from writers such 
as Joan Copjec and Tim Dean. Yet these responses are not precisely reciprocal; 
                                                 
15 As noted in the Introduction, I am using the term gender studies to outline rather loosely the study of 
sex, gender, and sexuality, such that it might comprise both “queer theory” and “transgender studies” as 
well. However, these fields are not ideologically assimilable. 
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Copjec and Dean deal primarily in psychoanalytic vocabulary without taking up the 
vocabulary proffered by Butler (such as “the lesbian phallus” or “the morphological 
imaginary”) and without sufficiently identifying or attending to the rationale, or the 
desire, motivating Butler’s concerns.  Rather, much of their responses could be 
qualified as “corrective” readings of Butler’s readings of psychoanalysis.  
Perhaps these correctives are warranted, given Butler’s own thoroughgoing critiques 
of psychoanalysis, but more could be gained, politically and psychically, if gender 
studies and Lacanian psychoanalysis integrated their energies and their political and 
intellectual concerns less fractiously but no less queerly, and with just as much desire.  
What do gender studies and Lacanian psychoanalysis have to offer one another?  Is it 
possible to integrate the two domains, or do they, as Copjec charges16 and as Butler 
herself seems to worry in Antigone’s Claim17 represent fundamentally incompatible 
approaches? 
 Gender studies and Lacanian psychoanalysis share a set of common questions, 
including: What is a subject?  What qualifies a human as human?  What is the role of 
sex in the production of subjectivity?  What is the role of sexuality in the production 
of subjectivity?  What conceptual differences separate the terrains of “sex” and 
                                                 
16 Copjec: “I noted already that there was a crucial difference between hers [Butler’s] and the 
psychoanalytic position on sex. I want now to go further by exposing the ‘total incompatibility’ of the 
two positions” (209). 
17 Butler: “It is why, for instance, it would be difficult to find a fruitful engagement at the present time 
between the new Lacanian formalisms and the radical queer politics of, for example, Michael Warner 
and friends. The former insists on fundamental notions of sexual difference, which are based on rules 
that prohibit and regulate sexual exchange, rules we can break only to find ourselves ordered by them 
anew. The latter calls into question forms of sexual foundationalism that cast viable forms of queer 
sexual alliance as illegitimate or, indeed, impossible and unlivable. At its extreme, the radical sexual 
politics turns against psychoanalysis or, rather, its implicit normativity, and the neoformalists turn 
against queer studies as a ‘tragically’ utopian enterprise” (Antigone’s Claim 75) 
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“sexuality”?  In spite of these shared concerns, sexual difference, what it is and what it 
means, often becomes a point of contention.  This antagonism is perhaps most 
stringently encapsulated in Kate Bornstein’s response to Lacanian psychoanalyst 
Catherine Millot’s text on transsexuality, when the former writes, “Gender 
terrorists are not the leather daddies or back-seat Betties. Gender terrorists are not the 
married men, shivering in the dark as they slip on their wives’ panties. Gender 
terrorists are those who, like Ms. Millot, bang their heads against a gender system 
which is real and natural; and who then use gender to terrorize the rest of us. These 
are the real terrorists: the Gender Defenders” (236).  The discourses of gender studies 
and Lacanian psychoanalysis collide to particularly spectacular effect around the 
questions of transsexuality and transgenderism.  What remains to be seen is whether or 
not these spectacular effects might be channeled into some sort of understanding for a 
logic of sexual difference for present bodies as well as “the holographic and moving 
contours of bodies to come, of bodies as they might come” (Berger 64). 
 
I. Something Has Been Lost 
In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Freud writes that we as human animals are 
all bisexual (141) and that we are all perverts (160).  The radical promise of Freud’s 
words on perversion has not gone unnoticed by gender theorists, who have rightly 
pointed to certain strident passages in Freud’s writings in order to object to a facile 
vilification of Freud as anti homosexuality.18  Less attention seems to have been paid, 
                                                 
18 See, for example, Teresa de Lauretis’s discussion of “Freud’s negative theory of sexuality” (xi), 
where “‘normal’ is conceived only by approximation, is more a projection than an actual state of being, 
while perversion and neurosis (the repressed form of perversion) are the actual forms and contents of 
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however, to Freud’s words on bisexuality and the provocative connections between 
perversion and bisexuality (bisexuality as related to psychical hermaphroditism and/or 
physical hermaphroditism, as well as bisexuality as homo- plus heterosexuality).19   
These terms, “bisexual” and “perversion,” have specific connotations for Freud 
that do not map seamlessly onto contemporary, quotidian usages of the words.  While 
it is in his discussion of “inversion” that Freud comes to offer his theory on 
bisexuality, the latter is not to be too quickly assimilated to matters of the sexual 
instinct.  While some gender theorists would have us attentively separate out the terms 
“sex,” “gender,” and “sexuality,” for Freud, bisexuality references sex, or, for him, the 
categories “man” and “woman,” as well as sexuality: “It is popularly believed that a 
human being is either a man or a woman. Science, however, knows of cases in which 
the sexual characters are obscured, and in which it is consequently difficult to 
determine the sex” (7).  Freud expands on this observation, that there exist individuals 
who could be referred to as physical hermaphrodites, to add, “The importance of these 
abnormalities lies in the unexpected fact that they facilitate our understanding of 
normal development. For it appears that a certain degree of anatomical 
hermaphroditism occurs normally. In every normal male or female individual, traces 
are found of the apparatus of the opposite sex” (7).  Here again we see Freud at work 
disentangling only to re-link the notions of normal and abnormal, positing a relational 
configuration between the two that does not easily admit of any naturalization, 
                                                                                                                                            
sexuality” (xii). See also the Introduction to and Paul Robinson’s chapter, “Freud and Homosexuality,” 
in Dean and Lane, Homosexuality and Psychoanalysis. 
19 The excellent work of Gayle Salamon is a notable exception. See, in particular, “The Bodily Ego and 
the Contested Domain of the Material.” 
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reification, or prioritization of the so-called “normal.”  As in so many cases for Freud, 
it is the “abnormal” that serves to provide insight into the “normal,” but, as de Lauretis 
writes, this “normal” is always a “projection” (The Practice of Love xii).  The 
incidence of anatomical hermaphroditism leads Freud to suggest that “… an originally 
bisexual physical disposition has, in the course of evolution, become modified into a 
unisexual one, leaving behind only a few traces of the sex that has become atrophied” 
(7).  In other words, Freud would have us believe that bisexuality, meaning both in 
terms of object choice and that of sexed being, is the condition of human subjectivity 
as such.  
On the very first page of Three Essays, Freud provisionally defines the sexual 
object as “the person from whom sexual attraction proceeds,” after which he defines 
the sexual aim as “the act towards which the instinct tends” (2).  He further defines 
“the normal sexual aim” (15) as “the union of the genitals in the act known as 
copulation” (15).  This latter, when read without the context of Freud’s further 
elaboration on perversion, smacks of uninspiring normativity, and it is moments these 
like that rightly rankle some sensibilities.  However, in the summary at the end of the 
text, Freud expands his definition of erogenous zones in a way that seems suggestive 
for an accompanying redefinition of the terrain of aims and object choices: “… sexual 
excitation in children springs from a multiplicity of forces. Satisfaction arises first and 
foremost from the appropriate sensory excitation of what we have described as 
erotogenic zones. It seems probable that any part of the skin and any sense-organ – 
probably, indeed, any organ – can function as an erotogenic zone…” (99).   
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What has happened in the meantime, between Freud’s initial definition of 
sexual object as a person, and these closing words on what can be considered 
erogenous?  While Freud would wish to carefully distinguish a sexual object from the 
(sexual/desiring) subject and her erogenous zones, such that auto-erotism would be 
defined as the subject taking herself as object, the “multiplicity of forces” of which 
Freud writes speaks to what is at play in polymorphous perversion, a state or form of 
desiring that admits of various deviations from the “normal” sexual objects and aim.  
Again evidencing a will to stem the flow of “commonsensical” chains of association 
between sexual instincts and objects, Freud concludes his section on inversion with the 
following cautioner:  
It has been brought to our notice that we have been in the habit of regarding 
the connection between the sexual instinct and the sexual object as more 
intimate than it in fact is. Experience of the cases that are considered abnormal 
has shown us that in them the sexual instinct and the sexual object are merely 
soldered together – a fact which we have been in danger of overlooking in 
consequence of the uniformity of the normal picture, where the object appears 
to form part and parcel of the instinct. We are thus warned to loosen the bond 
that exists in our thoughts between instinct and object. It seems probable that 
the sexual instinct is in the first instance independent of its object; nor is its 
origin likely to be due to its object’s attractions (14). 
 
This caveat, that the sexual object and the sexual instinct are “merely soldered 
together” (14), would seem already to give the lie to a definitional relegation of the 
sexual object to persons (and perhaps by extension the relegation of “the normal 
sexual aim” to genital copulation).   
 Yetif the condition of human subjectivity as such is bisexuality, and if, as 
Lacan writes, Freud “posit[s] sexuality as essentially polymorphous, aberrant” (Four 
176), then why in Lacan’s reading of Freud are there only two sexual positions, 
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masculine and feminine?  Where Butler might advocate gender play, where Derrida 
has been said to “dream [...] of a sexual relationship, albeit sexed otherwise: not one 
that is divided into two parts, played by two recognizable partners, but one that is 
inscribed in multiple ways” (Berger 60), Lacan replies implacably that “there’s no 
such thing as a sexual relationship” (Encore 57) and that there is a feminine way to 
respond to that failure and a masculine way to respond to it.  How do these 
qualifications, that there is no sexual relationship and that there are only two sexual 
positions, follow from the conditions of bisexuality and polymorphous perversion?  
And don’t these qualifications make psychoanalysis seem rather sexually 
impoverished with respect to other perspectives? 
 For Lacan, polymorphous perversion is the effect of castration, and, in the 
spirit of a perverse temporality, castration is equally the effect of polymorphous 
perversion.  How is this so?  In speaking of infantile sexuality, Freud provides the 
example of thumb sucking, explaining that in thumb sucking a child seeks a 
previously experienced pleasure that “is now remembered” (Three Essays 181) . Later 
Freud qualifies, “The finding of an object is in fact a refinding of it” (222).  For Lacan, 
finding and refinding objects is not only the infantile, polymorphous precursor to an 
eventual castration by way of shame, disgust, morality (Freud 191), and the Oedipal 
drama but also, or rather, the sign that the subject has already been castrated.20  For 
Lacan, as soon as there is an object, evidenced in the example of the infant’s turn to 
the thumb, there is castration. Something, in other words, has been lost. Lacan writes, 
                                                 
20 On the roles of shame, disgust, morality, and the Oedipal drama as forces of castration, Freud writes, 
“On this view, the forces destined to retain the sexual instinct upon certain lines are built up in 
childhood chiefly at the cost of perverse sexual impulses and with the assistance of education” (232). 
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 [W]hat makes us distinguish this satisfaction from the mere auto-eroticism of 
 the erogenous zone is the object that we confuse all too often with that upon 
 which the drive closes—this object, which is in fact simply the presence of a 
 hollow, a void, which can be occupied, Freud tells us, by any object, and 
 whose agency we know only in the form of the lost object, the petit a. The 
 objet petit a is not the origin of the oral drive. It is not introduced as the 
 original food, it is introduced from the fact that no food will ever satisfy the 
 oral drive, except by circumventing the eternally lacking object (Four 
 Fundamental 179–80) 
 
Lacan points to Freud’s specification that the object can be “any object” (180), 
commenting elsewhere, “Let us look at what he says – As far as the object in the drive 
is concerned, let it be clear that it is, strictly speaking, of no importance. It is a matter 
of total indifference” (168).  In other words, any object may be one toward which the 
drive might tend; what seems new here is the reason for such pulsion, as well as what 
is signified by that object around which the drive closes.  Here the regression is not 
precisely, for example, from thumb to breast to milk, but rather from any object to 
object a as “the eternally lacking object.”  Lacan tells us that object a is 
introduced from the fact that nothing, no thing—no food, no breast, no person—will 
ever satisfy the drive.  Object a as “cause of desire” (Encore 92) is not the object that 
the subject seizes, nor is it the aim of desire, but rather, “It is either pre-subjective, or 
the foundation of an identification of the subject, or the foundation of an identification 
disavowed by the subject” (Four 186).  It is, indeed, the foundation of a subject, but a 
contingent foundation: as Dean explains, “[T]his object counterintuitively 
(ungrammatically?) appears to precede the subject, to found the subject... Yet the 
apparent foundationalism of object a betokens a radically contingent foundation, since 
as Ellie Ragland points out, ‘[w]e humans are grounded in objects that are not 
themselves grounded’” (Beyond 194).  In insisting that “any object” can stand in as a 
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representative for object a and that object a is only a further representative of “the 
eternally lacking object,” Lacan distances himself from a reading of Freud that would 
see a sexual developmental progression or “maturation” from the oral to the anal to the 
genital drives.  Instead, Lacan emphasizes the essential groundlessness of object a and 
its voidlike role in the circuitous motion of the drive (Four Fundamental 181).  
 Lacan offers a variety of accounts of the “birth” or “origin” of these 
ungrounded objects a.  The story of the lamella, as one such example, is Lacan’s 
playful revision of Plato’s myth in the Symposium as told by the narrative voice of 
Aristophanes.  Replacing the missing parts as explained by Plato with the figure of the 
lamella, Lacan writes: 
 This lamella, this organ, whose characteristic is not to exist, but which is 
 nevertheless an organ – I can give you more details as to its zoological place – 
 is the libido. It is the libido, qua pure life instinct, that is to say, immortal life, 
 or irrepressible life, life that has need of no organ, simplified, indestructible 
 life. It is precisely what is subtracted from the living being by virtue of the fact 
 that it is subject to the cycle of sexual reproduction. And it is of this that all the 
 forms of the objet a that can be enumerated are the representatives the 
 equivalents. The objets a are merely its representatives, its figures (Four 
 Fundamental 197–98) 
 
This is yet another narration of castration, this time a rather surreal mythologization 
where something called a “lamella” (which the Oxford English Dictionary defines as 
“[a] thin plate, scale, layer, or film, esp. of bone or tissue; e.g. one of the thin scales or 
plates which compose some shells, one of the gills forming the hymenium of a 
mushroom, one of the erect scales appended to the corollas of some flowers”) 
transforms into an organ, and where that organ “is” the libido.  In fact the lamella-as-
libido provides the thin, hymenium contiguity for Lacan between what the subject 
loses via sexed reproduction and the order of the real, for “[i]t is precisely what is 
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subtracted from the living being by virtue of the fact that it is subject to the cycle of 
sexed reproduction” (Four Fundamental 198).  Lacan describes the libido as 
“essential” to “understanding the nature of the drive” (205), and his usage of a 
mythical organ to figure a real loss is strategic, for, as he writes, “This organ is unreal. 
Unreal is not imaginary. The unreal is defined by articulating itself on the real in a 
way that eludes us, and it is precisely this that requires that its representation should be 
mythical, as I have made it” (205).  In Encore, meiosis will serve as the framework to 
tell the same story, again constituting “a thoroughly obvious subtraction” (66), whose 
“‘waste’ returns to haunt the libidinal subject in the form of object a” (Suzanne 
Barnard, “Tongues” 174). 
 As Suzanne Barnard tells it in her contribution to Reading Seminar XX: 
Lacan’s Major Work on Love, Knowledge, and Feminine Sexuality, the lost object 
figured in Four Fundamental Concepts is “an indestructible fragment of asexual, 
nonsymbolized libido” (“Tongues” 176), and it is lost to subjects not yet marked by 
the cut of sexual difference, therefore subjects who could be described as “asexual” or, 
better (bringing Freud back and emphasizing the sexual aspect of this so-called 
asexuality), “bisexual.”  As Barnard explains, by the cut of sexual difference, subjects 
do not lose their other halves, but their “asexual ‘sameness’” (176).  Perhaps we could 
describe this intermediary or rather semimythical state of ex-sistence prior to sexual 
difference as one of a-sexual asexuality, a scene imaginable, too, from a Freudian 
standpoint if we graft onto it his own account of the bisexual, polymorphously 
perverse subject.  This is a scene that will resurface when we turn to Dean’s account of 
the queerer aspects of the psychoanalytic narration of sexuality. 
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 Lacan’s account of object a seems to pose no threat to any range of queer 
theories of sexuality insofar as it does not presuppose, for example, that a particular 
type of object should or in fact ever could satisfy the drive.  Indeed, Lacan repeatedly 
mocks the institution of so-called genital primacy (Ethics 88).  And yet none of this 
talk of objects, lamellas, and libido speaks directly to Lacan’s assertion that there are 
two possible subject positions, masculine or feminine.  Left only with a story of a-
sexual asexuality, we might be halfway to a Lacanian narration of transgender 
ontology—not such a radical thought when we recall that Freud was the one who 
pointed out the constitutive bisexual perversion of the human unconscious.  From 
whence, then, the feminine and masculine subject positions? 
 No matter where we locate the instantiation of loss in the subject (meiosis, 
birth, thumb sucking), it is clear that for psychoanalysis we are dealing with a desiring 
subject, a subject who lacks not simply some locatable object (e.g., a penis) but who 
lacks being as such.  But, according to Lacan, there is not only one way to desire.  
This is another way of saying that there is not only one way to apprehend the lack in 
the Other.  There are two sexual positions available to human subjects because, as 
Lacan asserts in Encore using the language of logic and mathematical formalization, 
subjects are positioned differently with respect to one term: the phallic function.  
There are two sexual positions insofar as every subject is either “all” or “not-all” 
under the phallic function.   
 Before falling too quickly into the abyss that can follow from the explication of 
the phallic function, a few preliminary words are in order on sexual difference as it 
relates to signification itself: Copjec notes that “[s]ex is the stumbling block of sense” 
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(204), citing Lacan’s own comment that “[e]verything implied by the analytic 
engagement with human behavior indicates not that meaning reflects the sexual, but 
that it makes up for it” (qtd. on 204).  Similarly, Renata Salecl writes in her 
introduction to Sexuation that sexual difference “is first and above all the name for a 
certain fundamental deadlock inherent in the symbolic order” (2).  In fact, it is 
impossible to signify sex, and the phallus serves as “an empty signifier that stands for” 
that impossibility (Barnard, “Introduction” 10).  Feminine and masculine subjects, 
then, relate to that failure, or are that failure, differently, or, as Lacan writes, 
 The universe is the place where, due to the fact of speaking, everything 
 succeeds... in making the sexual relationship fail... The epithalamion, the 
 duet..., the alternation, the love letter, they’re not the sexual relationship. They 
 revolve around the fact that there’s no such thing as a sexual relationship. 
 There is thus the male way of revolving around it, and then the other one, that I 
 will not designate otherwise because it’s what I’m in the process of elaborating 
 this year – how that is elaborated in the female way. It is elaborated on the 
 basis of the not-whole (Encore 56–57). 
 
What is the status of this hotly contested “not-whole,” and what does it illuminate 
about the phallic function?  Veering into yet another scene of castration, the formulas 
of sexuation provide the “logical matrix” (Salecl 2) of the deadlock of sexual 
difference.  As Lacan recounts, the formulas consist of the following: the right side of 
the formula, which reads ∃χ Φχ and ∀χ Φχ, figures the “feminine” side and can be 
translated to state that there is not one x that is not subject to the phallic function and 
that not every x is subject to the phallic function.  The feminine subject finds “herself” 
“not-all” by way of negation insofar as “she” forms part of an open set, open and 
thereby infinite because it is not constituted by an exceptional figure.  No shared trait 
– aside from the absence of any such shared trait – serves to define the set; no 
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constitutive outside functions close her set.  Exceptionally lacking exception, though, 
and being only loosely linked by virtue of an absence offers/burdens the feminine 
subject (with) a particular perspective on the phallic function and thus on what 
grounds the masculine subject, which Barnard describes as “a view to the contingency 
of the signifier of the Other in its anchoring function… [S]he ‘knows’ 
that the signifier of phallic power merely lends a certain mysterious presence to the 
Law that veils its real impotence” (“Tongues” 178).  One of the logical consequences 
of such a position, of “being in the symbolic ‘without exception’” (178), is that she has 
a different relation than the masculine subject, not only to the symbolic but also to the 
lack in the Other. 
 The “anchoring function” lacking to the feminine subject is located on the 
“masculine” side of Lacan’s formula: “On the left, the lower line – ∀χ Φχ – indicates 
that it is through the phallic function that man as whole acquires his inscription [. . .] 
with the proviso that this function is limited due to the existence of an x by which the 
function Φχ is negated [. . .]: ∃χ Φχ ” (Encore 79).  This exception also immediately 
takes on a truly exceptional status, from the standpoint of the masculine subject who is 
established by it, for the exception proffers the outside that closes “his” set and the 
limit that grounds “his” being; it thereby proffers a sort of support not afforded the 
feminine subject.  One figure of this exception would be that of the mythical primal 
father, he who evades castration and thereby enjoys unlimited jouissance. In other 
words, the masculine subject is only “whole” or “all” as a result of the fact that he is 
permitted (permits himself?) the fantasy of one who escapes the very same set that 
grounds his being: “That is what is known as the father function – whereby we find, 
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via negation, the proposition [. . .], which grounds the operativity (exercice) of what 
makes up for the sexual relationship with castration, insofar as that relationship is in 
no way inscribable. The whole here is thus based on the exception posited as the end-
point (terme), that is, on that which altogether negates Φχ” (Lacan, Encore 79–80).  
As Lacan makes explicit here, castration/sexual difference is something that 
fundamentally, if incompletely, makes up for the absence of the sexual relationship.  
By this logic, the sexual positions borne of sexual difference figure as solutions, 
no doubt principally unsatisfying ones, for the loss of a sort of relation that was in fact 
never possible, a relation of One-ness or complementarity, or for the loss of that 
missing half that Plato tells us, somewhat cruelly, we once had. Importantly, though, 
nothing in this account specifies that the lost/nonexistent sexual relation was a 
heterosexual one.  As Tracy McNulty has noted, “If the ‘relation’ that is lost is really 
the relation to the One, to unity or wholeness, then this would be true regardless of sex 
or sexual ‘orientation’” (pers. comm.). 
 At least in this Encore explanation of the formulas of sexuation, Lacan’s 
introduction to the feminine side reads quite differently from his introduction to the 
masculine side.  Perhaps in the spirit of approximating form and content, the 
masculine description is considerably more formulaic.  Immediately following his 
definition of the masculine side, his words concerning the feminine side posit a 
proviso that will prove fruitful for the turn to questions of transsexuality and 
transgenderism: 
 On the other side, you have the inscription of the woman portion of speaking 
 beings. Any speaking being whatsoever, as is expressly formulated in Freudian 
 theory, whether provided with the attributes of masculinity – attributes that 
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 remain to be determined – or not, is allowed to inscribe itself in this part. If it 
 inscribes itself there, it will not allow for any universality – it will be a not-
 whole, insofar as it has the choice of positing itself in Φx or of not being there 
 (80). 
 
Of course part of what is at stake in this particular citation is the status of the word 
choice.  Is it significant that the matter of choice comes up in his description of the 
feminine side of the formula?  And when Lacan states that any speaking subject has 
the choice to position itself or not in Φχ, what is the relationship between the “choice” 
signaled here and any possibility of “choice” occasioned by Butlerian notions of 
gender play?  Meanwhile, how do Butler’s and Lacan’s regimes of choice articulate 
with Susan Stryker’s observation that “performativity” and its promises do not always 
speak to “the self-understanding of many transgender people, who consider their sense 
of gendered self not to be subject to their instrumental will, not divestible, not a form 
of play” (“(De)Subjugated Knowledges” 10)?  And what are the differences between 
the experiences of transsexualism and those of transgenderism when it comes to 
thinking about “choice?” 
 Already we can see further sets of challenges, knotting around questions of 
disciplinary allegiance, contestation, dissidence, identity politics, and ontology.  These 
issues, too, will necessitate delicate unraveling as we continue to explore what 
Lacanian psychoanalysis and gender studies have to offer one another.  Still, it is 
statements like Lacan’s, above, that offer hope, beyond the fears and objections of 
theorists like Butler and Copjec, that there is room for meeting ground between 
Lacanian psychoanalysis and gender studies, over and above – in fact, sometimes 
revolving precisely around – the divisions concerning (and that are perhaps inherent 
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in) sexual difference. 
 
II. ‘[P]sychoanalysis is a queer theory’ 
Dean further supports such optimism when he declares that “psychoanalysis is a queer 
theory” (Beyond Sexuality 215), meaning, in part, that Lacanian psychoanalysis has 
“antinormative potential” (217).  One of the principal stakes of Dean’s project is “to 
think sexuality outside the terms of gender” (183).  In accordance with many thinkers, 
he considers the debate between essentialism and constructivism, or what he calls 
foundationalism and rhetoricalism, a false alternative, and he takes a view on sexuality 
that he describes as “both immoderately antifoundationalist and antirhetoricalist” 
(178).  In this way, he takes exception to Butler’s account of sexuality as outlined in 
Bodies That Matter, for, as he argues, Butler’s is a rhetoricalist approach.  According 
to Dean, “rhetoricalist theories of sexuality effectively evacuate the category of desire 
from their accounts” by failing to take account of “what in rhetoric or discourse 
exceeds language” (178).  Desire will prove essential to Dean’s own account of 
sexuality; in his project to deheterosexualize desire, Dean develops the notion of 
object a in order to theorize sexuality “outside the terms of gender and identity” (222).  
Dean demonstrates that a Lacanian theory of desire is “determined not by the gender 
of object-choice, but by the object a (l’objet petit a), which remains largely 
independent of gender” (216).  By this move, Dean, via Lacan, goes further than Freud 
did in his account of humans’ constitutive bisexuality.  Dean reminds readers of 
Freud’s claim that “we’ve all made a homosexual object-choice” (219).  However, as 
Dean makes clear, such a pronouncement presupposes that an object be gendered in 
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the first place; by relying on humans’ “bisexuality,” Freud leaves intact the possibility 
that objects may be “somehow identifiable as masculine or feminine” (219).  Object a, 
on the other hand, is not so easily assimilated to either hetero- or homosexual frames.  
Dean reminds readers of Lacan’s “unthinkable list” of possible objects a – “lips…, the 
rim of the anus, the tip of the penis, the vagina, the slit formed by the eyelids, even the 
hornshaped aperture of the ear…, the mamilla, faeces, the phallus (imaginary object), 
the urinary flow…, the phoneme, the gaze, the voice—the nothing” (Lacan qtd. in 
Beyond Sexuality 251–52). 
 Part of what is at stake in Dean’s insistence on object a as the queerly 
“ordering” term for sexuality is his wish to relocate the scene of desire from one 
revolving around the phallus, which, according to Lacan, is the name for a certain lack 
borne of the desire of the Other (“Meaning” 83).  Dean is sensitive to various feminist 
and queer critiques of Lacanian terminology, noting that suspicions about such terms 
as lack and the phallus are warranted, given, in part, the theological origins of lack and 
the psychoanalytic legacy of associating homosexuality with deficiency (Beyond 
Sexuality 248).  Master terms such as lack, loss, castration, death, and sexual 
difference are not ideologically neutral, and Dean advises caution about how different 
terms may “imply invidious distinctions or otherwise embed normative ideologies of 
gender and sexuality” (248). 
 According to Dean, the limitation of situating the phallus at the center of a 
theoretical account of desire is not only that the phallus has such a problematic history 
but that it is a single term; object a, on the other hand, “implies multiple, 
heterogeneous possibilities for desire” (250).  Dean wishes to figure desire within 
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“terms of multiplicity” (249) rather than principally according to an “ideology of lack” 
(247).  He cites Lacan’s assertion that “[d]esire is a relation of being to lack” (qtd. in 
Beyond Sexuality 247) but emphasizes, too, that “the question of conceptualizing 
desire in terms of lack remains a stubborn problem” for a variety of queer- and 
feminist-minded projects (248).  Dean identifies the latter resistance as having 
precisely to do with the way that the ideology of lack intersects with castration in 
psychoanalytic theory (248).  In favor of such a scene, Dean turns instead to 
polymorphous perversion as a site of multiplicity, contending that theorizing desire 
from the point of excess instead of from the point of lack “makes desire essentially 
pluralistic, with all the inclusive implications of pluralism” (249). 
 For Dean, one of the advantages of theorizing desire from the starting point of 
polymorphous perversion arises from Freud’s understanding of polymorphous 
perversion as preceding normative – that is, genital – sexuality; in this way, perversion 
comes to represent a sort of “paradise lost” that “normal sexuality” will try, but never 
completely manage, to supplant (235).  In rehearsing Freud’s decision to classify 
perversion in terms not of content but rather of “exclusiveness and fixation” (236), 
Dean will go so far as to suggest that “the process of normalization itself is what’s 
pathological, since normalization ‘fixes’ desire and generates the exclusiveness of 
sexual orientation [heterosexual or homosexual] as its symptom” (237). 
 Thus for Dean, polymorphous perversion figures as a model for desire to 
which he would have subjects return, both foundational and desirable insofar as it 
predates normalization.  This move serves to shift focus from a scene of desire 
dependent on castration, “one that threatens to return us to the binary categories of 
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complementarity and homogeneity so inhospitable to non-normative sexualities” 
(Beyond Sexuality 249), to one dependent on a multiplicity of objects.  While he knits 
polymorphous perversion and object a together with multiplicity, heterogeneity, and 
possibility, it seems important to acknowledge once again that primary perversion 
remains deeply imbricated with loss: it names the “stage” that inculcates desire via the 
production of objects, and, as we have seen, these objects are always already 
irremediably lost objects.  Primary perversion also figures loss insofar as it is a lost 
stage, replaced as it is, to whatever extent that may be, by processes of normalization 
such as the formation of a sexual (orientation) identity.  Perversion thus takes on a 
curious status in Dean’s thought, for from one perspective it constitutes a state of 
desire that is less lacking – the sheer multiplicity of objects available gestures in this 
direction.  But insofar as these objects all remain lost objects, the opposite could be 
argued as well: via polymorphous perversion, the subject is more lacking by 
entertaining more (lost) objects.  However, this change in the scenery of desire, from 
lacking phalluses to abundant objects, represents a provocative and productive 
development and needs to be read with respect to Dean’s own project to make the 
discourses of queer theory and Lacanian psychoanalysis more conversant: “[T]hough 
Lacan reads to me like a queer theorist avant la lettre, the institutional history of 
psychoanalysis, particularly in the United States, has forestalled any such alliance. As 
I’ve already suggested, a good part of this book’s intent lies in forging one— with the 
understanding that such an alliance might require both parties to renounce some of 
their most cherished shibboleths” (Beyond Sexuality 226). 
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 While I am in accordance with Dean’s assertion that both queer theory and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis may need “to renounce some of their most cherished 
shibboleths,” I am interested in going in a slightly different direction than that outlined 
in Beyond Sexuality.  While Dean is abundantly clear that he is not interested in 
gender, he also specifies that sexual difference (which, as we know by now, should not 
be collapsed into the category of gender) cannot be so summarily discounted: “Let me 
make clear that I’m not claiming that sexual difference is inconsequential to this 
account of sexuality, just that it is secondary. Desire emerges before sexual 
difference” (267).  No doubt.  Insofar as desire is the other side of lack/loss/castration, 
desire has been with the subject since the days of the lost lamella. H owever, what is 
not of interest to Dean, at least in this text, is Lacan’s assertion that masculine and 
feminine subjects relate differently to object a.  According to Lacan, it is the 
masculine subject that is principally occupied with object a.  Queer as it is, could 
Dean’s account of desire be lacking the feminine? 
 Lacan writes that “the object – from at least one pole of sexual identification, 
the male pole – the object… puts itself in the place of what cannot be glimpsed of the 
Other” (Encore 63).  By contrast, for the feminine subject, “something other than 
object a is at stake in what comes to make up for the sexual relationship that does not 
exist” (63).  Here again, we see Lacan specifying that via sexual difference, something 
tries to make up for the absence of the sexual relation.  However, there is a 
fundamental asymmetry at play in the making up for lost/fantasized complementarity, 
for feminine and masculine subjects make up for the loss, in part, with recourse to 
different types of others. 
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 On this point, Dean offers a compelling criticism of Lacan, suggesting that, in 
placing object a on the side of the feminine subject in his sexuation graph (found on 
page 78 of Encore), Lacan betrays a heterosexist impulse that is contested by his 
actual explanation of the “birth” and function of object a: “Although his axiom ‘there 
is no sexual relation’ counters the heterosexist assumption of complementarity 
between the sexes, Lacan’s explanations of this axiom are nevertheless invariably 
couched in terms of male and female failures to relate to each other, 
rather than in terms of relationality’s failure as such, regardless of gender” 
(“Homosexuality” 137).  Identifying these explanations as instances of heterosexism at 
odds with Lacan’s own theory, Dean asserts again that Lacan’s theory of object a 
involves “a making other to myself of my own corporeal jouissance” such that “there 
is no way that desire can be, in the first instance, heterosexual” (137).21 
 Perhaps the position of object a in Lacan’s depiction is a little deceiving.  The 
sexuation graph seems to imply that feminine subjects lose all connection to object a, 
but we could read this instead to suggest that the feminine subject simply is not as 
invested in object a insofar as she might be overwhelmed with interrogating the 
phallic signifier and with a certain queer, inscrutable relation with the barred, lacking 
Other.  To my knowledge, Lacan does not anywhere specify that feminine subjects 
                                                 
21 Dean goes on to explain, however, that “[a]ll desire entails the presence of the symbolic Other, but 
since this Other has no gender – there is no ‘Other sex’ – desire involves a relation to otherness 
independent of sexual difference” (“Homosexuality” 137). In this shift, from questions of Lacan’s 
theory of desire to questions of sexual difference, Dean attempts to clarify desire’s independence from 
the regime of “gender” but obscures the insight of the formulas of sexuation that “gender” and “sexual 
difference” are not one and the same thing. Too closely linking gender and sexual difference, Dean runs 
the risk of mandating “gendered” readings of Lacan, which could in turn result in a theory at times 
illogically heterosexist. At various moments in his narrations of the formulas, Lacan, too, can be read as 
too closely linking gender and sexual difference, which is why I have based my meditation primarily on 
the formulas. 
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lose all connection with object a; rather, he writes simply that “something other than 
object a is at stake in what comes to make up for (suppléer) the sexual relationship 
that does not exist” (Encore 63).  Of importance here is that one consequence of 
sexual difference is that while the masculine subject becomes principally invested in 
object a – wherever he may locate it/them – as one compensation for the lack of the 
sexual relation, the feminine subject “is ‘twice’ related to the Other” (Barnard, 
“Tongues” 172).  I take this to mean that the feminine subject is related both to object 
a (autre, or other) as that “scrap of the real” lost through sexed reproduction and to the 
Other conceived of as the lacking Other.  
 Dean’s reading of Lacan’s representation of sexual difference suggests there 
may be something to Butler’s critique that the Lacanian notion of sexual difference 
enjoins compulsory heterosexuality, if not in the formulas themselves, then at least in 
one way of reading the sexuation graph representation.  In both Bodies That Matter 
and Antigone’s Claim, Butler performs readings of the subject’s entry into the 
symbolic via sexual differentiation, and two of her principal charges are that Lacan’s 
symbolic is normative and that the assumption of a sexed position enjoins compulsory 
heterosexuality.  In Antigone’s Claim, Butler turns from matters of discourse and 
materiality to the scene of kinship in order to explore how psychoanalysis might 
both/either compel and/or inhibit the forging of new kinds of community ties, ties that 
Butler subsumes under the promising header “radical kinship.”  Since this text 
provides a deeper reading of the Oedipal scene that she found so troublingly 
heterosexist in, particularly, chapter 3 of Bodies That Matter, I will concentrate my 
response on this somewhat more recent text. 
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 Butler’s investment in the possibility of imagining new forms of kinship ties 
has a strong affective and political attraction, which she wields to good end, for 
example, in her listing of the ways that “kinship has become fragile, porous, and 
expansive” (Antigone’s Claim 22).  Butler cites the mobility of children who, because 
of migration, exile, refugee status, or situations of divorce or remarriage, “move from 
one family to another, move from a family to no family, move from no family to a 
family, or live, psychically, at the crossroads of the family, or in multiply layered 
family situations” (22).  She points to the blending of straight and gay families, to gay 
nuclear families, and to straight or gay families where a child may have no mother or 
no father, or two mothers or two fathers, or half-brothers as friends (22–23), asking: 
“What has Oedipus engendered?... What will the legacy of Oedipus be for those who 
are formed in these situations, where positions are hardly clear, where the place of the 
father is dispersed, where the place of the mother is multiply occupied or displaced, 
where the symbolic in its stasis no longer holds?” (22–23).  No doubt this is a time of 
potentially unprecedented familial mobility.  Some would evaluate these realities as 
the sign of a crisis in “family values”; others would celebrate the more positive effects 
of the new types of ties and encounters.  In this text, though, Butler is also taking aim 
at a particular strain of psychoanalysis that would seem unexpectedly to ally itself on 
some levels with defenders of the heterosexual nuclear family.  Butler references such 
positions as she has encountered them, including psychoanalysts opposed to or at least 
worried about gay adoption as a possible source of psychosis for the adopted children, 
Jacques-Alain Miller’s alleged opposition to male homosexual marriage on account of 
its likely infidelity, and others’ suggestion that autism can be traceable to lesbian 
 67 
 
parenting (70).  Butler concludes, “These views commonly maintain that alternative 
kinship arrangements attempt to revise psychic structures in ways that lead to tragedy 
again, figured incessantly as the tragedy of and for the child.” 
 I, too, would object to the efficacy or relevance of such concerns, for many 
reasons.  As one objection, these views appear to share the assumption that something 
like “gender” needs to accord to (or succeed in according to) a sexual position . In 
other words, these views, where they exist (meaning both in some Lacanians’ readings 
of sexual difference and in Butler’s reading of Lacan’s understanding of sexual 
difference), suggest once again that gender accords with unconscious sexuation.  
What, for example, is a “lesbian” according to those concerned about autism in 
children?  What if an apparently “woman”-loving “heterosexual” “man” could be said 
to be unconsciously “feminine?”  If “he” is in a relationship with a subject also 
describable as unconsciously “feminine,” is “he” a “lesbian?”  Perhaps this divorcing 
of gender from unconscious sexuation sounds like another queer utopia and is for this 
reason, for some, unviable, but I think it is the logical consequence of Lacan’s claim 
that “[a]ny speaking being whatsoever, as is expressly formulated in Freudian theory, 
whether provided with the attributes of masculinity – attributes that remain to be 
determined – or not, is allowed to inscribe itself in [the woman portion of speaking 
beings]” (Encore 80).  I would like to join Butler in imagining sexuation otherwise 
than as a scene of compulsory heterosexuality.  However, I do not think that doing so 
requires locating a loophole in the Oedipal narrative, as Butler does in her 
interpretation of the Antigone story.  For while Butler is quite right to lament and fear 
the compulsory heterosexuality that provides a potent backdrop to many societal 
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norms and ideals, no one knew better than Lacan that, as he put it, “[i]deals are 
society’s slaves” (qtd. in Dean, Beyond Sexuality 229).  
 In her argument, Butler seems to cast the Oedipal scene as the only available 
solution within psychoanalysis to the failure of the sexual relation, as in her 
observation that, for Lacan, the symbolic is “the realm of the Law that regulates desire 
in the Oedipus complex” (Antigone’s Claim 18).  True, all subjects enter the symbolic, 
but the Oedipal drama is a principally “masculine” (and indeed a principally 
“obsessional,” if not a principally heterosexual) solution to the failure of the sexual 
relation, one that hallucinates an object as prohibited.  But as we have seen, there is 
not only one solution to the failure of the sexual relation: there are two!  In this way, 
Butler is quite right to turn to Antigone as an alternative to the Oedipal solution.  In 
Butler’s reading, Antigone helps us envisage new forms of kinship and, 
correspondingly, the “possibility of social transformation” (24).  Butler indicates that 
Antigone’s own position in her family represents one of kinship incoherence (22), 
insofar as Antigone could be read to love her brother incestuously (6), and insofar as 
her father is also her brother.  Butler notes that she is not advocating incest per se as a 
new, radical form of kinship (24); rather, in reflecting on the end of Sophocles’ play, 
she writes, “In this light, then, it is perhaps interesting to note that Antigone, who 
concludes the oedipal drama, fails to produce heterosexual closure for that drama, and 
that this may intimate the direction for a psychoanalytic theory that takes Antigone as 
its point of departure” (76).  Perhaps Butler is exactly right on this count as well.  
Perhaps psychoanalysis should take Antigone as its point of departure.  Through the 
figure of Antigone, Butler explores a non-Oedipal solution to the failure of the sexual 
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relation, one that in Lacan’s reading entails a specifically feminine encounter with the 
signifier.  However, she does so without avowing that this solution was available to 
subjects from the start, and it was not Oedipus who engendered it. 
 At some points, one might be led to wonder if Butler’s configurations of the 
allegedly sedimentary symbolic might owe a bit more to Claude Lévi-Strauss than to 
Lacan’s own reformulation, as for example when she writes, 
 The Elementary Structures of Kinship was published in 1947, and within six 
 years Lacan began to develop his more systematic account of the symbolic... 
 On the one hand, we are told that the rule of prohibiting incest is universal, but
  Lévi-Strauss also acknowledges that it does not always “work.” What he does 
 not pursue, however, is the question, what forms does its nonworking take? 
 Moreover, when the prohibition appears to work, does it have to sustain and 
 manage a specter of its nonworking in order to proceed? (Antigone’s Claim
 16–17). 
 
In contrast to Lévi-Strauss, Lacan is more explicit: the form the nonworking of the 
incest prohibition takes is femininity.  Feminine figures testify precisely to the failure 
of the prohibition, for, as Copjec eloquently plots out, “Lacan answers that the woman 
is not-all because she lacks a limit, by which he means she is not susceptible to the 
threat of castration; the ‘no’ embodied by this threat does not function for her” (Read 
My Desire 226).  While the “universal” incest prohibition does not “work” for the 
feminine subject, this does not necessarily mean that she has incestuous relations with 
or desires toward someone in her family (which may be composed as radically or as 
porously as permitted by the limits of our imaginations) – though she very well may, 
and I see no reason to shy away from Butler’s suggestion that Antigone’s desire for 
her brother Polynices is incestuous: “Is it perhaps the unlivable desire with which she 
lives, incest itself, that makes of her life a living death, that has no place within the 
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terms that confer intelligibility on life?” (Antigone’s Claim 23).  Nonetheless, I would 
emphasize that incest as one possible disruptive form of radical kinship is not the only 
stake here.  Rather, according to Lacan, no object – mother, father, brother, sister – is 
marked as prohibited for the feminine subject. Not only is incest not prohibited; no 
one thing is prohibited.  Thus, for the masculine subject, the point is not that he need 
necessarily be a heterosexual, ostensibly “biological” boy barred access to his 
heterosexual, “biologically” female mother, but that he be a subject who has fallen 
under the blow of some prohibition and by consequence takes up a position as 
unconsciously masculine.  And as McNulty has noted, “To believe that [the prohibited 
object is] the mother is a specific symptom, a particular way of resolving castration... 
by attributing it to the father and thereby making it ‘avoidable’ through obedience or 
submission to norms. [In other words,] it also reveals the ideology of norms as a way 
of avoiding castration” (pers. comm.).   
 On the other hand, for the feminine subject, the point is perhaps even more 
radical: regardless of her “gender,” the feminine subject is she to whom no prohibition 
is addressed.  No universal can be made of or for her.  The relief given the masculine 
subject, composing prohibitions as limits, does not transpire for the feminine subject.  
Instead, the nonworking of the prohibition is what ushers the feminine subject toward . 
. . maybe (who knows?) her brother/half-sister/stepmother/adoptive 
cousin/grandfather, and definitely toward a contingent encounter with the symbolic.  
With this in mind, I would suggest that Antigone’s claim on a future for kinship, or a 
future for relationality, as well as a future for psychoanalysis, has just as much, if not 
more, to offer by way of what she does as a feminine figure confronting a symbolic 
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that she is “totally, that is, limitlessly inscribed within” (Copjec, Read My Desire 227) 
as with what she does as a would-be incestuous figure that “represents not kinship in 
its ideal form but its deformation and displacement” (Butler, Antigone’s Claim 24). 
 Curiously, then, if we attempt a still more fragile point of contact between 
Lacanian psychoanalysis and gender studies, a contact on the question of femininity, 
we open onto the sort of radical clearing wished for and envisaged by gender theorists’ 
calls for a safer, more just world for queer and transgender subjectivities and relations.  
What has been overlooked in Dean’s narration of desire and disavowed in Butler’s 
reading of kinship is the possibility and exploration of a feminine perspective.  The 
feminine perspective brings with it a relation both to the radically contingent and to 
intractability, or the real, precisely by virtue of the fact that the feminine subject is not 
afforded the same sort of support and limits by the phallic function spared the 
masculine subject.  And as Dean rightly cautions, “[A]ny queer or feminist political 
theory that refuses to acknowledge intractability will remain less effective than it 
otherwise might be, because it will ceaselessly encounter the real as an unfathomable 
blockage of its political aims” (Beyond Sexuality 92).  In other words, to respond at 
last to the question I raised above, as to whether or not psychoanalysis may seem 
rather sexually impoverished with respect to (some) other perspectives, I would like to 
argue that no, it does not. On the contrary. 
 Where psychoanalysis may appear limited resides in part in what I interpret as 
the too easy capitulation of the terms feminine and masculine to “gendered” readings.  
This happens both for gender theorists reading and sometimes writing psychoanalytic 
texts and for psychoanalytic theorists reading and writing psychoanalytic texts.  As we 
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saw earlier, some Lacanians participate in a logic of sexual difference whereby it 
magically turns out again and again that subjects with apparently female genitalia 
“are” “women,” and so on.  Butler damningly maps out the consequences of such 
readings with respect to family relations: 
 And when there are two men or two women who parent, are we to assume that 
 some primary division of gendered roles organizes their psychic places within 
 the scene, so that the empirical contingency of two same-gendered parents is 
 nevertheless straightened out by the presocial psychic place of the Mother and 
 the Father into which they enter? Does it make sense on these occasions to 
 insist that there are symbolic positions of Mother and Father that every psyche
  must accept regardless of the social form that kinship takes? (Antigone’s 
 Claim 69). 
 
It seems important to imagine a queerer future for Lacanian psychoanalysis wherein 
terms like “the desire of the mother” and “the law of the father,” still very much in 
currency, might be replaced (not, of course, without haunting remainders) by some 
new terminology that would better reference the psychical functions these terms index.  
But terminology shifts alone will not a queer theory make of contemporary 
deployments of psychoanalysis; we must also bear in mind Dean’s rigorous reminder 
that objects a emerge outside of and in excess to the frame of gender.  And with 
respect to sexual difference, we must insist on the ways in which, for Lacan, the terms 
masculine and feminine signal two different logics, two different modes of ex-sistence 
in the symbolic, two different approaches to the Other, two different stances with 
respect to desire, and (at least) two different types of jouissance.  Nothing here 
indicates “gender” as we might more conventionally conceive of it. 
 
III. Transgender Subjectivity: An Expression of the Logic of Sexual Difference 
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What would it look like to consider transgender subjectivity as an expression of the 
logic of sexual difference?  What are the implications of such a move?  This depends 
in part on what, generally speaking, we mean by the word transgender, and how it 
relates to the term transsexual. In the foreword to the Transgender Studies Reader, 
Stephen Whittle uses simply the word trans instead of either transgender or 
transsexual, reflecting the popular shift to the usage of a new, apparently more all-
encompassing term.  As he writes, 
 A trans person might be a butch or a camp, a transgender or a transsexual, an 
 mtf or ftm or a cross-dresser; they might, in some parts of the world, consider 
 themselves a lady boy, katoey, or even the reclaimed Maori identities 
 whakawahine or whakatane. Some communities and their terms are ancient, 
 such as the Hijra from Northern India, but many are more modern. The word 
 “trans,” referring to a “trans woman” or “trans man” (of whatever subtype of 
 trans identity) is a very recent take on the umbrella term “transgender” (xi). 
 
While I am moved by the suggestiveness of a term like trans for forging politically 
motivated identificatory alliances, I would like to narrow down my own definitions of 
transgender and transsexual in the interest of a provisional amount of coherence, but 
with the expectation that no one definition of either of these words could satisfy or 
suffice.  I would like to define the transsexual subject as a person who identifies with a 
gender that is not consonant with the gender assigned at birth.  In some cases, but 
certainly not all, the transsexual subject will go to whatever efforts possible (hormone 
therapy, sex or genital reassignment surgery, etc.) to “pass” as that gender.  Inasmuch 
as the transsexual subject strives to pass and/or (for not all transsexuals strive to pass) 
identifies with one gender or another with an apparent degree of certainty, he or she is 
psychically no different than any other subject who lines up under one banner or the 
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other.22  Ostensibly “nontranssexual” subjects also strive to pass; they also identify 
with an apparent degree of certainty with one gender or another.  In other words, 
“transsexuality” is not in and of itself any more extreme a type of symptom than is 
“man” or “woman.”  Where transsexual subjects’ experiences may be different from 
those of ostensibly nontranssexual subjects, of course, arises in part from the fact that 
the latter have not, so far, proven particularly welcoming: from under the meager 
protection of their banners, they have not yet realized that they have no monopoly on 
the psychic experience of the semblance of “gender certainty.”  Oftentimes, the upshot 
of this false monopoly on a piecemeal “certainty” is that transsexual subjects – 
particularly those who do not rigorously fit the demands of the public’s “incessant 
need to gender every person they see as female or male” (Serano 117) – are excluded, 
objectified, exploited, scapegoated, and silenced. 
 Transgenderism presents a slightly different situation, and this is the one with 
which this chapter has been occupied.  For it could be argued that the transgender 
subject – as someone who is not necessarily or only very strategically invested in 
“passing” as one gender or another (e.g., someone who could be described as 
“bigendered” or “gender-fluid” [Serano 27]), as someone who may be invested in 
embodying a gender that would attest to what he or she may define as the 
constructedness of gender (e.g., “genderqueer” [Serano 27]) – would be the human 
subject as such, the unconsciously bisexual subject for whom sexual difference is only 
ever an incomplete, unsatisfactory solution to the failure of the sexual relation.  In this 
way, transgenderism would figure as a solutionless solution to the impasses of sexual 
                                                 
22 See Serano. 
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difference, a sort of unconscious scene of undecideability, but an undecideability 
fundamentally shared by all human subjects, no matter their seeming “gender.”  
 But there is another way of reading transgenderism, or another transgenderism 
available to subjects, wherein transgenderism figures not as a solutionless solution to 
the impasses of sexual difference, but rather as an expression of the logic of sexual 
difference: a feminine solution.  Hysteria as it is defined by Lacan is a profoundly 
feminine phenomenon and is characterized by the question, “Am I a man, or am I a 
woman, and what does that mean?”  The hysteric tends to interrogate societal norms at 
large, oftentimes embodying a “subversive attitude” (Ellie Ragland-Sullivan 164) that 
arises in part from a profound suspicion that her own sexed and sexual body is 
incommensurate to cultural injunctions regarding gender identities.  As Ellie Ragland-
Sullivan writes, “Lacan saw the hysteric as embodying the quintessence of the human 
subject because she speaks, as agent, from the lack and gaps in knowledge, language 
and being” (“Hysteria” 164).  The hysteric is, in some senses, interested in nothing but 
the lack that, for example, Dean may be read to circumvent by focusing on the 
apparent multiplicity of object a.  The failure, deadlock, and trauma of sexual 
difference returns for the hysterical/feminine transgender subject, irreducibly, in her 
insistent interrogation of the phallic function and in her very queer relation to the 
lacking Other.  
 Our question, then, might read as follows: what will the feminine/transgender 
subject do confronting a symbolic that she is “totally, that is, limitlessly inscribed 
within” (Copjec, Read My Desire 227)?  For this, we do not have to look far – we 
might consider Antigone, or, if we wish to be more timely, we might pay attention to 
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art, writings, memoirs, and scholarship by various present-day transgender or, 
sometimes, transsexual-identified subjects.  If part of the point this essay is trying to 
make, though, is that there is something transgendered about the human subject, and 
that this transgenderism transcends notions of gender, it follows that we need not be 
restricted by rigid definitions of gender identities to encounter the question, “Am I a 
man, or am I woman, and what does that mean?”  Feminine subjects identify in 
multiple directions.  More importantly, they demonstrate another sort of agility as 
well: “[Lacan] implied that for all the difficulties woman had with speech and the 
signifier, mistrusting its promises because they de facto fail her, a certain freedom to 
play was available to woman… [A]ccording to Lacan, ‘Women are less enclosed by 
discourse than their partners in the cycle of discourse’” (MacCannell 198–99).   When 
we recall that discourses are “forms of the social tie” (Lacan qtd. in MacCannell 235) 
and that discourses as social ties move to cover over the lack of the sexual relation, we 
could argue by extension that the hysteric feminine subject in particular is structurally 
well situated to cycle through and fall between the cracks of discourses.  Preoccupied 
as the hysteric is with the very question that discourse wishes to mask, she may be 
particularly well situated to “do something” to the social tie itself.  And yet, despite 
(but also because of) her “freedom to play,” the feminine/transgender subject’s speech 
does not stop insisting that discursive flexibility, lest it be mistaken for a merry-go-
round of liberating multiplicity, is a flexibility borne of and about at least two 
overlapping lacks: castration and a certain exclusion.  Feminine/transgender speech 
materializes (sometimes, painfully silently) hollowed out by the deafening 
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significance of what it “is” to “be” a (divided) (feminine) subject, a truth that echoes 
across gender divides and blurs. 
 Ragland cautions as well: “Given that the hysteric’s fundamental question in 
the signifier is ‘Am I a woman or a man?’ she is at risk of being overtaken by the real 
in both the symbolic and the imaginary” (“The Hysteric’s Truth” 69). She later adds 
more pointedly: 
 How, then, does the hysteric reveal a truth worth noting? Subversion for its 
 own sake or acting out is not admirable... It is, rather, this, that the subject, any 
 subject except a psychotic, is divided. In varying ways, all individuals who are 
 divided suffer from this. The master represses it in the place of truth. The 
 academic puts it in the place of repressed knowledge. The analyst interrogates 
 it. But the hysteric lives it; it is her badge of honor that she lives castration at 
 the surface of her life and discourse... The hysteric does not say, as 
 poststructuralists would claim, I am man and woman, the difference makes no 
 difference... For her it is an either/or question. 
This is the heart of Lacanianism: either/or. Either one is masculine or one is 
 feminine. One is not both, except in the suffering of hysteria. Both is the 
 position of suffering, not liberation. It is this truth of the hysteric to which 
 Lacan pays heed (85). 
 
Ragland’s explicit cautions notwithstanding, something seems to slip through the 
cracks here, and it again references the hysteric’s contortionist cycles, overlappings, 
and subversions: “One is not both, except in the suffering of hysteria,” Ragland writes, 
carefully.  Consistently excepted, the feminine/transgender subject is perhaps in a 
unique position to enact social transformation.  Being wholly within the symbolic but 
at an exclusive remove, she may have special affinities with what it means to change 
that which is “external” by a motion that cuts in immeasurable, infinitesimal 
directions, inside and out, for “the symbolic is not a set of conditions external to the 
subject, and…, as a result, the subject who labors to change the world is already its 
product. The notion of a ‘change in the symbolic,’ understood as ‘outside’ the subject, 
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must therefore be supplemented by a ‘change in the subject’ as well” (Shepherdson, 
Vital Signs 39).  This recalls Lacan’s explanation: 
 There can be no act outside a field which is already so completely articulated 
 that the law is located within it. There are no other acts than those that refer to 
 the effects of this signifying articulation and include its entire problematic – 
 with on the one hand whatever loss [chute] the very existence of anything at all 
 that can be articulated as subject entails, or rather is, and with on the other 
 what preexists it as a legislative function (Other 125). 
 
As she who lives the loss, “the very existence of anything at all that can be articulated 
as subject entails,” and as she who is limitlessly inscribed in that symbolic that 
preexists her, the act of the feminine/transgender subject may indeed “refer to the 
effects of this signifying articulation and include its entire problematic.” 
 Might we not also hear in Ragland’s words on the suffering of hysteria queer 
resonances of the precise sentiment of Whittle, who, while (self-consciously) no more 
able to stand in as “spokesperson” for a collective transgender community than The 
Woman is able to exist, nonetheless states, “[I]t has been through this articulation of 
the imposition of gendering on us by others that the position of suffering of those with 
trans identities has been heard”?  Whittle speaks here to an order to which trans 
identities might be exceptional and to the suffering that implies, and, of course, he 
speaks of speaking.  Just after, he identifies one of the new possibilities opened up for 
trans people thanks to the increased opportunity for “public articulation of a trans 
voice and trans consciousness”: “[T]o turn away, ultimately, from the relative safety 
of queerness and go beyond that to claim a unique position of suffering” (xv).  If we 
are to dream of some liberatory remainder to this suffering subversion, it may – as 
Butler suggests from a different perspective – be locatable precisely there where 
 79 
 
Antigone speaks her “aberrant” words (Antigone 58) – yes, where, sometimes,“gender 
is displaced” (82), but sexual difference is not. As Slavoj Žižek writes in response to 
Butler’s Psychic Life of Power: 
 The Lacanian answer to this is clear – “to desire something other than its 
 continued ‘social existence’” and thus to fall “into some kind of death,” that is, 
 to risk a gesture by means of which death is “courted or pursued,” points 
 precisely towards the way Lacan reconceptualized the Freudian death-drive as 
 the elementary form of the ethical act. Note that the act, insofar as it is 
 irreducible to a “speech act,” relies for its performative power on the 
 preestablished set of symbolic rules and/or norms. Is this not the whole point 
 of Lacan’s reading of Antigone? 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
At the beginning of this chapter, I asked what gender studies and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis have to offer one another and whether it might be possible to integrate 
the two domains.  To answer quite simply, Lacanian psychoanalysis offers gender 
studies what I read as a richly malleable framework for thinking through matters of 
sex, subjectivity, desire, and sexuality.  Likewise, gender studies offers Lacanian 
psychoanalysis readers who are deeply, productively mistrustful and whose 
compelling perspectives on diverse social issues are driven by passionate commitment.  
Integration of the two domains can only ever be a scene of fruitful contestation, but it 
could also go further if contemporary psychoanalytic thinkers were willing to listen to 
their compatriots’ desires and to redefine some of their more exclusionary 
“shibboleths” (Dean, Beyond Sexuality 226), and if gender theorists were willing to 
reread psychoanalysis, again. 
 
 
 
 80 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
Eunuch, Not-Eunuch: Failures of Correspondence in the Vie de Sainte Euphrosine 
 
‘Amis, por coi t’ocis? N’i at nul recovrier. / En cest dol ke tu fais ne pues rien 
gaagnier’ 
Vie de Sainte Euphrosine 
 
The Vie de Sainte Euphrosine recounts the story of a beautiful saint born to a 
wealthy family.23  Devoted to God and disinterested in either marriage or the lineage, 
Euphrosine runs away to the nearby monastery to live as a monk.24  There, having 
taken the name Esmerade, a name the narrator specifies as “communaz a marle et a 
femele” ‘common to males and females’ (202; my translation, here and below), 
Esmerade will eventually encounter his father Panutius once again, when the latter 
visits the monastery where Esmerade has been living.  Panutius does not realize that 
the monk he meets is the daughter he has been searching for (“Que sa filhe soit mones 
qui poïst esperer?” ‘Who expects his daughter to be a monk?’ [215]) and the two strike 
up a friendship that lasts thirty-eight years. Esmerade’s health and appearance 
deteriorate over the course of those years, and on his last breaths he tells Panutius that 
                                                 
23 For my choice of text, I rely on Raymond T. Hill’s 1919 edition composed of the four extant 
manuscripts.  For a discussion of the variations amongst the surviving versions, see Amy V. Ogden’s 
Hagiography, Romance, and the Vie de Sainte Euphrosine, chapter one and Emma Campbell’s 
Medieval Saints’ Lives: The Gift, Kinship and Community in Old French Hagiography, chapter eight.   
24 On the subject of the cross-dressing saint in medieval hagiography, Valerie Hotchkiss writes that 
“[a]lthough relatively neglected today, these [female cross-dressing] saints were so popular in the 
Middle Ages that it is almost impossible to assemble all of the many versions of their lives” (13).   
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he is Euphrosine. The news leaks and “Euphrosine” joins the ranks of several 
sanctified cross-dressers memorialized in various accounts over the centuries.25    
 As a text that emerges around the fault lines of the meeting of competing 
discourses on kinship, Euphrosine sets itself apart from both the aristocratic 
conception of marriage as a form of exchange and the church’s promotion of marriage 
as a sacred contract between two parties and sanctioned by God.26  Euphrosine is 
interested in neither of these forms of relationality, focusing instead on a relationship 
marked by neither exchange nor contract, sacred or otherwise.  The vita thus offers a 
sort of case study of the conflicted state of kinship systems of the time while 
challenging the ethos of each of the predominant discourses.  Euphrosine/Esmerade’s 
will to extract him/herself from systems of human exchange organized by narratives of 
marriage and descent will result in a series of abandonments that position Euphrosine 
as one who does not reciprocate, as one who cannot be counted on to fulfill her end of 
a bargain; but the problem of reciprocity also emerges in the apparent lack of 
correspondence between Esmerade’s self-presentation as a monk and previous 
existence as Euphrosine: “Que sa filhe soit mones qui poïst esperer?”  The story 
challenges the idea that Euphrosine/Esmerade should be easily identified, instead 
making available a series of possible identifications – Euphrosine is a bride, a 
                                                 
25 Perhaps the most famous of these compilations in medieval France was Jacobus de Voragine’s 
Legenda aurea. Euphrosine is not one of de Voragine’s cross-dressing saints, but Hotchkiss notes that 
the “Legenda aurea was printed at least one hundred and fifty-six times before 1500, more often than 
the Bible” (148).  The earliest of the four manuscripts in which Euphrosine is found includes La Vie de 
Saint Alexis and La Vie de Marie l’Egyptienne as well as Poème moral, La Vie de Sainte Juliane, La Vie 
de Saint Andrier l’apostle, and Li Ver del Juïse (Hill 160).  Simon Gaunt points out that “the manuscript 
tradition indicates that this text is more central to medieval literary culture than modern scholarship has 
allowed” (“Straight Minds” 449), asking, “Could this neglect in part be a result of its casual treatment 
of transvestism and homosexuality?” (449).   
26 See for reference Duby’s Medieval Marriage: Two Models from Twelfth Century France.   
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daughter, an heiress, a runaway, a gem, a flower; Esmerade is a rock, a beast, a 
creature, a thing, a monk, a eunuch, a threat, a paragon of virtue – which do not add up 
to any recognizable whole.  Each time that reciprocity would appear to have broken 
down, new relations become available.  I argue that these very limits, fictions, and 
failures comprise the tender ties that exist between Esmerade and his father.   
 
I: Cast Off and Castrez 
 
Upon deciding to run away, Euphrosine elects first to become a nun. Having rejected 
her earthly family and inheritance, she is given the name Esmerade, or Emerald, and 
effectively wedded to God.  In a scene of spiritual marriage, the poet relates that 
Esmerade is “gemme et preciose et bele. / Ele est jostee a Deu come piere en anele, / 
Car ele est s’espose et s’amie et s’ancele” ‘[Esmerade is a] gem, both precious and 
beautiful. She is united with God like a stone to a ring, for she is his spouse, his friend, 
and his servant’ (202).27  Both partner and servant, earthly (piere) and divine (God’s 
own spouse), we could say that Esmerade – a nun at this point – grants to God the 
promise without reservation that she will not extend to her human counterparts.   
 Esmerade does not remain a nun for long, though; fearing that s/he will be too 
easily found by either Panutius or the man to whom her father promised her in 
marriage, he presents himself at a Benedictine monastery as a eunuch and asks for 
entry.  Up until this point, Euphrosine has been in the habit of failing to fulfill her 
obligations.  She has failed to reciprocate the love of her betrothed, failed to respond 
                                                 
27 Campbell sees in this “divine kinship” (94) an instance of the ways in which hagiography subtends 
and subverts human kinship relations, what she describes as an “effort in hagiography to think beyond 
the limits set by human social and sexual systems by demonstrating how spiritual relations are always 
in excess of human norms” (9).  
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to the requests made of her by her father, and generally cast off her loved ones and her 
duties in favor of a more divine relationship.  When he enters the monastery, though, 
Esmerade will be the one who is cast off.   
 At the moment of Esmerade’s entrance inside the monastery, the poet writes: 
Parut sa blance cars, sa face encoleree, 
Li olh vair et riant et la boche molee. 
La congregations por pou ne fut dervee. 
Cogitasion male lor est el cuer montee. 
Li jovencel l’esgardent cum beste saëtee 
Et dient en lor cuer : ‘U fut ceste trovee?’ 
Li saive ome ont la cose a dant abé mostree. 
Dient li : ‘Fai oster cest castré d’entre nous. 
Ce n’est mie castrez, mais Sathan l’envïous. 
Qui nos vuet trebuchier en ses laz a estrous. 
S’entre ces jovenciaz estat un jor u dous, 
Ja en orons tal chose dont tot serons gragnous’ (205). 
 
Gaunt offers this lovely translation of that scene: 
 
Her white flesh and fair complexion, her clear and smiling eyes and soft mouth 
were all too apparent. The congregation was almost driven out of its mind. 
Wicked thoughts came into their hearts. The young men look at her as if she 
were a wild beast and say in their hearts: ‘Where was this creature found?’ The 
wise men pointed this out to the abbot. / They say: ‘Remove this eunuch from 
amongst us. He is not a eunuch, but jealous Satan himself, who wishes to trip 
us up into his snares and fetters. If he remained amongst these young men for a 
day or two, we will hear of things which will make us all grieve (“Straight 
Minds” 448).  
 
Gaunt has pointed to the potency of sexuality to hagiographical writings, writing that, 
“in comparison to the more humdrum boy-meets-girl narratives encountered in other 
literary genres, hagiography offers accounts of diverse and unorthodox sexual 
activities” (440).  In this scene, there is no “humdrum boy-meets-girl” encounter; nor, 
however, do we find a virginal saint’s sublimely erotic desire for Jesus.  Instead, we 
find a monastery full of monks responding to a “’passing’ transvestite” (Gaunt 449), 
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and, as Gaunt points out, it is “noteworthy that all these young men are thought to be 
susceptible to homosexual desire” (449).  
 I agree with Gaunt that this scene can be read as an instance of homosexual 
desire, but I would like to consider Esmerade’s status here as both a eunuch and a 
“wild beast” in order to explore still more layers of “diverse and unorthodox sexual 
activities” (Gaunt 440), layers of sexuality that may be less clearly aligned to those 
hegemonic systems of identification organized around the categories of gender 
identity and sexual orientation.  Euphrosine’s previous hopes for community with the 
other monks suffer a blow because of Esmerade’s conspicuous appearance, which 
Gaunt translates as “all too apparent.”  The description of those qualities that drive the 
congregation “out of its mind” occupies only two of the stanza’s lines: “Parut sa 
blance cars, sa face encoleree, / Li olh vair et riant et la boche molee.”  Thus 
Esmerade’s first appearance is brief, and so is the description of it; but it is also heavy, 
a supra-saturated enumeration of ungendered charms – flesh, complexion, eyes, mouth 
– dragging behind the verb “Parut.”  These ungendered charms cause Esmerade’s new 
monastic brothers to look upon him not as a monk, a eunuch, a boy or girl, a chorus 
member or possible prayer-partner – all more or less fitting descriptions – but as one 
thing that he is not: “cum beste saëtee.”  Meanwhile, the wise men, backward 
iconoclasts, see beyond Esmerade’s “riant” eunuch eyes to a Satan within.  The young 
men have not asked for Esmerade’s exile, but the wise men worry about “things which 
will make us all grieve” – evidently that “ces jovenciaz” may ravage the smiling-eyed 
newcomer – and request Esmerade’s removal.  As a result of this (mis)recognition, 
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Esmerade’s chances at forging a community inside the space of the monastery come as 
briefly undone.  
 It is clear that something about the sight of Esmerade unsettles his observers to 
various effects, inciting feelings of desire, sheer anxiety, and the will to repression: 
“Li jovencel l’esgardent cum beste saëtee… ‘U fut ceste trovee?’”  The text suggests 
that the desire felt by the younger monks towards Esmerade may not have anything to 
do with Esmerade’s gender or genders; in the young men’s initial encounter with 
Esmerade, his status as a eunuch is powerfully overwritten by flesh, complexion, eyes, 
and mouth, features notably common to eunuchs, brides, boys, and girls.  The text 
disavows both hetero- and homoerotic frames by indicating that, to these other monks, 
Esmerade registers as a wild beast and a “ceste.”  Recalling the “beste” that came 
before, “ceste” both objectifies and bestializes the monk newcomer, implicating erotic 
economies (beasts, monks, objects) irreducible to the humdrum, hackneyed or the 
heternormative.  For those who find him beautiful, Esmerade is a thing, a beast, a 
creature; his humanity is in question, but he is a “thing” – or a non-human – who is 
avidly desired. 
 The word “chose” itself appears in the mouths of the “wiser” men: “’S’entre 
ces jovenciaz estat un jor u dous, / Ja en orons tal chose dont tot serons gragnous.’”  
For their part, the wiser men immediately associate the younger men’s desires with 
Esmerade’s apparently castrated state, identifying him as a “castré” who is not 
“castrez.” “Remove this eunuch from amongst us.  He is not a eunuch.”  There is an 
unsettling lack of correspondence between what Esmerade is called (eunuch) and what 
he is (not a eunuch).  For the wise men, Esmerade’s status as having enjoyed or 
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suffered a subtraction (castration) is complicated by a further subtraction: he does not 
belong to the set of “the castrated” either.  Esmerade is so castrated he is not castrated 
anymore.  He appears perhaps more eunuch than eunuch.  He both under-belongs and 
over-belongs, unsettling identificatory categories as such.   
 The category of “eunuch” dramatizes Esmerade’s ambivalent allegiances and 
incomplete involvements in the visible realm, or the realm of the identificatory: is 
Esmerade a man?  A woman?  A cross-dresser?  A eunuch?  A saint?  A rock?  Up 
until this point, Euphrosine has explicitly rejected all the identificatory categories 
made available to her – “fiancée,” “daughter,” “heiress,” even “nun” – in favor of 
“monk” and “eunuch”28 – the latter of which is immediately put in question by the 
wise men who have accepted Esmerade into the monastery.  But perhaps Esmerade’s 
participation in a name that exceeds itself (a “castré” who is not “castrez”) qualifies as 
the best available fit, for in this way, the text gestures to the ill-fitted character of 
identificatory categories as such, suggesting that something “thingly” lingers on the 
other side of such names.  “Eunuch” stands in as that castration with which Esmerade 
only partially coincides.  Along these lines, the desirous and anxious reactions to 
Esmerade’s appearance index the dissatisfactions that haunt all gender expressions, the 
sense that (genitalia, social construction, or willful dis-identifications 
notwithstanding,) something is never quite finished about these categories “man,” 
“woman,” “trans,” or others: “Remove this man/woman/eunuch from amongst us. He 
is not a man/woman/or eunuch.”  In other words, Esmerade’s presence harbors the 
potential to trigger, within those who regard him, the recognition that something 
                                                 
28 Ogden offers an interesting gloss on Esmerade’s status as eunuch; see pages 84-85. 
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“trans” cushions, contours, or exceeds all gender identities.29  Esmerade’s arrival 
brings us to encounter the ways in which gender identities as such move to smooth out 
the myriad ways bodies and identities fail to correspond fully.  The young men are 
driven wild with desire in proximity to such a thing.  The “wiser” men appeal to the 
abbot to contain the threat.  
 Perhaps we could also extrapolate that here already, in this liminal (and 
luminal) position, under-belonging and over-belonging to the category of “eunuch” 
(among others), lies something of Esmerade’s saintliness.  For the failure of 
correspondence – in this instance, between bodies and their possible identifications – 
is common to words themselves, and in particular, as Karmen MacKendrick argues, to 
sacred signs.  And what is a saint if not a sacred sign?  For MacKendrick, sacred signs 
are invitations and “seductive re-readings” (21).  If, however, sacraments are “a kind 
of sign” (MacKendrick 23), as Thomas Aquinas asserted, how are sacraments different 
from signs as such?  MacKendrick suggests that the difference is one of scale: 
“suppose the sacrament is a sign with peculiar intensity of significance and of 
meaning, in which every sign draws us into the mystery. That is, suppose what a 
sacrament does to a sign is to make it more so, to intensify it” (25).    
 For MacKendrick, “the sacramental sign operates under the rule of seduction, 
of signs at play,” but they are not “removed from reference altogether” (25).  With the 
allusion to reference or a referent, MacKendrick would seem to preserve space for 
                                                 
29 My reading here is similar to Andrew Scheil’s interpretation of Smaragdus’s status in the Old English 
story the Life of Euphrosyne as a liminal figure that challenges gendered categories as such.  Schiel 
suggests more specifically that “what makes the monks in the Life of Euphrosyne angry is not only their 
dismay at being assaulted by sexual temptation; they are angry at – and afraid of – the plasticity of the 
male body represented by Smaragdus” (354).   
 88 
 
something beyond or beneath to which a (sacred) sign would refer, but she qualifies 
that referent with great care: 
 In sacrament… we find this semiotic play in the context of knowledge not in 
 its utter absence or irrelevance, but in its infinite incompletion and 
 incompleteability, and its infinite desirability and attractiveness. The play of 
 signs plays off of the tantalizing, withdrawing, beyond-being ‘referent’ that 
 does not, cannot, quite refer, but is not ever quite empty either (25-26).    
 
MacKendrick concludes her essay by stating that “the ‘sacred sign’ neither reveals nor 
points to what is hidden beneath or transcendentally beyond” (30).  The sacred sign 
“transfigures the present” (30).   
 Thinking Esmerade himself as a sort of sacred sign – and for that reason, in 
MacKendrick’s estimation, as a sign notable for its augmented elusiveness (26), as a 
sign that transfigures the present, and transfigures what is present – allows us to 
wonder about the referent to which Esmerade himself refers, and how Esmerade 
transfigures it.  For MacKendrick, this referent would be beyond-being, not quite 
empty, neither beneath nor beyond.  But as we shall in a bit, according to Esmerade 
himself, the not quite empty referent, the not-beneath or the not-beyond, would be 
nothing as such: “N’i at nul recovrier” ‘There is nothing to recover’ (216).  According 
to Esmerade, there is nothing to recover, nothing to be recovered, nothing that has 
been recovered.  What if there is nothing to cover in the first place?  If there is no 
beneath or beyond, nothing to be (re)covered, then we might be emboldened to 
dispense with the reading wherein Esmerade is simply a (saintly) woman who has put 
on the clothes of a (saintly) man, who at the end is discovered or uncovered as a 
(saintly) woman.    
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 The story ventures into similar terrain when facing the question of human 
relations.  Here the failures of correspondence will shift from the realm of the 
identificatory into the realm of language, as Esmerade will both attempt to draw limits 
for his human father and supply him with a series of apparently unfulfilled promises, 
positioning himself as one whose words are complexly “un-credible.”  
 
II: Esmerade and Panutius: Relating Otherwise 
 
Before the first encounter between Esmerade and Panutius, the latter makes a few 
remarks illustrative of his own thoughts on the form and function of kinship.  
Addressing the absent Euphrosine, he declares, “Tant [fort] vos desiroie une fois a 
tenir. / Entre vo[z] bras voroie ceste vie fenir” ‘Once I desired so much to hold you. In 
your arms I wished to finish this life’ (214).  The abbot replies to this cry of despair by 
asking if Panutius would wish to speak to the most spiritual and sweetly spoken monk 
of the monastery, to which Panutius counters that no one – no “hom” – will be able to 
distract him from his mourning: “Une gemme ai perdue que hom ne seit prisier, / Ne 
n’at home soz ciel si sain ne si parlier, / S’i[l] ne la moi rendoit, ki poïst apaier” ‘I 
have lost a gem that no one can estimate.  There isn’t a man so holy or so well-spoken 
under the sun who, if he did not return it to me, could be able to appease me for it’ 
(214).  
 These remarks, uttered by Panutius in quick succession, capture the logic of 
kinship as governed by exchange as explicated by Claude Lévi-Strauss; Lévi-Strauss 
describes the exchange of women as necessary to the “mechanisms of reciprocity” 
(Structural Anthropology 60) at the heart of social relations.  In his declaration, “Tant 
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[fort] vos desiroire une fois a tenir, / Entre vo[z] bras voroie ceste vie fenir,” Panutius 
would appear to evoke a rather outlying risk to familial marriage alliances: that a 
parent will not give up the child in question – even that the father will wish to finish 
his life in the arms of the bartered daughter – in short, incest.30  In Lévi-Strauss’s 
account, however, the risk of incest is, in fact, in every way internal to kinship.  
Panutius’s remarks represent the other side of the exchange model of kinship: the 
notion that there is an object that is so highly prized, it must be given up.  Panutius 
takes the logic of exchange to its limit by suggesting he may not wish to give up the 
object he is required to place in circulation.  In other words, Panutius could be read as 
suggesting that, if once again given the opportunity to pledge his daughter to another 
in marriage – which would institute reciprocal relations with others by the guarantee 
of “the exchange of a third term who exceeds it” (Tracy McNulty, The Hostess 
xxxviii) – , he’d rather not.  
 Panutius, too, it would seem, has some deficiencies where reciprocity is 
concerned.  Both Panutius and Esmerade resist the marital exchange that would 
institute reciprocity.  Whereas Esmerade is disinterested in systems of human 
exchange and thereby fails to serve as the object that would guarantee social relations, 
Panutius is so invested in systems of human exchange – and specifically the precious 
object at their center – that he would prefer not to furnish the object that would 
                                                 
30 In fact, the risk is not so outlying, as is made abundantly clear in Old French literature by the sheer 
number of incest narratives: Old French literature is riddled with examples of father-daughter incest.   
See for reference Kathryn Gravdal’s “Confessing Incests: Legal Erasures and Literary Celebrations in 
Medieval France,” wherein Gravdal considers the “literary vogue of incest in the thirteenth century” 
(283) by looking at six Old French stories.  See also Steele Nowlin’s “Narratives of Incest and 
Incestuous Narrative: Memory, Process, and the Confessio Amantis’s ‘Middel Weie’” and Elizabeth 
Archibald’s Incest and the Medieval Imagination.   
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guarantee social relations.  They thus both resist the demands of reciprocity as 
imagined by the exchange model.  
 Instead of dismantling social relations as such, though, Panutius and Esmerade 
inaugurate a new relationality, one where no oath, woman, or God serves to concretize 
their tie; theirs is a relation without a localizable guarantor, where reciprocity 
functions as a fiction or a failure rather than as a given.  This begins to emerge in their 
first encounter, for here the poet presents even the play of Panutius and Esmerade’s 
initial misrecognition as fundamentally non-reciprocal: 
Ele conut se pere, si comence a plorer.  
Les larmes de ses olz li veïsiés filer  
Et par sa blance face jusk’al sain degoter… 
Il ne la conut mie, ne s’en sot apenser.  
Que sa filhe soit mones qui poïst esperer? (215). 
 
 She recognized her father, and starts to cry. You would have seen the tears of 
 her eyes flow from her white face to her breast drop by drop… He didn’t 
 recognize her at all, nor did he think of it. Who expects his daughter to be a 
 monk?  
 
These lines constitute the last three lines of one stanza and the first two lines of the 
next.  The poet deviates here from the strategy of monorhymed stanzas of ten lines by 
employing the same rhyme pattern for both stanzas; the aberrantly continuing rhyme 
allows Esmerade’s recognition of his father to trail into the following stanza, wherein 
Panutius fails to recognize his daughter.  Such doubling reinforces the knot-like and 
asymmetrical structure of the moment.  The poet’s language is plain: “Ele conut se 
pere, si comence a plorer.”  By contrast, Panutius “ne la conut mie.”  The poet 
indicates that Euphrosine’s unrecognizability before Panutius’s eyes is a matter of 
identification, and not one of appearance.  The poet quickly adds that “Pale astoit del 
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renclus et maigre de juner, / Fraite de malgesir et tainte de plorer.”  ‘She was pale 
from the enclosure and thin from fasting, tear-stained and weakened from poor sleep’ 
(215).  But prior to this description of Esmerade’s changed appearance, the reason 
given for Panutius’s misrecognition of his daughter is not that she has become too pale 
and thin as to be recognizable, but that, quite simply, Panutius didn’t even think of it – 
“Que sa filhe soit mones qui poïst esperer?” Who expects – who could hope (poïst 
esperer) – for such a thing?   
 As Esmerade explains to Panutius, Panutius has been sent to him so that 
Esmerade may both comfort and chastise him: “De toi veoir avoie, certes, grant 
deseier / Por sol toi conforter et por toi kastïer” ‘To see you I have, certainly, great 
desire, only in order to comfort and chastise you’ (216).  Thus Esmerade modifies the 
terms of that relationship by indicating that he “only” (“sol”) wishes to see his father 
in order to comfort and chastise him.  Esmerade excises an unidentified series of other 
possible modes of relating from the contents of their new relation, relations in excess 
of comfort and chastisement.  His desire for this relationship is now “only” motivated 
by something akin to spiritual imperatives, and this constitutes a relational 
modification presumably imperceptible to Panutius inasmuch as Panutius does not 
realize that they are, or that they had been, as it were, already related.  And, as 
Esmerade indicates, in the past they had been otherwise related.  
 In their first conversation, Esmerade assures Panutius of a future when the 
latter will see Euphrosine again, perhaps a future in the afterlife, stating that God does 
not wish for Euphrosine to be found yet: “Mais Deu ne plaist encore que ele i soit 
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trovee” ‘But it doesn’t please God that she be found yet’ (215).  Esmerade asks for 
Panutius to have faith in the credibility of Esmerade’s words, continuing,  
Crede mi [que] ta filhe est bone part alee,  
Et tel consel at pris dont ja n’iert returnee.  
Ne t’esmaier pas, sire! Ele iert encore trovee.  
A tes oez le veras sens nule recelee (215-216).   
 
 Believe me that your daughter has gone in a good direction, and she has taken 
 such advice that already she will not be turned. But don’t be frightened, sir; she 
 will be found again. You will see her with your own eyes with nothing hidden.  
 
Here, then, lies one of the key interpretive knots of the story.  What are we to make of 
Esmerade’s apparent promise, that Panutius will see Euphrosine again one day with 
his own eyes?  Is this a promise that Esmerade fulfills or betrays?  Is it a promise at 
all?  And if it is a promise to be betrayed, what kind of saint is this?  Furthermore, 
what kind of comfort is this?  Esmerade declares that Panutius will one day see 
Euphrosine with nothing hidden, thus that he will, in a sense, see an Euphrosine who 
hides nothing.  But what has Euphrosine been hiding? Has s/he been hiding 
Euphrosine, or Esmerade?  The word “nothing” appears three times in this stanza and 
the next, in two different guises.  In the stanza that follows, Esmerade advises Panutius 
even more emphatically to renounce his search for his daughter, asking, “Amis, por 
coi t’ocis? N’i at nul recovrier. / En cest dol ke tu fais ne pues rien gaagnier” ‘Friend, 
why are you torturing yourself? There is nothing to recover.  In this mourning that you 
do, you gain nothing’ (216).  Esmerade lets Panutius know unequivocally that in his 
situation, there is precisely nothing to be gained (and “gaagnier” also means to sow, to 
engender, to win); the labor of love he performs will recover nothing.  “Nule recelee,” 
“nul recovrier,” “rien gaagnier”: nothing hidden, nothing to recover, nothing to gain.  
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Perhaps this is no puzzle at all; at least this repetition is quite clear: beyond the desires 
for gain and engenderment, beyond the desires for a return in recompense for some 
expenditure, and beyond the desires for some hidden essence beneath the trappings of 
personhood, Esmerade declares that there is nothing.   
 Euphrosine’s remains, we might say, complicate relations between Esmerade 
and Panutius, introducing elements of give-and-take and expectation.  Yet at the same 
time, her absence is of the utmost importance to them, the gap that gives them the 
space to relate differently.  Between Esmerade and Panutius, there is no other end to 
their non-bargain, no expected outcome or horizon of possibility, nothing to bank on 
or hope for, but instead a vertiginous lack of commitment, gift, or contract, a list of 
apparent “negativities” that open onto a very radical form of relationality.  If before 
the two were tied by way of gifts (Euphrosine as gift from God), inheritances 
(Euphrosine as receptacle of Panutius’s money), and contracts (Panutius’s pledge to 
pass Euphrosine to her would-be husband), the alliance between Panutius and his 
monk-friend constitutes instead something closer to a contract-lacking proximity, a tie 
structured around the possibility or even likelihood of untying – an untying mirrored 
by Esmerade’s visible deterioration – rather than on notions of agreement, progress, or 
posterity.  As far as Panutius is concerned: either this monk is the man under the sun 
who has the weight in gold to pay for the jewel Panutius lost, or Panutius has been 
displaced to a different logic altogether.  Somewhere in between these two 
possibilities constitutes the space the text carves out for itself.   
 In their second to last conversation, Panutius envisages his upcoming loss.  
Esmerade has taken sick to bed, and Panutius addresses him quite poignantly: 
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Frere, vos me laisiez!... 
Amis, or recommence ma paine et ma tristor. 
Tant que je vos ooie, ne sentoie dolor; 
En la vostre parole sentoie tal dolçor. 
E[n]tre les innocens ait la vostre arme flor! 
Je ne vos ost veïr angeles de tenebror! 
Ja ministres d’infer ne vos face paor!  
Michaël vos enport(e) a joie et a baldor! 
El sain saint Abraham soiés mis a honor! 
Et apostle et martir et tot li confessor 
Vos presentent a joie devant Nostre Sagnor! (217-218). 
 
 Brother, you are leaving me!… Friend, now my suffering and sadness start 
 again. As long as I heard you, I felt no pain. In your words, I felt such 
 sweetness. May your soul flower among the innocent! May you never see the 
 angels of darkness! May the envoys of hell never frighten you! May Michael 
 take you to joy and to bliss! May holy saint Abraham honor you! May 
 apostles, martyrs, and all the confessors joyfully present you to Our Lord! 
 
The use of the subjunctive, and in Hill’s edition the accompanying exclamation points, 
indicate dramatic stylistic changes that define this moment with respect to the rest of 
the vita.  Notably, Panutius does not mark his own suffering with nearly so much 
emotion, but reveals such intensity in his hopes for Esmerade in the afterlife.  One is 
tempted to read these words as a very traditional sending-off speech given by a parent 
to a child.  However, these anguished hopes do not issue from a parent or from within 
a familiar constellation of familial structure.  Affect here cannot be subordinated to an 
obligatory demonstration, for Panutius is under no obligation to wish Esmerade well 
in the afterlife.  No commitment binds him whatosever.  His words are not predicated 
upon a societal structure that preemptively binds them, that presupposes and declares 
their link; his words, rather, are the very material of a structure that loosely, 
provisionally, and perhaps uncomfortably links them.  These particular words also 
follow directly from Panutius’s own naming of the importance of signifiers to their 
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relationship: “Tant que je vos ooie, ne sentoie dolor; / En la vostre parole sentoie tal 
dolçor.”  He responds to the sweetness of Esmerade’s words with his own singular 
paroles, for his are not adjectival statements, idiomatic reframings of some convention 
borne of a “blood” structure, but, precisely, subjunctive, words that “blossom among 
the innocent” and the non-pre-determined.  As he strives to describe Esmerade’s 
uncertain future, he strips his desires for him of automatism, returning them to the 
realm of the incredible.  The only future here is death, for such an outpouring comes 
about at the very moment at which the two are about to be separated: he wishes 
Esmerade well in his (next) abandonment of him. 
 However, as he goes on, Panutius’s tone changes: 
Amis, or recommence ma paine et mes ahans 
Et li dol k’ai soffert, ui at trente et uit ans, 
Que je perdi ma filhe dont sui gries et dolans, 
Que vos profetiziés et jë ere atendans 
Que je la troveroie, mais or i sui fallans. 
Je l’esperoie bien; folie est et nïans. 
Ançois perdrai ge vos, cui ele ert si senblans; 
Ans si senblans ne vi negun[s] gemel[s] enfans (218). 
 
 Friend, now my pain and suffering begin again, and the grief that I have 
 suffered, for 38 years now, when I lost my daughter for whom I am grieved 
 and suffering, when you prophesied that I be patient, that I would find her, but 
 I am still waiting. I hoped so much; it is crazy and stupid. Today I will lose 
 you who were so similar to her; so similar I never saw twin children.  
 
Euphrosine herself and the realm of the visible intrude anew on what to this point had 
been populated by words, and these intermingled intrusions change the tone of their 
exchange from the impassioned well-wishes of moments ago.  Euphrosine’s return and 
the return of the visible work in tandem to displace Panutius and Esmerade’s relation 
from one of spacings and an apparent radical lack of obligation, to one once again 
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answerable to contracts and promises.  As the prospect of losing Esmerade sinks in, 
Panutius begins to panic, and he levels an accusation at Esmerade’s long-ago and 
apparently unfulfilled assertion that he would once again see his daughter.  As such, 
he discloses either that, underneath his tie to Esmerade, there has been a dream of a 
different one, or that at the prospect of this tie’s dissolution, he reverts to the old, 
safely familiar, and infinitely disappointed logic of contracts and promises.  Either 
way, Panutius’s conversion has been difficult and incomplete.  For if there is a 
bargain, Esmerade has not respected what Panutius perceives as his contractual 
promises, where by an idolatrous metonymy Esmerade, another mediatrix, becomes 
capable of divine intervention, or access to it.  
 We have known since the first stanza, though, that Esmerade lacks reliability, 
interest, or investment in the earthly realm of exchange, when the poet declared, “Por 
lui [Deu Nostre Sagnor] gerpit son pere et tote heredité” ‘For Our Lord God she 
abandoned her father and all her inheritance’ (191).  In his relations with this visitor, 
Esmerade extracts himself from that realm once again, this time by means of 
seemingly unfaithful prophecies.  Thirty-eight years before, he had presented the 
prophecy that Panutius would see his daughter again with nothing hidden.  Even as he 
is apparently unwilling to furnish proof of the prophecy’s potential veracity (and 
thereby live up to the promise that Panutius now implies he has been quietly banking 
on), at the same time, he in some senses constantly presents Panutius with the thing 
Panutius had requested.  Simply garbed, skin and bones, shaven and pale, Esmerade is 
a more austere version of the amply-clothed, plump, fresh-cheeked Euphrosine of 
yesteryear.  Esmerade is so naked he becomes invisible (so castrated he is not).  By 
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way of these many travestissements, it remains open to interpretation as to whether or 
not either a vow or a promise has been made.  Not knowing what exactly Esmerade’s 
“word” entails, it is to that extent difficult to judge whether he has kept it or not.  In 
one way of looking at the scene, Esmerade has quite simply lied, or he has failed to 
honor a pledge; such a reading renders his word rather un-credible.  In another 
reading, Esmerade can be said to have kept the promise Panutius attributes to him, and 
thus in this sense has always already fulfilled the prophecy, but unrecognizably.  
 Esmerade replies: “Or te pri ke trois jors me gar en karité; / Ne me gerpis tu ja, 
tros k’aie a toi parlé” ‘Now I ask you to take care of me out of kindness. Don’t leave 
me until I have spoken to you’ (218).  This spacing sends Panutius precisely into the 
state of anxiety such things tend to, but he nonetheless tends to Esmerade: “Trois jors i 
fut Panuzes mut dotous et pensis / Et servit le malade cum ses privez amis” ‘For three 
days Panutius was very uncertain and pensive and he served the sick monk as he 
would a close friend’ (218).  After which time, they have their final conversation, and 
Esmerade delivers the news Panutius seems never to have suspected: “… je sui la 
misele. / Je sui te chiere filhe cui tu norris pucele, / Que tu metis jadis a letre en ta 
capele. / Je sui Eüfrosine. Je sui icele bele” ‘I am that wretched one. I am your dear 
daughter whom you raised from girlhood, whom you taught to read long ago in your 
chapel. I am Euphrosine. I am that beauty’ (219).  With each short sentence beginning 
with “I am,” Esmerade/Euphrosine bursts forth in a fever of self-assertion, an 
emphatic iteration of selfhood.  Here, in recapturing and reclaiming the identity of 
Euphrosine, Esmerade/Euphrosine also recaptures and reclaims the language of 
identities as such: in the intervening years of friendship with Panutius, never had 
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Esmerade relayed such a commitment to the “I” and its stories (that wretched one, 
your dear daughter, that beauty).  In his/her former voice, Esmerade/Euphrosine 
reverts to something more familiar: that mode of knowing and relating that would find 
its coordinates around the stories of the “I.”  He then makes a series of requests, 
qualified by the opener “se tu anc m’amas” ‘if ever you loved me’ (219).  Without 
waiting for any sign of concurrence – and without Panutius having the chance to speak 
again at all – , he suddenly concludes: “Or me haste la mors. Pater, ora pro me!” 
‘Death hastens upon me. Pater, ora pro me!’ (219).  Esmerade’s last words ring out 
with the weight of the inscrutable, for as death hastens upon him, he switches into 
Latin to utter a fixed phrase and to address an unspecified Pater, presumably, God 
himself.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The relations poeticized in this saint’s life are “transgender” in a variety of senses.  
First and most obviously, the saint/monk/eunuch at the center of the story: Esmerade 
is encountered not so much as ambiguously gendered, replete with multiple overlaps 
and departures, but as (stirringly) elusive as such – a beast, a rock, a flower, a gem, a 
bride, a boy, a saint.  Such substantives do not add up to a recognizable whole; in 
some cases, they are apparently mutually exclusive, but they share the common space 
of Euphrosine/Esmerade’s body.  In their lack of familiarity to one another – in the 
sheer distance between a rock and a bride – the poet suggests that bodies are formed 
out of wide variables of conjunctions and disjunctions, singularities that fail to 
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correspond to any one thing in particular.  Part of Esmerade’s saintliness resides in 
transfiguring these fault lines.  
 The transgender ties in this story also revolve around certain propositions, 
propositions that are both saintly in their elusiveness and geological in their hard glare: 
first, as just noted, that a body may not match its identifications; second, that contracts 
do not always keep their promises (that, indeed, a constitutive impossibility to do so 
accounts for contracts’ existence in the first place); and third, that a word may not 
match itself or its thing.  The characters who encounter these barriers do not 
thenceforth abdicate community as such, finding in these failures a reason to give up 
on relations as such.  To dare, instead, to organize a tender tie around these very 
failures is part of what makes Euphrosine so compelling.  
 Transgender relations prove rankling and enthralling for those moments when 
they depart from logics of relation organized by pre-determined contractual 
expectations, for the moments when they expose the impossibility of reciprocity rather 
than strive to patch it over, and for the ways in which such failures and incompletions 
incite and invite, compelling patience, passion, uncertainty, loneliness, and care-
taking.  Esmerade’s un-credible words provide a vantage point, at times perhaps an 
uncomfortable one, from which to approach the possibilities borne of failure, as do his 
failures to correspond to pre-determined gender categories.  This mention of 
credibility, though, is not to suggest that a more credible or more original referent or 
essence may lie somewhere else, such as behind or beyond.  To the implied geometry 
of this model, the psychoanalytic notion of semblance offers a resonant counterpoint.  
Serge André explains that semblance does not suggest that inauthentic veneers mask 
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subterranean truths, but rather, quoting Lacan, that “truth itself has the ‘structure of a 
fiction’… that the veil that clothes the truth, far from dissimulating, instead manifests 
that it is by nature a semblance” (143).  This also recalls Freud’s famous footnote in 
The Interpretation of Dreams:  
now that analysts at last have become reconciled to replacing the manifest 
dream by the meaning revealed by its interpretation, many of them have 
become guilty of falling into another confusion... They seek to find the essence 
of dreams in their latent content and in so doing they overlook the distinction 
between the latent dream-thoughts and the dream-work.  At bottom, dreams are 
nothing other than a particular form of thinking… It is the dream-work which 
creates that form, and it alone is the essence of dreaming (545).   
 
While André indicates the formal and fictional status of semblance, Freud writes 
against the (analytic) attempt to read essences in the first place, and Esmerade himself 
states that there is   “nul recovrier.”  The form of the thing – its scars and 
recombinations, strange geometries, lies, and disguises, as well as its more or less non-
linear state of incompletion (for these forms will always be subject to interpretation 
and retroactive narrations) – constitutes the extent of the matter.  According to 
MacKendrick, it also constitutes the sacredness of the thing.  
 In pursuit of a more divine inheritance, Esmerade inherits a more radical 
relationship with his abandoned father.  Organizing this new relation around absences, 
abandonments, fictions, and failures, Esmerade and Panutius nonetheless – or 
consequently – form a very tender tie.  Theirs is also a tie, though, that bears no 
balancing, rife with holes and subject to untying.  As Panutius will say just after 
Esmerade’s death, “Eüfrosine, amie, que m’avez deceü! / Tant vos avoie quise, tant 
avoie atendu, / Mais or vos ai trovee et or tot perdu” ‘Euphrosine, friend, how you 
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have disappointed me! So much had I longed for you, so long had I awaited you, but 
now that I have found you, I have lost everything’ (220). 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Beyond ‘A Pure Passing’: 
Transgender Voices in Joy Ladin’s ‘The Voice’ and Heldris of Cornualle’s Roman de 
Silence  
 
 
In our everyday speech acts, the voice is an often-forgotten object cause of 
desire.  A strain of materiality masquerading as something that could belong to 
someone, the voice is, as Mladen Dolar notes, “like a fingerprint” (22), inimitable; it 
marks the ones we “know,” a tenor bearing the relief of familiarity or a rush of 
anxiety.  Compared with the gaze, which has been mobilized in film and feminist 
theory as a critical problematic for thinking through questions of agency, identity, 
pleasure, and desire, the voice has not received the same volume of critical attention.  
Thanks, perhaps, to its intuitively physiological character, or to its seeming ability to 
belong to somebody, the voice has been difficult to situate as the site of a 
misrecognition; as Dolar writes, the voice “appears to lack a screen” – it appears as “a 
pure immediacy where one is both the sender and the receiver without leaving one’s 
pure interiority” (39).   
 Transgender narratives of the voice, by contrast, relentlessly indicate a screen 
through which the voice passes.  In narratives such as Heldris of Cornualle’s 13th 
century romance the Roman de Silence and Joy Ladin’s contemporary essay “The 
Voice,” the voice is not one’s own, or the voice one has is not the voice one needs, or 
the voice one has seems to speak from elsewhere.  One is ventriloquized by the voice; 
one ventriloquizes other voices.  The voices in these narratives are, alternately, 
foreign, artificial, studied, unreliable, strained, external, silent, unspeakable, musical, 
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and even “barely… human” (Joy Ladin, “The Voice” 252).  They outpace the words 
they carry, producing unexpected meanings or no meaning at all; or they materialize in 
strange places, in some instrument other than that of the vocal chords.  In these and 
other ways, transgender narrations narrate various short-circuits of the experience of 
“hearing (understanding)-oneself-speak” (Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology 98), 
exposing the uncanny character of the voice as such.  By situating this exposure in 
texts by and about transgender people, however, do such narratives indicate a 
“transgender” affinity with or suffering exposure to the effects of the voice as 
decentered and decentering?  And/or do they suggest that it might be possible, 
desirable, and even necessary to arrive at a voice that would not entail such short-
circuits? 
The thirteenth century Roman de Silence and the contemporary essay “The 
Voice,” texts separated by time and language, are “transgender” in different senses: 
each narrates something of the drama of the crossing of gender, but for different 
reasons.  Silence is born a “girl” but raised as a “boy” because of a law disinheriting 
women; he is not made aware that he isn’t like the other boys until around the age of 
twelve, a discovery that unleashes quite a lot of self-doubt.  Ladin, by contrast, 
transitions – voluntarily – to living as a woman as an adult.  Silence is, of course, a 
fictional character, while Ladin, a real person, represents in her essay some portion of 
her own experience.  Additionally, Ladin’s text is written after the advent of 
discourses of transgender in the United States, while the Roman de Silence can only 
anachronistically be called a transgender text.   
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In fact, very little aside from the crossing of gender and a preoccupation with 
the voice unites these texts, and even the voices concerned are largely different.  Each 
text foregrounds to varying degrees multiple dimensions of the voice, grappling not 
only with voice as object cause of desire31, but the voice in speech, and the voice as 
constituting in some way the meaning or coherence of a persona.  Neither Silence nor 
the “I” of Ladin’s essay has easy access to these latter two forms of voice, and their 
experiences with the exigencies of the self that the voice would seem to express 
problematize the notion that a voice would simply translate a pure interiority.  
Heldris’s romance, however, situates these problems squarely within a question about 
the origin of the “sexed being” of the subject, here allegorized in the form of debates 
between the figures of Nature and Nurture: to whom does Silence belong?  Is Silence 
authentically a woman, thus ostensibly belonging to Nature, or is he authentically a 
man, thus ostensibly belonging to Nurture?  Which can explicate his (“sexed”) being?  
I will argue that Silence is able to find a voice (in his case, as a minstrel) precisely 
                                                 
31 The object cause of desire, or object a, is a concept I borrow from Lacanian psychoanalysis.  For 
Lacan, objects a are representatives of the “eternally lacking object” (Four Fundamental 180) instituted 
by language into subjective existence.  By way of example, Lacan points to the “oral drive” and its 
relation to food: “The objet petit a [object a] is not the origin of the oral drive. It is not introduced as the 
original food, it is introduced from the fact that no food will ever satisfy the oral drive, except by 
circumventing the eternally lacking object” (180).  Objects a can take diverse forms, but Lacan selects 
the voice as one of the privileged representatives of object a, perhaps because it is often encountered in 
its uncanniness: Lacan writes that “we know [the voice] well… in its waste scraps, the dead leaves, in 
the form of the stray voices of psychosis, and in its parasitic character in the form of the interrupted 
imperatives of the super-ego” (Séminaire X 290-291, my translation).  The voice as object a is useful to 
think insofar as it problematizes notions of “inside/outside” and their applicability to the human body: 
Dolar explains the voice as object a as “a bodily missile which has detached itself from its source… yet 
remains corporeal. This is the property which it shares with all the objects of the drive: they are all 
situated in a realm which exceeds the body, they prolong the body like an excrescence, but they are not 
simply outside the body either” (73).  This all may sound very abstract, even mythical, and, to an extent, 
it is; as Jacques-Alain Miller has explained, “object a is in fact for Lacan a logical function, a logical 
consistency that finds it incarnation in what falls from the body in the form of diverse wastes” (“Jacques 
Lacan and the Voice” 139).  While I find the voice as object a to be a compelling concept, and one 
which I think is alluded to in the texts considered here, the reading that follows does not revolve around 
it.   
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through accepting the impossibility of finding an answer to this question.  
Furthermore, that his “sexed being”32 remain inexplicable – that he be unable to be 
found to belong to either Nature or Nurture – will, I suggest, prove to be the condition 
of possibility of Silence continuing to have a voice throughout the text.   
The contemporary essay, perhaps eschewing the naïveté or danger of asking 
after the origin of the “sexed being” in the first place33, situates the problem of the 
voice slightly differently, in a question about the authenticity of the self.  Through the 
technics of the voice, the exercise of pitch, breath, and head and chest resonance, 
Ladin seeks to express an authentic self.   Ultimately, the voice she 
constructs/discovers coincides neither with the voice of a man nor with that of a 
woman, but, again, with the voice of the self.  Ladin arrives at this self by realizing 
that there is “no difference” (254) between what she is and what she wants to be; the 
screen has disappeared.   
While for Ladin ventriloquism is (ostensibly) vanquished, it would seem that 
the properly sexed voice for Ladin transcends gender categories (much as I argue 
Silence’s does): “[My voice coach] didn’t want me to sound like ‘a woman.’ She 
                                                 
32 By “sexed being,” I do not mean “sex” or “gender.”  With this term, I am calling on the 
psychoanalytic notion that we are “sexed” not because of genital morphology or hormonal or 
chromosomal make-up; rather, we are “sexed” because desiring.  See Chapter One, “Transgender 
Subjectivity and the Logic of Sexual Difference.” 
33 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick articulates this concern in her landmark text Epistemology of the Closet in 
the context of her own critique of the efficacy of the terms nature and nurture or what are also referred 
to as essentialism and constructivism.  Sedgwick’s focus here is on the dangers of looking into the 
origin of sexual preference and identity, not “sexed being” in the general sense in which I am using it, 
but I suspect that she might be happy to expand her terrain to include this latter as well.  As she 
explains, “I am … eager to promote the obsolescence of ‘essentialist/constructivist’ because I am very 
dubious about the ability of even the most scrupulously gay-affirmative thinkers to divorce these terms, 
especially as they relate to the question of ontogeny, from the essentially gay-genocidal nexuses of 
thought through which they have developed… it would seem to me that gay-affirmative work does well 
when it aims to minimize its reliance on any particular account of the origin of sexual preference and 
identity in individuals” (40-41).  The context of Sedgwick’s own concerns, as signaled by “the 
essentially gay-genocidal nexuses of thought,” is the AIDS crisis of the 1980s.   
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wanted me to sound like me” (Ladin 254).  Both Silence and the “I” of Ladin’s essay 
embrace what I refer to as “compromise” voices.  For Silence, the compromise voice 
of minstrelsy is a voice that will serve him whether he lives his life as a man or as a 
woman.  For Ladin, the voice discovered at the end of her journey is surely not the 
voice of a man but neither is it simply identified as the voice of “’a woman’”; as, 
instead, the voice of the self, it transcends the brute binary of gender and is something 
more and something less than either of the above.  In these and other ways, each text 
offers a different “trans” answer to the question of the voice and its various modalities 
of expression and disruption. 
 
The Roman de Silence: The Voice of Inauthenticity 
 
The Roman de Silence tells the tale of a character named Silence, who, as already 
noted, is raised as a “boy” because of a law disinheriting women.  Around the age of 
twelve, Silence’s father informs him that he isn’t like the other boys and Silence 
begins to be visited by Nature and Nurture34, allegorical figures who vie for his body 
and gender identity.  Eventually, Silence runs away to become a minstrel, thinking 
that, whether he live as a man or as a woman, the art of music might serve him well.  
Later, he joins the king’s court and becomes known and respected for his virtue and 
military strength.  When the queen falls in love with him and he rejects her advances, 
she sends him on a series of adventures which, meant to be his undoing, ultimately 
lead to his exposure.  At the conclusion of the romance, Silence is publicly disrobed, 
                                                 
34 For a consideration of the figure of Nature and others (such as Lady Love and Lady Philosophy) in 
medieval texts, see Barbara Newman, God and the Goddesses: Vision, Poetry, and Belief in the Middle 
Ages. 
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recognized as a “woman,” married to the king (who has put his former queen to death 
for her schemes), and never speaks again.    
 At the time of his birth, Silence’s parents name him Silentius, noting that, 
should “sa nature” ‘his real nature’” (98-99)35 be discovered, they will change the –us 
to an –a: Silentia.  Named for silence – because, as his father notes, “silensce tolt 
anse” ‘silence relieves anxiety’ (96-97) – Silence will be raised in seclusion in the 
woods by two surrogate parents who agree to protect the child and the secret.  Silence 
passes a tranquil childhood as a model little boy.  Eventually, however (Heldris does 
not specify Silence’s age at the time), Silence’s father Cador will tell Silence the 
circumstances of his birth, in a scene wherein he repeatedly refers to Silence as “son”: 
“bials fils… bials fils… Bials dols ciers fils…” ‘beautiful son… beautiful son… Dear 
sweet beautiful son…’ (114, my translation).  Notably, Cador says nothing here about 
Silence being a girl, only that Silence must continue to cover himself: “Si chier come 
l’onor avés, / Si vos covrés viers tolte gent” ‘As you cherish honor, / you will continue 
to conceal yourself from everyone’ (114-115).   
It is the narrator who, prior to Cador’s speech, provides the seemingly key 
piece of information that Silence was born a “girl.”  He does so in a curious turn of 
phrase which puts in question just how confidently we can speak of Silence’s “sex” or 
“gender”: in Heldris’s words, (1) “Quant l’enfes est de tel doctrine / Qu’il entent bien 
qu’il est mescine, / Ses pere l’a mis a raison, / Se le demostre l’oquoison / Por que on 
le coile et le cuevre” ‘When the child was old enough / to understand he was a girl, / 
his father sat down to reason with him / and explain the circumstances / which had led 
                                                 
35 Unless otherwise noted, all translations are from Sarah Roche-Mahdi’s edition. 
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them to conceal his identity this way’ (114-115).  The interest of the formulation is in 
its sparseness: as Heldris states, “il est mescine,” suggesting that these categories – he, 
girl – can stand together, that they are more or less compossible.  While Heldris 
periodically reinforces a model of gender whereby “underneath” Silence would “be” 
“a girl,” a self to be concealed, there are also moments like this one where he 
configures gender as a site of compossibility, more horizontal than vertical.36    
Soon after this, the silence in and around Silence will be broken by one, 
distinctive clamor: that of debates between Nature and Nurture, who visit Silence and 
debate for him.  Up to this point, the narrator has presented Nature and Nurture in 
rather ambivalent terms.  All in all, Nature seems to be the more powerful figure, but 
not necessarily the preferred one.37  Ultimately, Nature advises Silence to go to the 
sewing room and learn to sew: “Va en la cambre a la costure, / Cho violt de nature li 
us. / Tu nen es pas Scilentius!” ‘Go to a chamber and learn to sew! / That’s what 
Nature’s usage wants of you! / You are not Silentius!’ (118-119).  As Jane Tolmie 
notes, “Nature’s rebuke plunges Silence into self-doubt” (15).  Nurture, however, 
                                                 
36 These moments arise in phrases where an apparent equivocation is offered as a simplex – “il est 
mescine” or “li vallés mescine” ‘the youth who was a girl’ (176-177), where “li vallés” is gendered 
masculine. These latter two equivocations/simplexes arise in a scene much later in the text, when 
Silence resists the seductions of the queen Eufeme. In fact, it may be that Heldris is mostly keen on 
reminding us that this boy is a girl because of the erotic excitement that may add to the scene.  For a 
discussion of “lesbian desire” in the romance, see Kathleen M. Blumreich, “Lesbian Desire in the Old 
French Roman de Silence.” 
37 As Roche-Mahdi notes, Heldris, “[w]ith exquisite irony” (xix), associates his Nature with the very 
sophistry and misuse that the figure of Nature, in the tradition of Alain de Lille’s De Planctus Naturae, 
generally denounces. On this point, R. Howard Bloch writes, “The Roman de Silence reads in many 
places like a vernacular version of Alain’s De Planctus Naturae which its author most certainly knew” 
(“Silence and Holes” 84).  Nature is responsible for Silence’s exceptional beauty, and this represents a 
literary tradition and a specifically gendered one, inasmuch as “Nature appears frequently in Old French 
romance as creator of the most beautiful girl in the world” (Roche-Mahdi xvii).  Indeed, this seems to 
be Nature’s primary complaint against Silence’s life as a boy: Silence has not been caring for the girlish 
beauty s/he was given by Nature.  Hours in the wind and hot sun have made of him “une grosse ouevre” 
(108). 
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appears to chase Nature away, telling Nature to leave her “noreçon” ‘nursling’ (122-
123) alone and claiming authorship of Silence’s de-naturing: “Jo l’ai tolte desnaturee” 
‘I have completely disnatured her’ (122-123).38  “[P]oised between opposed identities 
and assailed by opposing powers” (Tolmie 14), Silence is, then, “temporarily 
paralyzed” (15).39   
 For the time being, it is Reason40, not Nurture, who stays with Silence to 
puzzle through the matter.  A third allegorical figure who shows up to confer with 
Silence, Reason intervenes to offer a “third way” beyond Nature and Nurture’s 
debates, one that affirms survival and pragmatism in the face of the unknown.  Reason 
is not interested in figuring out who, between Nature and Nurture, is more powerful; 
she does not care which one, if either, can claim Silence or more justly explain his 
being.  She merely, and more devastatingly, relays that, “poi li valt mains de la mort / 
Se il s’acostume et amort / A deguerpir sa noreture / Por faire cho que violt Nature” ‘if 
he abandoned his nurture / for what Nature wanted, / it would be almost as bad / as 
killing himself’ (122, my translation).  Reason raises the stakes of the battle for 
Silence’s body: the Old French relays this far better than my translation does, 
                                                 
38 It is interesting that Nurture speaks of Silence in the feminine here, given that, first, Nurture wants to 
affirm Silence’s masculinity and, second, that Heldris rarely refers to Silence in the feminine at all.   
39 According to Tolmie, paralysis will be “the position [Silence] occupies, in one way or another, for the 
remainder of the romance” (15).   
40 Newman also addresses the figure of Reason and her relation to Nature in Old French literature.  
With respect to their representations in Jean de Meun’s portion of the Roman de la Rose and Alan de 
Lille’s De Planctus Naturae, Newman writes, “Jean radically departs from Alan in positing a breach 
between Nature and God’s other daughter, Lady Reason, since in his view, only Reason enables 
humans to contemplate the divine order which, by definition, transcends Nature. Thus Dame Raison, 
the first of Jean’s authoritative speakers, upholds Christian sexual ethics” (“Did Goddesses Empower 
Women?” 137).   
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communicating through repetition (“mains de la mort,” “amort”) that what Nature 
wants for Silence would be, for him, a form of death.41  
Silence agrees with Reason; he does not feel equipped at all to live as a 
woman, nor does he want to do so (124-125).  Still, he does not find himself at peace.  
He remains torn, grief-stricken, suffering; as Heldris relates, “Et cuers s’est une 
creäture / Mervelles d’estrange nature: / Qu’il pense voir moult largement, / Torne et 
retorne trop sovent / Les larges pensers que requelt / Dont motes foie[e]s se due[l]t” 
‘And the human heart is a creature / that has a strange and peculiar nature: / it thinks a 
great deal, / turns the deep thoughts it harbors / over and over again, far too often, / 
and causes itself a great deal of grief’ (124-125).  This seems to be what Reason 
presents as, ironically, the livable option available to Silence – not that Silence would 
“know” where he “belongs,” but that he would sustain himself from the site of a 
forced choice, turning and re-turning “larges pensers,” dealing in grief, “paralyzed” 
(Tolmie 15) according to Tolmie, but, according to Reason, (at least) alive in this 
ambivalent commitment. 
 Finally, an opportunity presents itself, a way to find some sort of voice in the 
midst of this ambivalent commitment.42  Two minstrels come to Cornwall and Silence 
                                                 
41 The verb s’acostumer, too, is a striking choice, inasmuch as Reason thereby suggests that, in 
abandoning his nurture, Silence would take on the habits and the costume of nature.  In other words, 
this embrace of nature – a death embrace – would be, itself, covering, habit, a sort of additive – qualities 
we might today associate with “nurture.” As others have noted, Heldris provides another such 
subversion whereby Nature is explicitly associated with the “cooked” rather than the “raw” in the 
tragicomic scene with Merlin: Silence, who must capture Merlin, is advised to leave out delicious 
smelling cooked meat, for Merlin will be unable to resist the smell of cooked meat and Silence will be 
able to ensnare him.  Indeed, Merlin smells the meat and starts to head towards it; Nurture intervenes, 
trying to stop him, claiming that she had nurtured him in the woods such that surely he would have 
relinquished his human nature and would now prefer herbs.  But Nature literally drags Merlin to the 
cooked meat and Merlin will abandon his life in the woods, the irony being, of course, that the woods 
becomes Nurture’s domain and cooked meat becomes Nature’s.   
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decides that he, too, should become a minstrel.  As he reasons, if, as a man, he proves 
to be no great knight, minstrelsy will prove useful to him.  If he is to live as a woman, 
on the other hand, music could compensate for his inability to embroider.  Silence 
imagines life as a woman as a situation of “captivity” that he would find boring, 
telling himself that “’[s]i te porra mains anoier / Se tu iés en un bastonage / Ke tu aies 
vials el en gage’” ‘’[y]ou will be less bored / in your captivity / if you at least have 
something to fall back on’’ (134-135).  As Linda Marie Zaerr notes, “Young Silence 
immediately recognizes minstrelsy as a bridge between the worlds of men and women, 
making up for the deficiencies in either” (109).   
 As Zaerr observes, the voice of minstrelsy represents Silence’s attempt to forge 
a compromise between the demands of living life as a man and those of living it as a 
woman, and, I would add, between the demands of Nature and those of Nurture.  
Silence does not adjudicate between Nature and Nurture, finding in one or the other 
the answer for his being.  Instead, his ambivalence in the face of their claims – his 
resistance to being claimed by either one or the other – are, I believe, the very 
condition of his access to a voice, albeit a voice that is visibly exterior to his body, 
actualized at a distance instead of internally through equivalence or collapse.  In these 
ways, Silence’s minstrelsy constitutes a “transgender” voice, one that has communion 
with both the worlds of men and those of women.  In Tolmie’s words, “Afraid to be a 
(failed/not) woman, afraid to be a (failed/not) man, [Silence] nevertheless imagines 
herself as having some form of voice…” (16).  But Silence’s minstrelsy also 
                                                                                                                                            
42 For a marvelous study of the degree of Silence’s agency as expressed in the stylistics of the text, see 
Mary Ellen Ryder and Linda Marie Zaerr’s “A Stylistic Analysis of Le Roman de Silence.”  Analyzing 
such features as deceleration and frequency, Ryder and Zaerr conclude that the romance’s language 
“consistently diminishes the audience’s perception of Silence’s power” (36).   
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constitutes a particular kind of “transgender” voice, one for which a certain sort of 
short-circuit, screen, or relay remains in play.  To the extent that minstrelsy constitutes 
Silence’s voice at all, it references “a rupture in the middle of” (Dolar 42) full 
presence: Silence cannot mistake his voice, this voice in a viele, for an “auto-affective 
voice of self-presence and self-mastery” (41).  Finally, Silence’s transgender voice 
also references “a void” (Dolar 42), the void created the moment neither Nature nor 
Nurture can account for Silence’s sexed being, “a void in which the voice comes to 
resonate” (42).   
 How effective is Silence’s voice at a distance?  Zaerr explores this question in 
a fascinating analysis of those scenes in the romance in which Silence actually 
performs.  As Zaerr points out, the Roman de Silence would most likely have been 
performed, but “[t]here is no incontrovertible evidence” (101) as to how it would have 
been performed.  (Nor is there evidence that it was in fact performed.)  Perhaps the 
lack of historical record on these questions explains in part why critics have tended not 
to consider the text’s performance in their readings of the romance.  A musician 
herself, though, Zaerr discovers that a metaperformance of the romance opens onto 
important insights: if, as Zaerr states, the Roman de Silence “invites us to participate in 
a minstrel’s perspective on silence,” it is nonetheless “only in performance that this 
perspective is embodied” (99).   
 We are told that Silence becomes a fabulous musician, to the extent that the 
minstrels with whom he is travelling will eventually plot to murder him.  Yet we hear 
relatively little about Silence’s performances.  By contrast, we are told in precise detail 
about one of the other two minstrels’ performances (e.g., the songs and instruments 
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played, the popularity of one of these songs, the order in which they are performed, 
and so on [Zaerr 108]).  Moreover, when these two minstrels perform, they are center 
stage.43  Similarly, in other romances of the time featuring a scene of performance, the 
character who is singing is allowed to speak (Zaerr cites Daurel et Beton, Galeran de 
Bretagne, Frêne, and Aucassin et Nicolete [103]).  Silence, however – as Zaerr 
discovers when she decides to perform one of the scenes wherein Silence himself 
plays viele – is strikingly not on the scene during his own performance.   
 In the scene in question, Silence performs during a great feast at the behest of 
the duke.  The other two minstrels initiate the concert, but Silence takes over when the 
duke wants to hear Silence and Silence alone: “… li dus nes violt consenter, / Ne mais 
Scilence solement. / Celui voelent oïr la gent” ‘… the duke wanted to hear Silence 
alone. / Everyone wanted to hear only him’ (152-153).  And so, ostensibly, Silence 
plays, but the audience of the romance itself hears nothing more of Silence’s 
performance; instead, the focus of the scene shifts immediately to the other two 
minstrels and the lengthy conversation they have about their jealousy of Silence (152-
157).  Zaerr nicely sums up the irony of the passage: “Performance reveals eloquently 
the incongruous reality that Silence does not participate in performance at the feast, 
though logically he must be performing... I cannot make my vielle sing the melody of 
Silence while I am saying the words of the minstrels” (110).  If, as I have suggested, 
Silence accesses voice at a distance, through his viele and harp, Zaerr’s reading of this 
                                                 
43 In her narration of her own experience of performing this scene, Zaerr remarks that she finds the 
transitions from one minstrel to the other “comfortable and believable,” that she “could hint at 
simultaneous performance of vielle and harp by plucking the lower strings with [her] left hand while 
[she] bowed the higher strings,” and that all in all performing the scene “reveals a high degree of 
agency in the minstrels” (108-109).    
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scene indicates that this access to voice constitutes uncertain ground for Silence’s 
performance of self.  There is, in a sense, a double screen at work in Silence’s relation 
to voice: twice he is displaced from self-presence, twice removed from pure 
immediacy.   
One day, Silence returns to Cornwall.  He walks right up to his parents that day 
playing his viele, but they do not recognize him; still, Cador agrees to speak privately 
with the unknown minstrel in hopes of having some news of his missing son.  After a 
moving scene wherein Heldris emphasizes the great irony of Cador’s longing to see 
his son again when his son is right in front of him, Silence breaks in with this 
declaration:   
‘Sire,’ fait il, ‘vos fils vos prie 
Que vos merchi aiés de lui. 
Bien reconois que grant anui 
Avés eü por moi, bials père, 
Vos et mi parent et ma mere. 
Merchi de vostre engendreüre! 
Vos savés bien de ma nature: 
‘Jo sui,’ fait il, ‘nel mescrées, 
Com li malvais dras encreés 
Ki samble bons, et ne l’est pas. 
Si est de moi! N’ai que des dras, 
Et le contenance et le halle 
Ki onques apartiegne a malle.’  
 
‘Sire,’ he said, ‘your son begs of you 
to have pity on him. 
I see very well that you have endured dreadful suffering 
on my account, dear father, 
You and my family and my mother. 
Have pity on your offspring! 
You know my nature very well. 
I am,’ he said, ‘believe me, 
like an inferior piece of cloth 
powdered with chalk, that looks good, but isn’t. 
That’s what I am! I have only the clothing 
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and bearing and complexion 
that belong to a man’ (170-171).   
 
In this scene, Silence does not disclose himself as Cador’s daughter, but neither does 
he disclose himself unequivocally as Cador’s son.  Instead, in what seems to be the 
closest thing to a proper identification for Silence, he discloses himself as Cador’s 
fake son, “[k]i samble bons, et ne l’est pas.”  Silence, in other words, wants nothing to 
do with “a pure passing” (Dolar 36); what authenticity he has resides, paradoxically, in 
inauthenticity: “Vos savés bien de ma nature… Si est de moi!”  With the metaphor of 
the “malvais dras,” Silence suggests that his masculinity is a piece of fabric that will 
tear under stress, indeed, in a sense, thereby performing that very possibility.  If on the 
one hand he apologizes that he has only the clothing, bearing, and complexion of a 
man, he also qualifies that apology; with the word “onques,” he undermines the extent 
to which these terms belong to the category “malle” as well: these clothing, bearing, 
and complexion once, or under certain circumstances, belong/ed to a man.  Silence 
thereby resists narratives of authenticity in every available direction: his passionate 
outburst suggests that it is not only that he is neither an authentic man nor an authentic 
woman, but that it would be difficult to locate once and for all the qualities that could 
index the authentically gendered subject.   
This scene speaks, among other things, to Silence’s intense discomfort with 
passing as a man before his father.  To suggest that Silence is discomfited by passing 
as a man before his father, however, is not to suggest that Silence wants to be 
recognized by his father as a “woman” – nowhere in the romance does he indicate 
anything along these lines.  Instead, Silence seems to want to be recognized as a 
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“(failed/not) man” and it may be precisely with his father that Silence finds a space 
where that would be possible.   
 If, as Zaerr suggests, minstrelsy makes up for the deficiencies in both the 
gendered universes available to subjects in the thirteenth century (and, largely, today) 
– “man,” “woman” –, then Silence seems to suggest in this scene that it ought not 
make up for those deficiencies too well; having a voice should also involve leaving 
some room for failure, for the inadequate, the incomplete, the patched up, and the 
inexplicable.  When his musical voice allows him to “pass” too well, or allows him the 
appearance of authenticity, Silence is moved to speak to his father to redress the 
matter.  Thus does Silence not only find in minstrelsy a sort of “compromise” voice, 
one which serves as a solution to what could otherwise be a paralyzing site of 
ambivalence; in this scene with his father, he goes so far as to speak in order to affirm 
inauthenticity and ambivalence.  Instead of finding an “image” or “answer” for his 
“being” in either of the figures of Nature or Nurture, or in either the identity of that of 
“a real man” or that of “a real woman,” Silence follows the insights of Reason, 
sustaining himself at a site of ambivalence, grief-stricken at times – as in this scene – 
but, at least, orbiting the inexplicable with a voice. 
 
Joy Ladin: The Voice of the Self 
 
Ladin, too, is looking for a voice, but an authentic one.  Ladin beautifully narrates the 
steps that lead her to the “voice of [her] future” (254), a voice that not only allows 
people to “’read’ [her] voice as female” (253), but a voice that can be “something to 
relax into, to accept in all its husky imperfection” (254).   
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 Ladin does not speak of this process in terms as explicitly grim as Reason’s.  
As we have seen, Reason points out that Silence’s embrace of Nature would be a 
death-embrace.  Still, the transition Ladin describes is lonely, even humiliating (251), 
and she narrates far more extensively the day-to-day frustrations of vocal 
transitioning, a problem not in play in the Roman de Silence, where Silence easily 
adopts a minstrel voice and is never questioned about his gender.  Ladin explains that 
most of the changes effected by a regimen of hormonal replacement will help her body 
to be “read” as that of a woman, but that hormones will not change her voice: “It 
would be slow,” she writes, “like natural puberty… but, given a proper hormone 
replacement regimen, it would be inexorable, and by the end of two years, my body 
should ‘read’ as female” (249).  But, “Hormones wouldn’t transform my genitals… 
Hormones wouldn’t change my skeletal structure… And hormones wouldn’t change 
my voice” (249).  Grim in this moment, Ladin writes, “The first two were daunting but 
expected. The last was devastating” (249).   
Even though Ladin begins by noting that hormones’ inability to change her 
voice to one that can be “read” as female is, for her, devastating, she goes on to 
explain that she rather liked her male voice.  This liking, however, strongly qualified, 
speaks to the misrecognitions which have already framed Ladin’s existence: “My 
voice was the one male part of me I didn’t loathe…, the one means I’d found to touch 
other people without being touched and thus physically reminded of the foreignness of 
the body they mistook for me” (249).  Touching without being touched, Ladin’s male 
voice allows her to have contact with others without suffering the alienating effect of 
being made aware of her body, a body she identifies not as “my body” but as “the 
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body” – “the body they mistook for me.”  People misrecognize Ladin when they 
recognize this body as her.  “The body” stands like a screen between Ladin and others, 
and only her voice is able to reach around that divide, trying to make up for it, but 
only ever in one direction, for Ladin touches with her voice without being touched in 
turn. 
If her body is “the body,” her voice, on the other hand, is a “male part of me,” 
an organ or appendage, something “male” that is, in a sense, attached to “me,” but, 
unlike other male parts, not loathsomely.  She explains that she worked on her male 
voice, “to sound honest, concerned, angry, soulful, playful, deadpan” (249).  Even 
before her transition, then, the voice for Ladin is a muscle, a tool, an object of study, 
and, in this sense, neither natural nor automatic.  As Ladin notes with respect to her 
male voice too, “I learned to think of that voice as me” (250, emphasis added).   
In transitioning, Ladin will have to de-familiarize herself from the voice she 
has come to recognize as her very self; but, as she asks, “How could any other voice 
feel like mine, like an authentic expression of me?”  Ladin first describes her lack of 
success with advice she finds online: “to cut out the chest resonance that men typically 
use to amplify their voices…,” to “direct my air-flow to the small cavities in my 
head…,” “to sing along with deep-voiced women singers…” (251).  The upshot of this 
wealth of information is that “My growing list of things to remember to do and not do 
when talking turned speaking into an exhausting and humiliating exercise; the only 
thing I was sure I’d learned was that every sound that came out of my throat proved I 
wasn’t a woman” (251).  We see in these avowals that Ladin’s voice has already 
begun to transition, not from the voice of a man to that of a woman, but from the only 
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reliable coordinate in a foreign body to, in Ladin’s perception, “humiliating” “proof” 
that she isn’t a woman.   
Ladin’s next attempt is a free online manual which counsels her to do 
“extensive voice exercises every day for the rest of my life” (252).  Ladin throws 
herself into this venture, and her voice begins to change, but she describes the effect 
as, ultimately, the loss of voice as such: “I no longer had anything that could be called 
‘my voice’” (252).  Ladin’s wording here is quite desolate: at this critical juncture, she 
finds that she has no vocal accompaniment to her nascent sense of self.  Stranded from 
“her voice,” Ladin has now  
a new voice, or rather a series of new voices… These voices were strained, 
unreliable, and required constant thought and effort…. Even when I talked to 
my closest friends, those who really knew what I was going through, I couldn’t 
shake the sense that my voice was a caricature they listened to with pity (252-
253).   
 
Speaking of voices in plural, Ladin isn’t sure if these new voices are a voice at all or – 
in what amounts to a fittingly strained metaphor – a caricature of one.  In the process 
of transitioning, Ladin’s voice betrays her more than ever, carving out new gullies 
between Ladin and her family, her most trusted friends, and her identity as a woman as 
such.   
The essay does not end on this note, of course.  What next happens to Ladin’s 
voice will be only a subtly different transformation but a vastly more sustainable one: 
a friend gives Ladin three lessons with a professional voice coach.  Ladin reports: 
“She adjusted my pitch downward, opened my air passages to increase breathiness, cut 
some of my head resonance and added a trace of the chest resonance I had eliminated 
months before. The result was a voice that sounded and even felt easy and natural. She 
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didn’t want me to sound like ‘a woman.’ She wanted me to sound like me” (253-254).  
After having striven to internalize a bewildering array of modifications, Ladin finds 
with this coach an easy, natural voice borne of small adjustments, adjustments that 
suggest that Ladin’s female voice was never so far off after all.   
Yet:  
The ease of that voice made it hard for me. My life had always been defined by 
discomfort with myself. The steps I had taken to find my female self had 
increased that discomfort, reminding me, every time I opened my mouth, of the 
difference between what I was and what I wanted to be.  
But according to my voice teacher, the only way I could find my female voice 
was to realize that there was no difference between what I was and what I 
wanted to be (254).   
 
Ladin does not say more about this matter, how the ease of her voice makes it hard for 
her.  We might wonder what she might have told us had she dwelled longer on this 
point; are there newfound instantiations of the screen of the voice encountered even at 
the point at which she arrives at this hard-fought ease?   
 
Conclusion 
 
At the end of Ladin’s essay, we may rejoice with her at her discovery that there is no 
difference between what she is and what she wants to be.  Silence’s end is not so 
joyous.  At the conclusion of the romance, Silence is finally rendered silent.  After a 
series of dramatic adventures, near-death experiences, wars, seductions, and narrow 
escapes, Silence is identified as a “girl” in front of the whole court and publicly 
undressed; it is Merlin who speaks: “Si est desos les dras meschine” ‘he is a girl 
beneath his clothes’ (306-307).  Both during and following this disclosure, Silence is 
praised for his valiance, wisdom, and loyalty, until Heldris finally declares, (4) 
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“Silence atornent come feme. / Segnor, que vos diroire plus? / Ains ot a non 
Scilensiüs: / Ostés est –us, mis i est –a / Si est només Scilentiä” ‘They dressed Silence 
as a woman. / Lords, what more can I say? / Once he was called Silentius: / they 
removed the –us, added an –a, / and so he was called Silentia’ (312-313).  Heldris puts 
Silence’s agency in these final scenes in grave doubt: an anonymous “they” dress 
Silence as a woman, and Heldris himself is rendered nearly speechless by the enormity 
of the thing: “Lords, what more can I say?”  Yet, dressed as a woman, Silence 
remains, for one last moment, “he”: we know this based on the writing – “només”: 
now a “he” dressed as a woman, a “he” with the name Silentia, Silence’s newest (and 
most fleeting) gender is visible in writing, but silent everywhere else. 
 The contemporary text ultimately restores pure interiority to Ladin’s voice; 
through her experience of vocal transition, Ladin leaves behind both familiar 
discomfort and the uncanny plurality of the “barely human” to find a more fully self-
present voice than ever before.  Ladin expresses this success in strikingly spatial 
terms: she has had to realize that “there was no difference between what I was and 
what I wanted to be.”  The screen has been dismantled, distances collapsed.  As Ladin 
finds that she is no longer a caricature of herself, presumably the distance that 
previously separated her from her loved ones is disappearing now too.   
The medieval text, on the other hand, takes the opportunity of a transgender 
narrative to communicate, however inadvertently, a message about the fundamental 
inexplicability of sexed being.  I have been arguing that Silence’s access to any sort of 
voice – any music, speech, or persona – depends on the space created by that 
inexplicability.  Once he gives himself over to Nature, who stands in as one 
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explanation for his sexed being, he is thenceforth silent.  By contrast, Ladin narrates 
an entirely different sort of space – space for the idea that, for some, it is possible to 
recognize oneself in one’s voice; it is possible, desirable, even potentially necessary, 
to arrive at self-recognition in the voice.  That this space should be available for both 
transgender and non-transgender people is the implicit message of the text.   
According to Dolar, “[t]o hear oneself speak – or simply, just to hear oneself – 
can be seen as an elementary formula of narcissism that is needed to produce the 
minimal form of self” (39); “[t]he moment there is a surface which returns the voice, 
the voice acquires an autonomy of its own and enters the dimension of the other; it 
becomes a deferred voice, and narcissism crumbles” (40).  Heldris and Ladin agree: a 
minimal sense of self is necessary.  Ladin finds hers once she realizes that there is no 
difference between what she is and what she wants to be, when, in other words, the 
screen through which the voice passes at least seems no longer to be in operation.  
Silence, however, locates his in, first, a deferred voice – the sort of voice that, 
according to Dolar, causes narcissism to crumble – and, later, in his very 
inauthenticity (“Si est de moi!”).  While both paths function as a form of survival, 
Silence’s explicitly retains the unknown, and thus a void where the voice – site of both 
self-recognition and alterity, alternately uncanny and orienting – may resonate in all its 
forms.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Signifying Without Limit: The Isle des Hermaphrodites 
 
The Isle des Hermaphrodites presents in caricatured form the possibility of 
(re)signifying (the body) without limit.44  Part travel narrative, part dystopic vision of 
the “Old World” and its others, the novel is usually identified as a satire of the court of 
Henri III (1574-1589)45, a king variously accused of bisexuality, sodomy, effeminacy, 
and, of course, hermaphrodism.  In keeping with more virulent strains of anti-
hermaphroditic sentiment circulating at the time46, Artus presents the hermaphrodites 
of his imaginary island as enthusiastic proponents of rape, murder, and incest; they 
target in particular religion, family, and the state, revealing each social structure as 
ultimately vulnerable and lacking in foundation.  If, though, the hermaphrodites can be 
said to approach the symbolic – or the order of language imposed without foundation 
on human subjects – as a site of ruse to be exposed for its laughable shortcomings, 
they are not, for all that, unambivalent representatives of a certain pre-Sadean 
“’delight in evil’ [bonheur dans le mal]” (Lacan, “Kant with Sade” 765): they are, for 
                                                 
44 Long provides a history of debates regarding the name of the author (Hermaphrodites in Renaissance 
Europe 215).  Historical references alternate between “Thomas Artus” and “Artus Thomas.”  I will 
follow Long in referring to the author as Thomas Artus; her own choice is based on Pierre Bayle’s entry 
on the author in the Dictionnaire historique et critique (Rotterdam, 1697) (Long 216).   
45 This is certainly how Pierre de l’Estoile, contemporary of Henri III and compiler of political material 
of the period, interpreted the novel: his first footnote of the novel states that “cette prétendue 
Description est une Satyre Allégorique du Regne de Henri III, de son Gouvernement, de sa mollesse, & 
de la vie effeminée de ses Favoris” (Journal de Henri III et de Henri IV : Memoires pour servir a 
l’Histoire de France, ou Journal de Henri III. Roy de France & de Pologne. Tome IV 3).  There has 
been relatively little scholarship on the Isle, but for the most part, those authors who have treated the 
novel to more attention than that of a footnote make reference to the significance of the rule of Henri III 
and his court of Favorites to the novel’s satirical thrust.  Frank Lestringant, in an intriguing reversal, has 
argued that the novel is directed against Henri IV (Le Livre des îles: Atlas et récits insulaires, de la 
Genèse à Jules Verne). 
46 See for reference Agrippa d’Aubigné Les Tragiques and Theodor de Bry’s America.  For a discussion 
of the uses of the word “hermaphrodite” at the beginning of the seventeenth century, see the 
“Introduction” to Claude-Gilbert Dubois’s 1996 edition of the novel.   
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example, welcoming ambassadors to the narrator who subsequently describes them 
and charming aesthetes whose daily rituals feature activities apparently no more 
violent than that of getting a perm.  Violence here is generally consigned to the 
background, referenced through allusion (as in the sumptuous décor, where we see 
fragments of the stories of Heliogabalus [73-75] or Ovid’s Caenis/Caenus [70]) or in 
anamorphic stains of horror (such as when the narrator first reads a scene at a hair 
salon as one of torture [61]).  I will return to these scenes, but suffice it to say for the 
moment that, while Artus draws back from directly representing the limitless violence 
called for by the hermaphrodites’ laws, violence is – sometimes quite literally – in the 
background of the novel.47 
                                                 
47 There has been quite a lot of excellent scholarship on the significance of the figure of the 
hermaphrodite in early modern France.  As Long notes, “For an identity that is effaced by the legal 
system, intersexuality, particularly in the form of the hermaphrodite, is one of the most visible figures 
of the time” (5).  Horrifying portent and epistemological puzzle, the hermaphroditic body of the late 
sixteenth century figured simultaneously as monster, icon, thought experiment, and symbol of the 
anxieties and possibilities of (sexed, gendered) embodiment.  In many ways, Artus’s novel offers an 
ideal venue for the exploration of what Gary Ferguson has described as early modern France’s 
“veritable cultural obsession” (Queer (Re)Readings in the French Renaissance 27) with the figure of 
the hermaphrodite, for the novel toys simultaneously with competing understandings of hermaphrodism 
circulating at the time.  According to Ferguson, this obsession with hermaphrodism was “no doubt 
fuelled… by the neo-Platonic revival and the vogue of the figure of the androgyne” (27), and Ferguson 
asserts that while the idea of the hermaphrodite “encourages the idea of sexual indeterminacy and tests 
the limits of gender separation versus human unity” (27-28), “what is crucical is that division” (28).  In 
other words, while the hermaphrodite can signify either “double or between” (28), it is division as such 
that emerges as the transfixing idea.  On the novel itself, Ferguson writes that “[t]he most notorious 
instance of the satirising of the court of Henri III through the figure of the hermaphrodite was to 
appear… in the early seventeenth century, under the reign of Henri IV. L’Isle des Hermaphrodites, 
published around 1605 and attributed to Artus Thomas (or Thomas Artus), sieur d’Embry, is a far from 
straightforward text, however. A number of critics have argued that the spirit of the work is in fact more 
in line with the libertine attitudes and licentiousness of the court of Henri IV than with that of his 
predecessor. Moreover, in the same way that the material of parody is present in the target model, so, 
conversely, an element of seriousness, even utopianism, has been discerned by a number of scholars in 
the Isle” (Queer (Re)Readings 265).  See for reference Ferguson’s “Androgynes, Hermaphrodites, and 
Courtesans: Women, Queer Nature, and (Queer?) Pleasure” in Queer (Re)Readings.  See also Long’s 
Hermaphrodites in Renaissance Europe, where she provides an excellent analysis of Artus’s novel as 
well as extensive readings of the writings of anatomy professor Caspar Bauhin and surgeons Ambroise 
Paré and Jacques Duval, all of whom published on hermaphrodism in the early modern period.  See also 
Ruth Gilbert, Early Modern Hermaphrodites: Sex and Other Stories; Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter 
Stallybrass’s “Fetishizing Gender: Constructing the Hermaphrodite in Renaissance Europe”; Lorraine 
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 In the pages that follow, I will consider the hermaphrodites’ aesthetics of 
covering and instability and their laws about language and invention, finding in these a 
different version of “transgender subjectivity” from that explored in the rest of the 
project.  I would like to suggest that, in their approach to limits, the hermaphrodites 
embody a “masculine” transgender subjectivity.48  While Esmerade of the Vie de 
Sainte Euphrosine and Silence of the Roman de Silence embody a “feminine” 
transgender subjectivity, such that Esmerade imposes new limits and Silence suffers 
from the inescapability of them, Artus’s hermaphrodites glory in doing away with 
limits.  Imagining a world without limit is their joy, inspiration, and défi.  When limits 
do emerge in the novel (for the proliferation of possibility depends just as surely on 
encounters with limits), they emerge (with one notable exception) as, again, 
anamorphic stains of horror that are quickly resolved and recalibrated.   
 The novel opens with a narrator who offers a commentary on how European 
encounters with the “New World” have awakened insatiable desires for the new: “Le 
nouveau monde nous a produit en ce nouveau siecle tant de choses nouvelles, que la 
pluspart du monde ancien, mesprisant son antiquité, a mieux aymé chercher, au peril 
                                                                                                                                            
Daston and Katharine Park’s “The Hermaphrodite and the Orders of Nature: Sexual Ambiguity in Early 
Modern France”; and Todd Reeser’s “Ruling the Hermaphrodites: Masculinity, Sovereignty, and 
National Identity in Political Discourse,” which considers the sociopolitical stakes of the Isle des 
Hermaphrodites and the ideals of masculinity and moderation in the construction of both kings and 
fathers.  Reeser offers the compelling idea that, for the novel, “a fallen masculinity is more the issue 
than sexual or gender fluidity per se” (242).   
48 In reading the hermaphrodites in this way, I mean to explore the idea that transgender subjectivity 
would be exclusive neither to subjects who identify as transgender nor to “feminine” subjects (who, 
again, may or may not identify as transgender).  By “masculine,” I mean to reference not just Lacan’s 
“masculine” subject position as such but, more specifically, a perverse one.  As with my discussion of 
hysteria in Chapter One, I do not present or regard these interpretations as pathologizing.  Instead, I see 
my aim as similar to that of Ann Cvetkovich in An Archive of Feelings: Trauma, Sexuality, and Lesbian 
Public Cultures.  Cvetkovich writes in part in the interest of de-pathologizing trauma itself, thereby 
emptying certain claims about the relationships between trauma, incest, and lesbian sexualities of their 
potentially pathologizing and disciplinary force.   
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de mille vies, quelque nouvelle fortune, que se contenter de l’ancienne et vivre en 
repos et tranquillité” ‘The new world has produced for us in this new century so many 
new things that the majority of the old world, despising its antiquity, preferred to seek, 
to the peril of thousands of lives, some new fortune rather than content itself with the 
old one and live in peace and tranquility’’ (53-54, my translation, here and below).49  
The narrator’s view on this pursuit of the new, already suggested by the mocking 
repetition of the word “nouveau,” is succinct: “Et ainsi desirant les hautes avantures, 
ils rencontrent le plus ordinairement celles qui terminent tous leurs desirs, sans avoir 
jouy du contentement qu’ils recherchoient” ‘And so desiring high adventure, they 
most commonly encountered those that brought an end to all of their desires, without 
having enjoyed the contentment they were seeking (54).  Following this, we encounter 
one such adventurer, the second narrator, “un de nos François” ‘one of our 
Frenchmen’ (54).  Upon introduction, this traveler is associated with blood: Artus 
identifies him as “un de nos François qui n’avoit pas moins de valeur que de prudence, 
mais à qui une bonté naturelle avoit osté la puissance et la volonté de tremper ses 
mains dans le sang des siens” ‘one of our Frenchmen who did not have less valor than 
prudence; but a natural goodness had taken from him the force and the will to dip his 
hands in the blood of others’ (54).  After years of escape from “sanglantes tragedies” 
‘bloody tragedies’ (54), France’s Wars of Religion, the traveler returns to regale a 
group of his friends and familiars with the story of his trip to the Island of the 
Hermaphrodites.  It is this narrator who will breathlessly recount the many scenes that 
                                                 
49 All translations, unless otherwise noted, are my own.  My translations, for the most part quite literal, 
regrettably do not and cannot aspire to capture the stylistic complexity, playfulness, and nuance of the 
original French.   
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constitute our glimpse of the hermaphrodites’ society.  It is not until the conclusion of 
these descriptions that we arrive at the hermaphrodites’ own views on social 
structures, language, ethics, and invention: the traveler/second narrator has transcribed 
an extract of the hermaphrodites’ written laws.  Artus’s strategy of embedding 
narratives within narratives thus promptly renders it difficult to speak of the novel as a 
whole; each narrative voice speaks to a subtly different perspective on limits and the 
new, with the first narrator and the hermaphrodites representing opposing 
perspectives.   
 The traveler opens the story of his visit to the Island of the Hermaphrodites 
with a sentence of 32 lines.  In these 32 lines, the traveler summarizes how, after an 
unspecified amount of time spent travelling, he came to arrive on the island: bored by 
his travels (55), he was on his way home when a storm caused him to shipwreck on 
the island.  This opening sentence of 32 lines does more than relay background 
narration, however, for it also inaugurates, in particularly exaggerated form, a stylistic 
feature of the novel.  Throughout the novel, the traveler will tend to speak at great 
length, postponing full breaks and adducing ever more detail in unending clauses and 
fragments.50  When the traveler does begin a new sentence in these first few pages, he 
offers syntaxis rather than parataxis, language which both orients and connects:  “Mais 
apres que… Lors… Toutesfois… Et comme… Toutesfois… Ainsi” ‘But after… 
During… However… And as… However… Thus’ (56-58).  Thus does the traveler – 
in an early and formal representation of the extreme ambivalence that will characterize 
the novel as a whole (perhaps the only feature that could be said to characterize the 
                                                 
50 He shares this stylistic feature with the hermaphrodites’ written laws.   
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novel as a whole) – offer a minimal experience of orientation even as he testifies 
quietly to a desire not to orient his listeners.  In this way, his listeners’ experience will 
be similar to his own on the island, for, as he notes, at the end of the second sentence, 
“nous veismes que la terre sur laquelle nous marchions estoit toute flotante, et qu’elle 
erroit vagabonde sur ce grand Ocean sans aucune stabilité” ‘we saw that the land on 
which we were walking was floating freely, and that it was wandering vagabond on 
this great Ocean with no stability’ (56).   
 The sheer beauty of the island proves destabilizing as well: upon arrival, the 
traveler’s eye fails to comprehend the marvels of the place, for “l’architecture, la 
sculpture, et l’ordre que l’on y voyoit compassé en toutes ses parties, attiroit tellement 
l’esprit en admiration, que l’oeil, qui peut voir tant de choses en un instant, n’estoit 
pas assez suffisant pour comprendre tout le contenu de ce beau palais”  ‘the 
architecture, the sculpture, and the order we saw there, studied [compassé] in all 
aspects, so attracted the spirit in admiration, that the eye, which can see so many 
things in an instant, was not enough to comprehend all the contents of that beautiful 
palace’ (57).  From the beginning, there is something present which the narrator 
cannot entirely grasp, an admiration and attraction outside of comprehension and a 
visibility to which his eye, “qui peut voir tant de choses en un instant,” does not have 
access.  The language with which the traveler describes the inassimilable indexes the 
scope of his unmooring: perplexingly, both the order (“l’architecture, la sculpture, et 
l’ordre,” figures of frame and structure), and the content (“le contenu de ce beau 
palais”), stretch out elusively, suggesting that even those conventional anchors of 
vision and knowledge – point and perspective, general and particular – collapse and 
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withdraw on the island, leaving the traveler quite literally unmoored.  The traveler 
finds himself strangely “compassé” without coordinates, and that on an island which, 
moreover, floats, “vagabonde,” “sans aucune stabilité.”   
 Having discovered that “on l’appelloit l’isle des Hermaphrodites” ‘they called 
it the island of the Hermaphrodites’ (58), the traveler will go on to provide a rapturous 
ethnography of the many scenes he observes, beginning by following a group of 
people carrying plates for, he supposes, the “seigneur du lieu” ‘lord of the place’ 
(59).51  This, it seems, will be his first encounter with either a hermaphrodite as such 
or with an elite one52; he has noted nothing in particular about the “merveilleusement 
grande multitude de gens qui alloient et venoient de tous costez” ‘marvelously great 
multitude of people coming and going from all sides’ (59), nor about the “quelques 
hommes” ‘few men’ (59) carrying food, so much dizzying background to the inside of 
the palace.  This first encounter will instantly prove destabilizing in its own right, 
however, for the hands and face of the seigneur du lieu will momentarily, and 
somewhat horrifically, fail to materialize:   
 Je n’avois encore veu ce que c’estoit qui estoit dans ce lict, car on ne voyoit 
 point encore les mains ny le visage; mais celuy qui luy avoit mis le manteau 
 vint aussi tost luy lever un linge qui luy pendoit fort bas sur le visage, et à luy 
 oster un masque qui n’estoit pas des estoffes ny de la forme de celuy que 
 portent ordinairement les Dames, car il estoit comme d’une toille luisante et 
 fort serrée, où il sembloit qu’on eust mis quelque gresse dessus, et si il ne se 
 couvroit pas tout le visage, car il estoit eschancré en ondes devers le bas de 
 peur que cela n’offençast la barbe qui commençoit à cotonner de tous costez 
 (60).    
 
                                                 
51 Reeser identifies the “seigneur du lieu” as the king of the island (242).   
52 It is not clear to me how we are supposed to view the people serving the elites versus the elites 
themselves.  Potentially they are all hermaphrodites, as it is the island of hermaphrodites, but the 
narrator only identifies certain individuals as hermaphrodites as such or in other cases as Seigneurs-
Dames. 
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 I had not yet seen what it was that was in this bed, for we did not yet see either 
 the hands or the face; but the one who had put the coat on him came 
 immediately to raise a fabric that hung low over his face and to remove from 
 him a mask that was of neither the fabric nor the form of that ordinarily worn 
 by Ladies, for it was as if of a glistening fabric and very tight where it seemed 
 they must have put some fat underneath, and so it did not cover the whole face, 
 for it was cut away in waves towards the bottom so that it would not offend the 
 beard beginning to cotton from all sides.   
 
In what turns into a detailed description of a mask, the narrator begins by remarking 
that he has not yet seen “ce que c’estoit qui estoit dans ce lict,” evidencing a will to 
mark the hermaphrodite as a foreign object, a “ce que” rather than a “ce qui.”  
However, Artus promptly adds another twist to such objectifying logic by suggesting 
that “ce que c’estoit qui estoit dans ce lict” can be determined by a good look at “its” 
hands and face.  As generally naked parts of the body to which an eye may turn in 
search of gender markers, the hands and face are indeed the more modest option for 
the obligatory gender check, but, in this case, the narrator already knows that the 
person in question (“he”53) is a hermaphrodite.  In a sense, the person in the bed is 
thrown into question less because he is of an indeterminate gender than because he is 
of indeterminate hands and face: “on ne voyoit point encore les mains ny le visage.”  
These hands and face are, of course, gloved and masked: those serving the lord cover 
his face with a fabric that is like that of a glistening cloth, one which is inscrutably 
distinct from that normally worn by Ladies.  This is a fabric which fails to fit into 
recognizable categories – it is like one thing, it is not another, it is not really (identified 
as) anything in particular.  These coverings thus both elude classification themselves 
and somehow put into question – “ce que c’estoit” – the person they cover.   
                                                 
53 As Long notes, “… the hermaphrodite is actually designated by the pronoun il, even though he is 
called a ‘demi-femme’” (224).   
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 In the rituals of beautification that the narrator proceeds to observe, he 
continues to encounter strange gap, absences, and unidentifiable objects.  In the room 
adjoining that of the hermaphrodite in the giant bed, he stumbles upon what appears to 
be a torture chamber: “… à peine fus-je entré dans la chambre, que je vy trois hommes 
que l’on tenoit aux cheveux avec de petites tenailles que l’on tiroit de certaines petites 
chaufferettes, de sorte que l’on voyoit leurs cheveux tous fumeux”  ‘I had barely 
entered the room when I saw three men being held by their hair with little pincers 
pulled from certain little heaters, such that we saw their hair all up in smoke’ (61), 
which, the narrator notes, “m’effroya du commencement” ‘frightened me at first’ (61).  
As he notes, he “eu toutes les peines du monde à m’empescher de crier, pensant qu’on 
leur feist quelque outrage” ‘had all the pains in the world stopping myself from crying 
out, thinking that they did them some outrage’ (61), but from the precipice of a scene 
of apparent torture, based on the suspect combination of pincers and smoking heads of 
hair, he discovers that these three are getting perms: “quand je les euz considerez de 
plus prés, je recongneu qu’on ne peut faisoit point de mal” ‘when I had regarded them 
more closely, I recognized that no one was doing them any harm’ (61).  From light 
self-mockery, the narrator shifts to teasing the hermaphrodites, explaining that there 
couldn’t be anything outrageous afoot “Car l’un lisoit dans un livre, l’autre gaussoit 
avec un valet, et l’autre entretenoit un qui se disoit philosophe” ‘For one was reading 
in a book, the other was laughing and mocking with a valet, and the other was 
speaking to one who called himself a philosopher’ (61).  Again, the narrator flirts with 
horror, suspended for a moment in the midst of something like a primal scene, 
“pensant qu’on leur feist quelque outrage”; thus too does the violence which the 
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narrator had left France to avoid return.  He quickly recalibrates the scene laid out 
before him, such that it transforms into one of gentle comedy, but the residue of 
violence – the suggestion that we do not know what goes on with those “tenailles” and 
“chaufferettes” when the narrator leaves the room – is unsettling. 
 In addition to getting perms, the hermaphrodites are having their eyebrows 
waxed – “non toutefois si dextrement que cela ne feist beaucoup de douleur au pauvre 
patient” ‘not, however, so dexterously that it did not cause quite a lot of pain to the 
poor patient’ (62).  Again, some residues of violence surface, guised in comedy.  As 
the narrator watches on, the hermaphrodites’ cheeks, foreheads, and necks are rouged 
ruby-red and their lips are rubbed to rosy perfection.  He explains how one 
hermaphrodite has his teeth brushed too: “je vis à l’instant un autre se mettre à genoux 
devant luy et le prenant à la barbe, luy faisoit baisser la machoire d’en bas, puis ayant 
mouillé le doigt dans je ne sçay quelle eau qu’il avoit là aupres de luy dans une petite 
escuelle de verre, il prit d’une certain poudre blanche, de laquelle il luy frotta les 
gencives et les dents” ‘I saw at that moment another go to his knees before him and, 
taking him by the beard, made him lower his jaw from below, then, having wet his 
finger in I don’t know what water that he had close to him in a little glass bowl, he 
took a certain white powder with which he rubbed his gums and teeth’ (62).54  Once 
this anonymous figure has cleaned the hermaphrodite’s teeth, he fixes dentures in his 
mouth.  Next someone dyes the hermaphrodite’s beard, “à peu près de la couleur de 
feu” ‘approximately the color of fire’ (63).  The hermaphrodites are not only well 
                                                 
54 Teeth-cleaning here takes on remarkably erotic undertones.   
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turned out with their pommeled waves, ruby faces, and fiery beards: they are on the 
cutting edge of hygienic technology. 
 The threat of violence sensed by the narrator, hovering as optical illusion 
around the edges of these scenes of ritual and beautification, gathers momentum in the 
palace’s décor.  One of the beds, for instance, recounts Ovid’s story of Caenis/Caenus, 
who, after being raped by Neptune, asks not to be a woman anymore so as to be 
safeguarded from “ever suffering / such injury again” (Ovid, The Metamorphoses 
405).  Artus does not relay the details of Caenis/Caenus’s story, but readers of Ovid 
know that Caenis the woman became Caenus the man, and that Caenus’s fate as a man 
would prove just as violent as had been his fate as a woman.55  In the story of 
Caenis/Caenus, an act of violation leads to a desire for gender transformation; the 
gender transformation is a “mighty gift” and a “recompense”: as Caenis states, “’What 
I have endured / is so outrageous that I now must choose / some mighty gift as 
recompense: a thing / that will prevent my ever suffering / such injury again’” (405).  
In the request, Caenis has already become Caenus: “The tone in which she uttered 
these last words / was deeper – such as suits a male; indeed, / she had become a man” 
(405).  Gender transformation has similarly violent connotations in the tapestry the 
narrator regards next, where he sees represented scenes of the life of Heliogabalus.  
One of these scenes depicts Heliogabalus’s third century sex-reassignment surgery: “je 
voyois ce mesme homme estendu tout nud sus une table, et plusieurs à l’entour de luy 
qui avoient diverses sortes de ferremens, et faisoient tout ce qui leur estoit possible 
                                                 
55 Neptune granted him a certain invincibility – that he could not be wounded or killed by blows or iron 
weaponry –  but in the battle with the centaurs, Caenus would eventually be buried alive by the 
frustrated centaurs unable to kill him by means of their strength and weapons.   
 135 
 
pour le faire devenir femme; mais à ce que j’en pouvois juger par la suitte de l’histoire 
il demeuroit du genre neutre” ‘I saw this same man stretched out entirely naked on a 
table, with many people surrounding him holding diverse sorts of medical instruments 
[ferremens] and doing all that they could to make him become a woman; but from 
what I could judge based on the rest of the story, he remained neuter’ (73).  
Heliogabalus, apparently reviled for various reasons both political and sexual, would 
be assassinated at the age of 18 and dragged through the streets of Rome.  If Artus 
means to suggest that the hermaphrodites have, in their choice of décor, surrounded 
themselves with carefully selected myths and icons, Artus’s narrative strategies seem 
no less motivated: the direct suggestion of gender transformation is left to the 
background, where it might hover as both a specter of violence and a horizon of 
possibility, a “mighty gift” both proceeded and followed by “sanglantes tragedies.”56  
                                                 
56
 These suggestions of violence seem to recall the very “sanglantes tragedies” the traveler had hoped to 
elude; but if that is the case, why, through the conduit of Caenis’s mythical rape and Heliogabalus’s 
ancient assassination, associate the violence of the Wars of Religion with gender transformation?  Long 
points out that Artus writes against the backdrop of not only the Wars of Religion but the rise of 
skeptical ideals in Renaissance France, and she finds a correlation between the diffusion of 
understandings of gender, the Reformation, and the reintroduction of skepticism into Western thought.  
Skepticism, as Richard Popkin points out, through a historical accident, was re-introduced into Western 
thought at the same time as the Reformation (xvi); perhaps even more strikingly, it was in 1562 that 
Henri Estienne published a Latin edition of Sextus Empiricus’s Hypotyposes (Popkin 19), the year of 
the Massacre of Vassy, conventionally marked as the start of France’s Wars of Religion.  According to 
Long, Artus “cleverly makes his hermaphrodites ‘embody’” (220) various skeptical theorems: “First, 
the hermaphrodites are only the appearance of human beings, recognizable only by speech, costume, 
gesture, and the laws they create – all socially dictated, that is appearance-oriented and performative, 
aspects of identity. They also embody the suspension of judgment, in that they are neither male nor 
female (also not entirely French or alien, nor entirely fact or fiction)” (220).  These, as Long points out, 
constitute menacing perspectives on truth, religion, bodies, and customs: [“w]hat seems to menace 
dogmatically ordered French society is the acceptance that there may be more than one perspective on 
any issue. Acceptance of Protestantism puts the ‘truth’ of Catholicism into doubt – two religious truths 
cannot exist at one and the same time. If one tolerates the existence of both, one achieves only 
suspension of judgment… Similarly, given the coexistence of two sexes in one person, the notion of 
one sex as the  ‘true’ sex is canceled out... Without any foundational truth, the subject is left only 
with appearances by which to judge sexes” (220).   
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 In each scene of ritual and beautification he describes, the narrator’s attention 
is fixed on appearances: more specifically, he attends to “the cultural signs of gender – 
clothing, gesture, language, public behavior – rather than bodily marks of sex or 
reproductive questions” (Long 216).  For this reason, the bodies of the Isle figure not 
in marks of what we might call “genital difference” but in the interstices of tapestries 
of objects – clothes, gestures, language, architecture, even origami, pastries, ritual.  
The hermaphrodites play with the coverings of the body to such an extent that the 
“body itself” seems to disappear altogether or to materialize precisely as covering, 
prosthetic, and technology; thus does Artus “question normative views of sex… 
without restoring any solid epistemological grounding” (Long 216).57  The retreating, 
indeterminate, and all but absent hermaphroditic body at the center of the narrative 
contributes to the unmoored and unmooring quality of the text and could be read as 
one of the ways in which violence itself, in the guise of a disturbing suggestion or 
skeptical argument, makes its uncanny return: there may be no there there, or, in 
skeptical terms, “trying to know real being is like trying to clutch water” (Richard 
Popkin, The History of Scepticism From Erasmus to Spinoza 52).   
 In his depiction of the objects of the hermaphrodites’ island, Artus lavishes 
particular attention on objects which serve as coverings.  In several such scenes, as the 
traveler’s eyes fail again and again to comprehend, the coverings encountered frighten 
him, such that the novel vacillates rapidly between moments of comedy and horror.  In 
the midst of this humor and horror, Artus points to the ways in which the 
hermaphrodites’ objects and rituals flirt with the uncomfortable doubles of absence 
                                                 
57 As Long explains, skepticism “argues against the efficacy of language” (219) to posit any solid 
epistemological ground.  See for reference Book Two of Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism. 
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and prosthesis, loss and substitute, hole and covering; these are pairings which hold a 
particular status in psychoanalytic thought, where the “term for the process of creating 
a visible substitute for something perceived as missing is fetishism” (Dean, Unlimited 
Intimacy 145).  Fetishism is not only aesthetic or architectural, though, as we have 
seen in the hermaphrodites’ masks, gloves, and fake teeth, but also a “feat of the 
imagination” (Dean 149) and a “creative strategy” (149) that bestows value upon acts 
or objects which have no such inherent value.  Fetishism, in other words, is political.  
According to Dean,  
 When an ordinary or devalued object – one thinks, for example, of a used 
 jockstrap or dirty underwear – is transvalued and made precious, we glimpse 
 the extraordinary power of fetishism to destabilize cultural hierarchies. 
 Although plenty of fetishes are predictable (big cocks, big breasts), not every 
 case of fetishistic transformation is as trivial as the example of used underwear. 
 Predictable fetishes are overdetermined by reigning cultural values, whereas 
 less-predictable instances point to the cultural underdetermination of certain 
 fantasies – and hence to the possibilities of erotic creativity (149). 
 
 The hermaphrodites very self-consciously compel themselves to the outer 
boundaries of disgust and acceptability in the case of food, and specifically foreign 
food or foods which are “tout estrangeres” (Artus 145).  In their fidelity to creativity 
and feats of the imagination, the hermaphrodites acknowledge that they must open 
their “tastes” to things which they actually do not like:  
 … mon interprete me dict que ce n’estoit que par curiosité, et qu’en ce pays 
 c’est la coustume de faire fort grand cas des choses nouvelles…, de sorte qu’ils 
 mangeoient bien souvent des choses qui estoient du tout contraires à leur goust. 
 Mais si elles estoient nouvelles, et sur tout estrangeres, pour faire plaisir à la 
 coustume, ils en forçoient d’en user, et en faisoient grand cas en public (145).  
 
 My interpreter told me that this was only out of curiosity and that in this 
 country it is the custom to make a great spectacle of new things…, such that 
 they ate quite often things which were entirely contrary to their taste. But if 
 they were new, and above all foreign, in order to satisfy the custom, they 
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 would force themselves to try them and to make a big thing of doing so in 
 public.  
  
The “patisseries” that the narrator observes the hermaphrodites eating – which are 
“tout contraires à leur goust” – have been given “des noms d’alchimie, comme 
excitation, erection, projection, multiplication, et autres noms signifians la vertu…” 
‘alchemical names, like excitement, erection, discharge, multiplication, and other 
names signifying virtue…’ (145-146).58  The maxim here depends on expanding the 
zone of what is acceptable to the culture, forcing through the disgust at the boundaries 
to encounter those new, foreign, and not entirely tasty pastries which are then 
rewarded with culturally valorized names like arousal, erection, discharge, and 
proliferation.  The narrator, of course, is tongue in cheek again, implicitly suggesting 
that another of the marvels of the island is that, for the hermaphrodites, words like 
erection and discharge signify virtue and cleanliness – the expectation being that all of 
“nos François” must know that these are dirty names for dirty things.  The 
hermaphrodites recalibrate these foreign pastries by associating them with acts which 
they honor, for “[p]erverse desire pushes back the boundaries, claiming ground from 
disgust” (Jonathon Dollimore 378).  Since disgust functions in part to shore up the 
borders of either an individual’s or a culture’s subjectivity (according to Jonathon 
Dollimore, “[d]isgust is typically experienced at the boundary of a culture” [368)]), to 
push past such margins entails a threat to coherence or integrity.  The hermaphrodites 
valorize such permeability as virtuous.   
                                                 
58 For an expansive study of the associations between alchemy and hermaphrodites, see Leah DeVun, 
“The Jesus Hermaphrodite.”    
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 The hermaphrodites’ valorizations of different foods, fabrics, styles, and words 
exemplify the transvaluation of objects that have no inherent value and of objects that 
have been negatively valued by other cultural paradigms; however, the 
hermaphrodites’ feats of imagination go even further than the act of making precious 
particular types of undervalued objects: they also make precious inconstant, unstable, 
elusive objects as such, objects which surface only to recede, slipping from grasp.  The 
hermaphrodites’ objects are always – sometimes quite literally – slipping away from 
them.  For example, in the morning toiletry rituals, the narrator notes that some of the 
men standing around the hermaphrodites are undoing the work of their compatriots, 
and that the hermaphrodites watch on in mirrors as this counter-productivity takes 
place: “Chacun d’eux avoit plusieurs hommes à l’entour de la chaise où ils estoient 
assis, l’un defaisant ce que l’autre avoit faict, l’autre tenant en ses mains un grand 
miroir” ‘Each one of them had several men around the chair where they were seated, 
the one undoing what the other had done, the other holding in his hands a large mirror’ 
(61).  Such instabilities manifest even more literally in their pavement, their chairs, 
and their postures.  The narrator mentions that “le pavement estoit si luisant et si 
glissant qu’à peine s’y pouvoit on tenir” ‘the pavement was so shining and so slippery 
that they could barely hold themselves upright on it’ (58).  And watching one of the 
hermaphrodites walk, the narrator declares, “lors commença à se remuer de luy-
mesme, car jusques alors il n’avoit eu movement que par l’ayde d’autruy; mais il 
bransloit tellement le corps, la teste et les jambes que je croyais à tous propos qu’il 
deust tomber de son long. J’avois opinion que cela leur arrivoit, à cause de l’instabilité 
de l’isle, mais j’y appris depuis que c’est à cause qu’ils trouvent ceste façon la plus 
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belle que pas une autre” ‘then he began to move himself of his own accord, for up 
until that point he had only moved with the help of others; but he so wobbled his body, 
head, and legs that I believed at any moment he might fall flat on his face. I was of the 
opinion that this happened to them because of the instability of the island, but I have 
since learned that it is because they find this fashion of walking the most beautiful of 
all’ (68).  Finally, the hermaphrodites have invented chairs to correspond to what they 
find “plus belle que pas une autre” (77), chairs which will permit them to maintain a 
state of perpetual movement even when seated: “Il y avoit là dedans plusieurs chaires 
brisées qui s’allongeoient, s’eslargissoient, se baissoient, et se haussoient par ressorts, 
ainsi qu’on vouloit. C’estoit une invention Hermaphrodique nouvellement trouvée en 
ce pays-là… ” ‘Inside there were several broken chairs which, with springs, could get 
longer, bigger, lower, and higher, as one wished. It was a Hermaphroditic invention 
newly found in that country…’ (77).    
 The hermaphrodites’ creative feats of the imagination stretch into the realm of 
language as well.  This is already evident in the scene with the pastries, where the 
hermaphrodites contest and reconfigure the oftentimes pejorative senses of words such 
as excitation, erection, projection, and multiplication, indicating them as words which 
signify virtue.  The reconfiguration is mutual: these terms are displaced from the realm 
of the pejorative, and virtue itself becomes, happily, associated with the sexual.  The 
hermaphrodites address the matter of language directly, though, in a section of their 
laws titled “POUR CE QUI CONCERNE L’ENTREGENT” ‘FOR THAT WHICH 
CONCERNS SOCIALIZING’ (112).  In this cult of appearances, the guiding principle 
is, predictably, deception in the service of profit (112).  Beyond deception, however, 
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lies a universe of signifying potentiality, where “[t]ous ceux des nostres” ‘all of our 
kind’ (112) would possess unbridled tongues, and where a good word would be worth 
more than a good friend: “Leur langue sera comme le ressort d’une horloge qu’on a 
desbandé, elle ne pourra s’arrester tant qu’ils ayent devidé tout ce qu’ils auront envie 
de dire, et chacun permettra à son compagnon de parler le moins qu’il pourra, quand 
ce ne seroit que pour estouffer sa gloire, et empescher sa reputation” ‘Their tongue 
[langue] will be like the spring of a clock that has been loosened [desbandé], it will 
not be able to stop itself  for as long as they have poured out all that they will want to 
say, and each one will allow his companion to speak as little as possible, whenever 
this would be only to stifle his glory and prevent his reputation’ (113). “Nos plus 
loyaux subjects et vrais Hermaphrodites” ‘Our most loyal subjects and true 
Hermaphrodites’ (114) should ideally be all but unable to shut up, so long as that 
excited cacophony of words serve to stifle another’s expression; likewise, “Sur tout 
nous conseillons aux nostres de perdre plustost un bon amy qu’un bon mot” ‘Above 
all, we advise our [citizens] to lose a good friend before a good word’ (113).  “Un bon 
mot” might be an invented one, so long as it be sweet in sound and, normally, possess 
two meanings: “l’une représentant à la lettre ce qu’ils auront envie de dire, l’autre un 
sens mystique de voluptez, qui ne sera entendu que de leurs semblables…” ‘the one 
representing to the letter that which they will want to say, the other a mystical sense of 
sensuality, which will only be understood by others like them/others of their own 
kind…’ (114-115).  Indeed, whole languages should be invented toward subversive 
ends, “soit pour l’amour, soit pour l’Estat” ‘either for love, or for the State’: “nous leur 
avons permis et permettons d’avoir dès maintenant et à tousjours quelque langue ou 
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jargon composé à leur fantaisie qu’ils nommeront de quelque nom estrange, comme 
Mesopotamique, Pantagruelique, et autres” ‘we have permitted them and will continue 
to permit them now and forever to have some language or jargon composed at their 
whim which they will name by some strange name like Mesopotamian, Pantagruelian, 
and others’ (115).   
 As in all things, the hermaphrodites take evident pleasure in the savor, 
invention, subversive potentiality, and quick abandonment of a word, and their laws 
testify to a will to signify without end, but in such a way as to be comprehensible to a 
small community of initiates, “leurs semblables.”  There could be no confidence in 
such a community, though, given that at any moment, a particularly poetic and 
enterprising member may call upon or invent “un bon mot” worth more than a friend.  
The hermaphrodites are aware that their advocacy of subterfuge and violence renders 
each one of them vulnerable – in fact they are proud of it.  As they state in the opening 
paragraph of their laws on “entregent,” “Tous ceux des nostres… porteront sur le front 
une medalle qu’on appelle impudence, et sur le revers l’effronterie, à fin que cela 
puisse enseigner à tous les peuples qu’ils sont capables de faire et de souffrir toutes 
sortes d’affronts” ‘All of our kind… will wear in front a medal that we call 
impudence, and on the back effrontery, such that that might teach all peoples that they 
are capable of doing and of suffering all sorts of affronts’(112).  Advertizing that they 
are capable of committing and enduring all manners of affronts, the hermaphrodites 
suggest that they are both willing to affront all limits and capable of surviving any 
attack, that they are, thus, without limit.   
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 Artus and the hermaphrodites overlap in their projects, if at fleeting moments, 
in demonstrating how “[w]hen an ordinary or devalued object … is transvalued and 
made precious, we glimpse the extraordinary power of fetishism to destabilize cultural 
hierarchies” (Dean 149).  If, as Dubois relays in his introduction to the novel, 
hermaphrodism was associated with inconstancy at the time, and inconstancy signified 
deception and Machiavellianism (9), Artus adds to these apparent vilifications the 
erotic and aesthetic elements of inconstancy.  If only in spite of itself, Artus’s novel is 
its own feat of the imagination, transvaluing those sorts of bodies which were often 
virulently devalued in the 16th and 17th centuries.  He thus – if only in a small way – 
practices what one could call a fetishistic ethics at the same time as he populates an 
island full of aesthetes who do the same.  A fetishistic ethics involves openness to the 
boundaries of disgust; it may make precious the revolting object or body; it flirts with 
the horrifying and mitigates those necessary losses via creative engagements with 
object production and object loss.  But it is not utopian.  As Dean writes, “Trying to 
make fantasy conform to political dictates, no matter how progressive the political 
principles involved, is misguided and dangerous – misguided because the unconscious 
remains definitely uneducable and dangerous because such an Orwellian project 
smacks of thought control and censorship” (160).  By contrast, the hermaphrodites 
confront lack, and attempt to mitigate it, with the refrain “chacun selon sa fantaisie” 
‘each according to his whim [fantaisie]’ (143).   
 Limits, however, keep emerging; as I noted earlier, the proliferation of 
possibility depends just as surely on encounters with limits, and in their “ARTICLES 
DE FOY” ‘ARTICLES OF FAITH’ (89), the hermaphrodites attempt to grapple with 
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loss and its mitigations by means of the signifier itself.  Each of the eight articles 
begins with the words “Nous ignorons.”  The verb ignorer can signify either “not to 
know anything about” or “to ignore,” such that the verb testifies to the structure of 
disavowal in simultaneously positing an object (as ignored, as unknown) and denying 
it.  The hermaphrodites declare they do not know anything about more familiar 
religious tenets: for example, “Nous ignorons une providence superieure aux choses 
humaines… ” ‘We know nothing of a providence super to human things’ (89).  After 
positing what they do not know anything about, they assert what they believe instead, 
or they may qualify the disavowed thing – the more familiar religious tenet – by 
adding a twist: “Nous ignorons tout autre paradis que la volupté temporelle” ‘We 
know no other paradise than that of temporal sensuality’ (89).  Their faith is in a 
temporal and limited universe, devoid of god and thereby lacking the repair of an 
organizing divinity.  They assert, “Nous ignorons toute autre vie que la presente, et 
croyons qu’apres icelle tout est mort pous nous. C’est pourquoy nous nous efforçons 
jusqu’au dernier jour à nous donner tout le plaisir que nous nous pouvons imaginer” 
‘We know nothing of any other life than that of the present, and we believe that after 
here, all is dead for us. This is why we strive until the last day to give ourselves all the 
pleasure that we might possibly imagine’ (89).  Death animates their faith, but in the 
strong sense, for it is not a death which promises eternal life, but a death that signifies 
finality, erasure, a death which, in life, compels them to force themselves to give 
themselves all the pleasure they can possibly imagine.  By declaring “et croyons 
qu’apres icelle tout est mort pour nous,” they lodge faith in death at the center of 
“icelle.” What they believe in, in other words, is death.  What they ignore or do not 
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know anything about is anything that would limit or attenuate death.  In this way, the 
violence perceived by the narrator, which seems to have followed him from France to 
the New World to this island, finds form and a secure resting place in – of all places – 
the hermaphrodites’ anti-Decalogue.   
 But perhaps the most compelling limit represented by the novel would be that 
the hermaphrodites encounter in their relations with one another.  According to the 
hermaphrodites, part of living “a sa fantaisie” requires a systematic undermining of the 
notion of the stable or faithful tie as such.  They are keen to demonstrate that 
structures like kinship, contract, filiation, and marriage furnish only fantasmatic 
bonds, bonds which wish to mask or attenuate the absence of reciprocity between 
subjects.  In their written laws, they assert again and again that the referents upon 
which groups have tended to rely in defining or securing kinship – such as marriage or 
patrilinearity – are without foundation.  Instead of upholding the value of such 
institutions as marriage or patrilinearity, the hermaphrodites point inextricably to the 
fantasmatic character of such institutions and the fact that such institutions do not – 
cannot – ultimately guarantee anything.   
If the hermaphrodites replace the ties they dismantle with some other form of 
tie, it would seem to be that of the broken tie – the tie as broken, or breakable, or made 
to be broken, or the promiscuous, vagabond tie: this last description of their ties has 
the advantage of making reference to the narrator’s description of the island itself as 
“toute flotante… erroit vagabonde sur ce grand Ocean sans aucune stabilité” (56).  
While the hermaphrodites’ aesthetics celebrate elusiveness and instability, movement, 
ruse, disguise, invention, creation, and wobbliness, this aesthetics may also open onto 
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an ethics.  For in insisting upon the constant proliferation of ever new objects which 
must by their “nature” ever slip away, the novel suggests that the hermaphrodites 
expose themselves to loss to an almost absurd degree; for the hermaphrodites, there is 
no securing of either objects or other, and they make an ethic out of the continual 
exposure of, and to, that limit.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Beyond the Grammar of the Norm:  
Transgender Subjectivity and the Limit(s) of Sexual Difference 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Psychoanalytic thinkers tend to be fond of limits: “I begin with the limit” (3), Jacques 
Lacan states in Seminar XX, Encore; “jouissance is a limit” (92); “the limit … is 
constituted by the fact that there are beings who speak” (139); “Our path, that of 
analytic discourse, progresses only due to this narrow limit” (2).  In those regions 
where the fields of gender studies and Lacanian psychoanalysis have met since Lacan, 
this limit figures in various places as the limit of sexual difference; yet the “limits” 
different authors have in mind are rarely commensurate.  For some, the limit turns out 
to be normative: this seems to be at least part of Judith Butler’s critique of Lacan’s 
paradigm of sexual difference, as Butler argues that certain constraints function as 
limits to the kinds of sexed beings we might become (Bodies That Matter 96).  In 
Butler’s reading, subjects are, in a sense, terrorized into those becomings: “the 
Lacanian scheme presumes that the terror over occupying either of these positions [the 
feminized fag and the phallicized dyke] is what compels the assumption of a sexed 
position within language” (96).  (This word “terror,” in fact, returns us to one of the 
polemics which opened this project: gender theorist Kate Bornstein’s identification of 
Lacanian analyst Catherine Millot as a “[g]ender terrorist … [a] Gender Defender[ ]” 
[236].)  For others, the limit of sexual difference is organic: there is a sort of “genital 
difference” (Gayle Salamon, Assuming a Body 151) either to be ultimately upheld or 
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deconstructed.  I have in mind here gender theorist Gayle Salamon’s critiques of 
feminist writers Elizabeth Grosz, Luce Irigaray, and Biddy Martin in “Sexual 
Indifference and the Problem of the Limit,” an article to which this chapter is very 
much indebted.  Sometimes, too, the “normative” and the “organic” are of a piece with 
one another: psychologist Suzanne J. Kessler’s work on the medical management of 
“intersex” (“for lack of a better word,” to quote the title of Thea Hillman’s memoir) 
people, for example, reveals the extent to which social views on the “organ” inform 
medical practice and (re)produce normative genitals (Lessons from the Intersexed).  
Similarly – but from within a different idiom and toward a different end – 
psychoanalyst Geneviève Morel speaks of “natural, anatomical difference” as “a 
mythical real,” one which only “acquires its value … when interpreted” 
(“Psychoanalytical Anatomy” 30).   
 For Lacan, though, the limit of sexual difference is logical.  To my knowledge, 
Lacan does not anywhere use the phrase “the limit of sexual difference,” but he does 
speak extensively of limits and logic in the seminar which is aptly titled On Feminine 
Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge.  Approaching sexual difference as “the 
name of a deadlock, a trauma, an open question – something that resists every attempt 
at its symbolization” (Slavoj Zizek, “The Real of Sexual Difference” 61), Lacan tries 
to formalize that impasse through the writing of the formulas of sexuation, explaining, 
in rather hesitant terms, “That is why I thought I could provide a model of it [the real] 
using mathematical formalization, inasmuch as it is the most advanced elaboration we 
have by which to produce signifierness” (93).  In addition to the “models” afforded by 
mathematical formalization, Lacan turns to poetry to attempt to write something of the 
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limit of sexual difference, speaking of “the textual work that comes out of the spider’s 
belly, its web” (93).  As he notes, “It is a truly miraculous function to see, on the very 
surface emerging from an opaque point of this strange being, the trace of these 
writings taking form, in which one can grasp the limits, impasses, and dead ends that 
show the real acceding to the symbolic” (93).  Both logic and the spider’s belly 
provide a strange sort of ground for the writing of the impasse that is sexual 
difference; both constitute instances of “the real acceding to the symbolic,” and what 
this looks like – or feels like (“one can grasp”) – is a limit, impasse, or dead end.  But 
what is that logical impasse?  Why is this what sexual difference is?  And how does 
the transgender subjectivity of interest to this project relate to it?   
 In the pages to follow, I would like to consider a set of gender studies and 
psychoanalytic texts where the limit of sexual difference is at issue.  I am drawn to the 
question of the limit not only for its currency in debates on sexual difference, but for 
the ways in which the limit might be thought with respect to transgender subjectivity 
and embodiment.  Sometimes the various forms the limit of sexual difference may 
take – normative, organic, logical, or otherwise – slip, and my hunch is that this 
slippage can be found particularly in those moments when authors are dealing, 
whether implicitly or explicitly, with transgender subjectivity and transgender and 
gender non-normative embodiment.  While in some cases this slippage is expressly at 
issue, intended and illuminating – as in the Kessler example cited above, which, to be 
clear, does not dialogue with psychoanalysis at all – , in other cases, such a slippage is 
problematic.  Above all, to my mind, it is problematic in psychoanalytic texts 
themselves, namely, at the point at which the logical limit of sexual difference lapses 
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into a normative or organic one.  This, of course, seems to be Butler’s critique of the 
Lacanian scheme in general, in the sense that she does not read it as anything other 
than normative; but, as I have tried to show in Chapter One and will revisit here, such 
a slippage belies the understanding of sexual difference outlined in Lacan’s Seminar 
XX, Encore formulas of sexuation – and psychoanalytic thinkers would most likely be 
the first to say so again.   
 To those who have turned to transgender subjectivity as the exemplum of a 
liberatory transgression which proves the point of the instability or potential 
limitlessness of (the terms of) sexual difference, and to those who have critiqued 
transgender subjectivity for just that; to those who have eschewed transgender 
subjectivity altogether; and to those who have turned to it as the “impossibility” which 
proves the point of the limit of sexual difference, I propose that the form of 
transgender subjectivity of interest to this project, which Lacan might call “feminine,” 
constitutes a very particular experience of the limit.  Could transgender subjectivity 
allow us to think the limit of sexual difference as a moving target, one whose 
dominion over subjects would take different forms?  By this account, what would be 
unmoving – what would not “budge,” to call on Joan Copjec’s formulation (Read My 
Desire 211) – would be that there is a limit as such, meaning, for every subject.  
Subjects may wish, in a normative enterprise, to impose limits on other subjects, and 
some may use the language of sexual difference to do so, asserting that subjects are 
“men” or “women” and nothing other.  This move, though, makes of sexual difference 
something which “vulgariz[es]” (Copjec, “The Fable of the Stork and Other False 
Sexual Theories” 67) and “visualize[es]” (67) the “unanswerable question of being” 
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(68).  In a richer sense, one which does not aspire to offer the grammar of a norm, 
sexual difference is a language for thinking about how subjects position themselves 
with respect to the limit, specifically, their own limits. 
 
I. The Organic, the Normative, the Logical, and “the Common Error” 
When Lacan narrates the formulas in Seminar XX, Encore, he does not speak of 
transpeople.  He makes clear at this point in his theorizations of sexual difference that 
unconscious sexuation does not have to do with gender identification: “one is not 
obliged, when one is male, to situate oneself on the side of [the masculine]. One can 
also situate oneself on the side of the not-whole… Despite – I won’t say their phallus 
– despite what encumbers them that goes by that name, they get the idea or sense that 
there must be a jouissance that is beyond” (76).  As Lacan indicates here, unconscious 
sexuation is not determinate of gender but has rather to do with modes of jouissance.  
In his narrations of the formulas, Lacan speaks of “men” and “women” without 
clarifying whether or not any of these men and women might be trans; gender non-
normativity, in whatever its form, is perhaps not much on his mind in this seminar.  
When he does throughout the years speak explicitly of transpeople, a fairly rare 
occurrence throughout his oeuvre, his language is fragmentary instead of synthetic59; 
there is not really, in other words, anything like a Lacanian theory of transgender.  
There are records of a couple cases, brief asides that are generally none too inspiring, 
and references that have to do with the case of Schreber (and to my knowledge, Lacan 
does not anywhere identify Schreber as the exemplum of transsexuality as such).   
                                                 
59 To be fair, this is his overall pedagogic approach.   
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 Various Lacanians have attempted to fill that gap, taking up Lacan’s 
fragmentary evidence and, in some cases, their own clinical experience in hopes of 
offering something more synthetic on transsexuality and transgender.  Perhaps the 
most famous among these attempts in the U.S. context is Catherine Millot’s Horsexe; 
Millot makes a number of interesting points about Lacanian concepts, but the claims 
she makes about “the transsexual” are incredibly generalizing, as for example when 
she relays (without sign of critique) the views of Janice Raymond: “Transsexuals’ 
image of women is wholly conformist, and holds no hope of salvation outside the 
polar extremes of their sexual identification scale: the star and the housewife” [14]).  
Millot’s claims are also pathologizing – at least, they are to the extent that we are 
meant to understand mechanisms like identifying “outsidesex” (135) and choosing 
“not to leave open the question of his desire” (142) as ones that psychoanalysis would 
frown upon.  (Recall that Lacan’s proposes that, “from an analytical point of view, the 
only thing of which one can be guilty is of having given ground relative to one’s 
desire” [Ethics of Psychoanalysis 319]).  The least pathologizing and, for this reason 
and others, most promising Lacanian text on transsexuality and transgender is Patricia 
Gherovici’s Please Select Your Gender: From the Invention of Hysteria to the 
Democratizing of Transgenderism; Gherovici notes that “Millot’s claims may need 
some updating” (12).   
 Morel includes a brief note on transsexuality in an article dealing with what 
she refers to as psychoanalytical anatomy.  Her objective is to explain how it is that, 
“[f]or psychoanalysis, sexual difference is not a question of anatomy” 
(“Psychoanalytical Anatomy” 28), and her article is useful because it outlines a 
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schema which disentangles three temporal registers of sexuation, registers which more 
or less map onto the three kinds of “limits” I mentioned above: the organic, the 
normative, and the logical.  Morel identifies the first register as “that of natural, 
anatomical difference,” noting that, “[i]n the old days, this used to be marked at birth, 
but the genotype is now mostly predicted using ultrasound” (30).  Morel qualifies this 
so-called natural, anatomical difference, however, stating that it “is a mythical real, 
inasmuch as it acquires its value only from the second phase” (30).  The second 
register, the normative one, “is that of sexual discourse” (30).  Here, “nature” is 
subject to interpretation; “’one’ distinguishes ‘it’ as being a boy or a girl. ‘One’ here 
means the family, the doctor, and so on…” (30).  The sexual discourse is the site of 
the propagation of what “Lacan calls the ‘common error,’ common because it is 
everybody’s and because it creates a community…” (30).  The “common error” 
“changes the status of the phallus. The phallus is the signified of jouissance …, but 
sexual discourse makes it a signifier” (30).  The third register, then, the logical one, is 
that of sexuation (31), where to be “sexed” means to be “all” or “not-all” inscribed in 
the phallic function.   
 Morel’s schema shares some features with something one might find in a 
feminist essay on gender: the “natural organ” is de-naturalized and demystified; it 
becomes significant only when it becomes signifying, and the ways in which it is 
signifying constitute an error.  Gherovici words it quite nicely: “It is true that the 
phallus, often confused with the limp little prick, is not much more than a signified of 
jouissance that sexual discourse transforms into a signifier” (195).  It is the “common 
error,” writes Morel, which “changes the status of the phallus. The phallus is the 
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signified of jouissance …, but sexual discourse makes it a signifier” (30).  In outlining 
the sense of the common error, Morel is drawing from Lacan’s nineteenth seminar, 
…Ou pire, where  Lacan observes that “rather early on, earlier than one might expect, 
these individuals [girls and boys] are distinguished from one another” (17).  They are 
distinguished on the basis of the value taken on (18) by that “fameuse ‘petite 
différence’” (17).  This value is not inherent to the “petite difference”; it takes on 
value through the “function of criteria that are formed depending on language…” (##), 
such that “the judgment of recognition of the surrounding adults is based then on an 
error…” (17-18).  For “[a]n organ is only an instrument through the mediation of 
something by which every instrument is grounded. The fact is that it is a signifier” 
(18).  Norms, in other words, dictate the reading of the body; recognition springs from 
the “function of criteria that are formed depending on language.”  Morel outlines what 
the organ-become-signifier henceforth signifies in “the sexual discourse”: “’Boy’ no 
longer means simply that it has a penis, but that it is capable of virility, of being a 
man, as one says. ‘Girl’ loses its anatomical meaning to become simultaneously a 
synonym of privation and defect and also of femininity… The natural organ has 
become an organon, a signifying instrument” (30).   
 In part this is all familiar.  Lacan and Morel are pointing to the discursive 
register of the body, to gender norms and roles.  But, at the point at which we shift 
from the second to the third register of sexuation, or from a normative to a logical 
understanding of sexual difference, much hinges on how we understand the phallus, 
the phallic function, and the common error, for the concept of the phallic function 
carries over.  What, after all, do the norms articulated in the sexual discourse have to 
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do with unconscious sexuation?  It seems to me that it is in the space between the 
second and the third registers schematized by Morel that disputes easily, and 
understandably, arise between gender theorists and Lacanians – for example, when 
Butler laments the “tacit cruelties” of norms and calls for “a kinder, gentler 
psychoanalytic theory” (Bodies That Matter 115), or when Copjec retorts, “Sex does 
not budge, and it is not heterosexist to say so” (Read My Desire 211).  This space is a 
reminder that, on a certain level, gender studies and Lacanian psychoanalysis are 
concerned with fundamentally different subjects: in the last instance, gender studies is 
interested in the subject who acts and is acted upon on the social scene, while 
Lacanian psychoanalysis is interested in the subject of the unconscious.  That being 
said, part of the intent of this project is to find places where, nonetheless, the two 
discourses cannot do without each other, and the blurry space between the second and 
third registers of sexuation is, I think, just one such site.  Gender studies can here 
remind psychoanalysis of the degree to which the latter imports, or runs the risk of 
importing, concepts from the terrain of “the sexual discourse” into the terrain of the 
ostensibly “logical,” and psychoanalysis can remind gender studies that, no matter 
how far we might go in adapting the sexual discourse to the changing desires of its 
inhabitants, ultimately, “the body will never find in language a harmonious home” 
(Gherovici 212).   
 What, then, is the phallus?  Lacan’s definition in “The Signification of the 
Phallus” arrives as he is explaining why it is that “man cannot aim at being whole”: 
“man cannot aim at being whole … once the play of displacement and condensation to 
which he is destined in the exercise of his functions marks his relation, as a subject, to 
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the signifier. / The phallus is the privileged signifier of this mark in which the role 
[part] of Logos is wedded to the advent of desire” (581).  The phallus for Lacan, in 
other words, is the signifier of a mark, that where the subject suffers a loss/is instituted 
as desiring because of the fact of language.  Perhaps the simplest and most capacious 
definition available, though – and thus one of the most useful ones to this project –, is 
Renata Salecl’s: the phallus is the signifier of the subject’s lack in being 
(“Introduction” 6).   
 When Morel speaks, following Lacan, of the “common error,” she is surely 
right: “One” does say that “it’s a boy” or “it’s a girl”; and when she adds that the 
common error has something to do with the community, she is surely right again: 
being subject to this pronouncement is indeed quite generally how one enters the 
community in these places.  It’s important to bear in mind that Morel’s words here are 
descriptive, not prescriptive.  What she does not address in this descriptive mode, of 
course, are the constricting effects of the sexual discourse.  After all, why would this – 
a gender binary interpreted and reproduced through a dimorphic reading of genitalia, 
of “la fameuse ‘petite différence’” – be the criterion for the creation of a community?  
Is Morel suggesting that there would be a certain necessity to safeguarding the 
common error in this particular way, such that the creation of community depends on 
not only sharing the error, but on sharing the error as it is?  But error must be 
something which can change, correct?  After all, this is the realm of discourse.  
Morel’s words are brief here and these questions are neither raised nor answered.   
 While Morel does not suggest that the common error may change in any way, 
she does indicate that “the subject can accept or refuse the common error of sexual 
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discourse” (31), thereby indicating that some might find it objectionable.  But, 
according to Morel, “[i]f he (or she) refuses it, the result is psychosis, or outside-
discourse, and he will have to invent an untried sexuation” (31).  According to Morel, 
“transsexuals” are such people.  Under the heading of “Transsexuality,” Morel writes, 
“If we place ourselves in the second phase of sexuation, we can see that these subjects 
refuse the sexual discourse” (33) such that “we are not dealing with an error of nature 
here but rather with a refusal on the order of foreclosure, of sexual discourse, and of 
the common error which it implies: turning the phallus into the signifier of sex” (33-
34).  Simply put, for Morel, those with non-normative gender expressions – those she 
would group under the name “transsexual” – are psychotic or outside-discourse 
because they refuse to turn the phallus into the signifier of sex.   
 Morel’s move here is both problematic and confusing.60  In the first place: 
while “the sexual discourse” does predominantly regard transsexual, transgender, and 
gender non-normative people as, yes, non-normative, meaning outside the norm, it is 
highly problematic simply to lump together gender non-normativity and the structure 
of psychosis.  Psychosis is a very particular structure, one wherein subjects maintain 
very particular relationships to language, and it is far from clear that gender non-
                                                 
60 In addition to the reasons I outline in the body of the chapter, her move is confusing and problematic 
in its apparent deviation from how Lacan himself presents the matter in the seminar to which she is 
referring.  I read Lacan’s words on transsexuality and the common error to be suggesting that 
transsexuals participate in the common error rather than reject it: “An organ is only an instrument 
through the mediation of something by which every instrument is grounded. The fact is that it is a 
signifier. So then! It is as signifier that the transsexual no longer wants it and not as an organ. And in 
this he suffers from an error, which is precisely the common error. The passion of the transsexual is the 
madness of wanting to free himself from this error, the common error which does not see that the 
signifier is enjoyment, and that the phallus is only its signified. The transsexual no longer wants to be 
signified as phallus by sexual discourse, which, as I state, is impossible. He is only making one mistake, 
which is to want to force this sexual discourse which qua impossible is the passage of the Real, to want 
to force it by means of surgery” (18-19).  However, Morel significantly develops these ideas in a more 
trans-friendly direction in two other pieces: see “The Sexual Sinthome” and Sexual Ambiguities.  
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normativity as such would necessarily have anything to do with, for example, the way 
in which language that has been foreclosed returns in the real.  As Lacan writes, 
“What is the psychotic phenomenon? It is the emergence in reality of an enormous 
meaning that has the appearance of being nothing at all – in so far as it cannot be tied 
to anything, since it has never entered into the system of symbolization – but under 
certain conditions it can threaten the entire edifice” (Seminar III 85).    
 Morel’s move is also confusing: for aren’t those who refuse to turn the phallus 
into the signifier of sex (for Morel, “transsexuals”), in a sense, closer to 
psychoanalysis – which is the discourse which states that the phallus is not the 
signifier of sex but a signifier of the subject’s lack in being, the signifier of a mark of 
loss?  Might there not in fact be a certain affiliation between those who refuse the 
common error and the truths to which psychoanalysis attests?  There may or may not 
be a pathologizing gesture in the appellation of “psychotic” for Morel (one might feel 
sure that there is, but all of the four structures Lacan describes may take either 
pathological or non-pathological form), but one wonders if “analysts” too are 
psychotic, and one imagines not.61    
 Unlike Morel, Gherovici draws attention to the possible affiliation between the 
insights of those who reject the common error and the insights of psychoanalysis in 
her framing of the common error.  Discussing two case studies (Henri, analyzed by 
Lacan, and Schreber, discussed by Freud and Lacan but analyzed by neither), 
Gherovici writes:  
                                                 
61
 I overstate the case here to point to the absurdity of generalizing in such ways about any group of 
people.   
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 Their transformation into women was the consequence of not being able to 
 make a common ‘error,’ which is that of taking a natural organ for an organon, 
 a system of principles, an organizer. This common error can be what the 
 rectification proposed by some transsexuals is all about: ‘If you think that 
 because I have a penis I am a man, that is an error; I can be a woman who has a 
 penis.’ Or conversely, ‘If you think that not  having a penis makes me a 
 woman, this is an error because I am a man without a penis.’ And, they are 
 absolutely right because for the unconscious somebody with a penis can be a 
 woman or someone without a penis can be a man. Sexual positioning is not 
 based on organ attribution (165-166).   
 
Gherovici’s approach is quite different from Morel’s, even though she is drawing on 
Morel’s work and speaking to the same concepts.  Gherovici is responding to specific 
cases, cases which she has, prior to this paragraph, spent some time detailing.  The 
benefit of this approach is that she is not obliged to speak in generalizations.  Neither 
does she extrapolate from these two cases to make assertions about “transsexuals as 
such” or “the transsexual”; instead, she writes, “This common error can be what the 
rectification proposed by some transsexuals is all about” (emphasis added).     
 We see in these two treatments that the “common error” of the second register 
of sexuation is invoked with respect to transgender subjectivity in psychoanalytic 
literature to paradoxical effect: to assert that transgender subjects over-invest in the 
common error, or to assert that they see through it, or that they do both: “’If my penis 
makes you think that I am male, even though I feel myself to be a woman, then put me 
under the knife’” (Morel 33-34).  To the extent that the notion of the common error is 
useful, though, perhaps the point to be taken from it is the following: that no matter 
what the sexual discourse makes of the impossibility of signifying sex, it will 
constitute an error.  To distinguish ostensibly transpeople from ostensibly non-
transpeople on the basis, in a sense, of who believes more in the organ as signifier (by 
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the way, would that be the transperson or the non-transperson?) seems to miss the 
larger point that the concept of the phallus is supposed to articulate: it is impossible to 
signify sex, and that will remain true no matter your gender, genders, or 
genderlessness.  
   
II. “[S]exual (im)possibilities”: Figures at the Limits of Sexual Difference 
Butler turns to Lacan’s work on sexual difference in hopes of trying to think through 
the kinds of constraints that shape the “sexed” beings we may become.  Her attention 
to constraints is intended to help clarify the vexed status of “construction” and to 
relieve it of its ostensible voluntarism: “[w]hat has been understood as the 
performativity of gender – far from the exercise of an unconstrained voluntarism – 
will prove to be impossible apart from notions of such political constraints registered 
psychically” (Bodies That Matter 94).  Butler outlines her understanding of those 
political constraints through a reading of the Oedipal scenario, stating that she “will 
not consider the full domain of constraints on sex and sexuality” as that would 
constitute “a limitless task” but that she “does propose in a general way to take 
account of constraints as the limits of what can and cannot be constructed” (96).  As 
such, the Oedipal scenario’s own status is somewhat uncertain here: what is the 
purview of Oedipus?  What is its relationship to those “political constraints registered 
psychically”?  Is Butler agreeing with those writings by Lacan that posit the Oedipal 
scenario as central to subjective existence (as for example in Seminar III, when he 
declares that “[a] neurosis without Oedipus doesn’t exist” [201])?  Is she suggesting 
that psychoanalysis has influence over social norms, such that its own belief in 
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Oedipus would have the effect of reproducing the heteronormative version of Oedipal 
norms that Butler finds?  Or is she suggesting more simply that the Oedipal scene 
expresses norms at work in the social – the site of “the full domain of constraints” –, 
norms or constraints that gather their strength from a variety of sources?   
 Butler’s reading of the Oedipal scene is concerned with castration as a “figure 
for punishment”: as Butler explains, “the fear of castration motivat[es] the assumption 
of the masculine sex, the fear of not being castrated motivat[es] the assumption of the 
feminine” (96).  Butler declares that two figures hover at the margins of “the Lacanian 
scheme,” figures she equates, it seems, with a lack of fear of castration and lack of fear 
of not being castrated: “Implicit in the figure of castration … are at least two 
inarticulate figures of abject homosexuality, the feminized fag and the phallicized 
dyke” (96).  While Butler does not indicate which description of the Oedipal scene she 
is responding to here (a few pages later, she cites the following lines from the 
beginning of “The Signification of the Phallus”: “’Why must he take up its [sex’s] 
attributes only by means of a threat, or even in the guise of a privation?’” [101]), the 
word “implicit” indicates her interpretive gesture.  Of course, these figures would have 
to be implicit: they are inarticulate, abject, excluded, repudiated, and, as Butler will go 
on to suggest, eroticized.  Butler suggests that “the Lacanian scheme presumes that the 
terror over occupying either of these positions is what compels the assumption of a 
sexed position within language, a sexed position that is sexed by virtue of its 
heterosexual positioning, and that is assumed through a move that excludes and 
abjects gay and lesbian populations” (96).  The limits of sexual difference come to be, 
then, through “the regulation of phanastmatic identification … the resistance to 
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identification with masculine feminization and feminine phallicization” (97).  Both 
sexual difference and its limits in this scenario are matters of identification.62   
 While the limits of sexual difference thus materialize as particular figures, 
constraint is also more generally described as “what is difficult to imagine” and “what 
remains radically unthinkable”:  
 in the domain of sexuality these constraints include the radical unthinkability 
 of desiring otherwise, the radical unendurability of desiring otherwise, the 
 absence of certain desires, the repetitive compulsion of others, the abiding 
 repudiation of some sexual possibilities, panic, obsessional pull, and the nexus 
 of sexuality and pain (94).   
 
Butler is clearly concerned with what Morel identifies as the second register of 
sexuation – more specifically, with what Morel identifies as the “’One’” of discourse.  
While Butler speaks to the unthinkability of desiring otherwise, Morel speaks to the 
“One’s” attribution of a gender, transforming “it” into a “boy” or a “girl.”  In Morel’s 
narration, what emerges as the radically unthinkable, the radically unendurable, absent 
and/or repudiated, is some gender other than “boy” or “girl,” or some assignation at 
birth not having to do with gender.  At this point, Butler does not speak directly of 
transgender, but we can, I think, hear the future of transgender when Butler makes 
statements like this one: “The point of this analysis is not to affirm the constraints 
under which sexed positions are assumed, but to ask how the fixity of such constraints 
is established, what sexual (im)possibilities have served as the constitutive constraints 
of sexed positionality…” (96).   
                                                 
62 Butler indicates at a certain point her reading of Lacanian sexual difference as gender, identifying 
“[w]hat in Lacan would be called ‘sexed positions’” as “what some of us might more easily call 
‘gender’…” (111).    
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 For Butler, there is not a limit of sexual difference; there are limits.  At these 
limits are certain figures, some which are defined but “inarticulate,” some which are 
undefined, and some which are too unthinkable to have any relation to shape 
whatsoever.  Butler cautions, though, that she is not writing in the service of 
prescribing new and different identifications:  “The point here is not to prescribe the 
taking on of new and different identifications. I invest no ultimate political hope in the 
possibility of avowing identifications that have conventionally been disavowed” (115).  
Butler points to the imperializing character of such a gesture:  
 The ideal of transforming all excluded identifications into inclusive features – 
 of appropriating all difference into unity – would mark the return to a Hegelian 
 synthesis which has no exterior and that, in appropriating all difference as 
 exemplary features of itself, becomes a figure for imperialism, a figure that 
 installs itself by way of a romantic, insidious, and all-consuming humanism 
 (115-116).   
 
If Butler cautions against an “all-consuming humanism” marked by the “ideal of 
transforming all excluded identifications into inclusive features,” she nonetheless 
insists that “there remains the task of thinking through the potential cruelties that 
follow from an intensification of identification that cannot afford to acknowledge the 
exclusions on which it is dependent” (116).  We might bear this in mind as we reflect 
on “the potential cruelties that follow from” the kinds of gender identifications “that 
cannot afford to acknowledge the exclusions on which” they are dependent.    
 Butler’s readings of Lacan are, like my own, selective (something she 
acknowledges about her reading [72]).  Just as I do not address those narratives of 
sexual difference that Lacan offers prior to the Seminar XX, Encore formulas, Butler 
does not write about the formulas.  Consequently, Butler’s responses to Lacan’s sexual 
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difference, drawn in Bodies That Matter from “The Mirror Stage,” “The Meaning of 
the Phallus,” and Seminars I, II, and III, are concerned with the Oedipal scene that has 
dominated psychoanalysis for so long.  In a sense it is no surprise that Butler finds 
much here to subject to her incisive eye, for the Oedipal scene is the realm of norms: 
the classical Oedipal subject, the obsessional, is, we might say, the subject most likely 
to find psychic support in whatever ideology of norms constitutes the milieu: the 
obsessional “binds himself to his ego” (Lacan, Seminar II 268); “[h]e effaces his 
pleasure so as not to arouse the anger of his master” (269).  As I pointed out in 
Chapter One, though, there are not only Oedipal/obsessional subjects.  In the writings 
by Lacan to which Butler turns, he has not yet elaborated his most radical take on 
sexual difference.  Perhaps some psychoanalytic thinkers would object that the 
elements for the formulas, and thus for an explicitly logical account of sexual 
difference, are already there in the aforementioned texts; but, if they are, it does not 
seem that they are there in a form that lends itself as well to the transmission enabled 
by the formulas themselves.  Perhaps it’s “the sexual discourse” that gets in the way.   
 Butler identifies the heteronormativity she finds in this sexual discourse and 
this appraisal is indeed critical; whatever Oedipus’s status may be in Butler’s own 
estimation, this kind of ideology critique of psychoanalysis is necessary if the latter 
wishes to be responsive to the analysands it will encounter.  Moreover, to the extent 
that Lacan and his followers import heteronormative and gender-normative notions 
from “the sexual discourse” into their theorizations of the logic of sexual difference, 
Butler’s critiques likewise extend from the terrain of the normative limit(s) of sexual 
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difference (what Morel calls the “One” of discourse) to that of the logical limit of 
sexual difference.   
 
III. Bodily Materiality: “’It is a creation and a construction and not a gift’” (Paul 
Schilder)  
Gayle Salamon’s Assuming a Body: Transgender and Rhetorics of Materiality offers 
what we might call, in the schema I am trying to plot out of various kinds of “limits,” 
a radical take on “the organic.”  “Organic” is not, of course, the word she would use: 
on the contrary, Salamon takes issue with feminist texts which re-assert a “natural” 
limit of sexual difference.  Salamon is interested in rethinking the materiality of the 
body and the myriad mechanisms which act together so that a body may come to be; 
her description of psychoanalyst Paul Schilder’s conception of the body applies just as 
well to her own: “It would seem to be apparent that the body, in this account, is far 
from a simple biological given” (30).  Bringing together phenomenology, 
psychoanalysis, and recent work on transgender, Salamon compellingly argues that 
these discourses have much to offer one another on questions of embodiment.  
Together, they allow us to think the body as not simply given and not simply a given – 
and as neither more nor less given for gender non-normative people than gender-
normative ones.   
 Salamon’s project is a significant contribution to trans studies for a series of 
reasons, of which I will address only a few.  First: Salamon confronts with rigor and 
elegance the critique that Butler in particular and queer theory in general are not 
concerned with the materiality of the body, finding this to be, among other things, a 
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misreading of the concept of social construction (73).  Salamon responds in particular 
to Second Skins, Jay Prosser’s important theorization of transsexual subjectivity and a 
text that takes Butler’s Gender Trouble to task for putting “transgender” to work as a 
function which elucidates gender performativity (Prosser, Second Skins 26).  Salamon 
suggests that Prosser’s book “is emblematic of a trend in trans studies that appeals to 
bodily materiality in order to secure a firm foundation for both the specificity and 
difference of trans subjectivity” (37).  Salamon suggests that this approach is 
problematic to the extent that it wishes to posit a bodily materiality that is 
nondiscursive (41) and for its reliance on “a set of disavowals whereby transsexuals’ 
relation to their ‘fleshy materiality’ is uncomplicatedly and unproblematically positive 
and affirmative” (40).   
 As Salamon notes, of course, “It is easy to sympathize with the political aims 
of [Prosser’s] strategy…” (4), but Salamon is interested in a more capacious 
understanding of the body, one where the body need not be qualified as – to quote 
Prosser’s term – “’unimpeachably real’” (qtd. in Salamon 41) to be material and, 
indeed, to matter.  Thus will Salamon rethink bodily materiality itself, calling on 
writers as diverse as Didier Anzieu, Butler, Freud, Griffin Hansbury, Luce Irigaray, 
Lacan, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Kaja Silverman, as well as works like the film 
Boys Don’t Cry, Jan Morris’s autobiography Conundrum, and Lily Rodriguez’s 
photograph Mud, in order to demonstrate that the constructed and even uncertain body 
is no less material for being so.  As she writes, “I seek to challenge the notion that the 
materiality of the body is something to which we have unmediated access, something 
of which we can have epistemological certainty, and contend that such 
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epistemological uncertainty can have great use, both ethically and politically, in the 
lives of the non-normatively gendered” (1).   
 Salamon is also interested in what “recent theorizations of transgendered and 
transsexual bodies” (1) might offer women’s studies and feminism.  Salamon’s 
address to women’s studies is both poignant and pointed.  According to Salamon, “if it 
is to reemerge as a vital discipline, women’s studies must become more responsive to 
emerging genders” (95); as she points out, “[g]enders beyond the binary of male and 
female are neither fictive nor futural, but are presently embodied and lived, and the 
discipline of women’s studies has not yet taken account of this” (95).  This, however, 
is a two-way street: “It is equally true that trans studies needs feminism. Trans studies 
in its current, nascent state is often dominated by a liberal individualist notion of 
subjectivity, in which a postgender subject possesses absolute agency and is able to 
craft hir gender with perfect felicity” (96).  Salamon addresses the constraints and 
worldly impacts that construct any body, as for instance when she points out, drawing 
on the work of Schilder, that the construction of the body is not “an entirely 
voluntaristic project”: “’There is no question,’ Schilder writes, ‘that our own activity 
is insufficient to build up the image of the body’” (31).   
 It is in the context of a series of responses to feminist work on sexual 
difference that Salamon engages “the problem of the limit.”  Salamon critiques 
writings by feminists Elizabeth Grosz, Irigaray, and Biddy Martin in order to build 
toward the idea of a sexual difference that would, in a sense, leave more room for 
difference.  Closely reading each of the aforementioned theorists, Salamon finds 
surprising returns to a “natural” or “organic” limit of sexual difference, limits which 
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take anxious shape around the figures of transpeople.  But, as Salamon asks, “[m]ust 
sexual difference be legible at the surface of the body? And is sexual difference the 
same thing as ‘natural’ sex?” (151).  What might happen “if we took seriously 
Irigaray’s insistence on the generative power of sexual difference as that which makes 
relationality possible, without positing an absolute identity within any sex as the 
ground for that difference?” (168).  I would like to sketch out Salamon’s critique of 
Grosz in part to provide more context for Salamon’s own intervention: Salamon draws 
on many of the same theorists as Grosz (Anzieu, Freud, Lacan, Merleau-Ponty, 
Schilder), but, as we have seen, Salamon does so in the service of a theory of 
embodiment that takes trans bodies as one of the points of departure; as she writes, 
“our current ideas of what a body is will be irremediably diminished until trans bodies 
and subjectivities are considered in a more thorough way” (1).   
 Salamon credits Grosz’s Volatile Bodies as “a radical and important rethinking 
of corporeality” (146), one which “seems to offer… the possibility of a body that is 
pliable, labile, open to constantly shifting and shiftable identifications, 
transformations, and reworkings – a body that can exceed even the confines of its own 
skin” (147).  This indeed is the language of Grosz’s text, which speaks to bodies 
which, “in their materialities, are never self-present, given things, immediate, certain 
self-evidences” (Grosz 209).  Difference (which Grosz seems to use interchangeably 
with “alterity”) is at the heart of Grosz’s account, as she argues that bodies themselves 
“insist on alterity… Alterity is the very possibility and process of embodiment: it 
conditions but is also a product of the pliability or plasticity of bodies which makes 
 169 
 
them other than themselves, other than their ‘nature,’ their functions and identities” 
(209).  
 “But,” as Salamon finds, “not too pliable, not infinitely pliable” (149): there 
must be a limit, and Grosz expresses this limit in biological terms: “[t]he body is 
constrained by its biological limits… The body is not open to all the whims, wishes, 
and hopes of the subject” (187).  Still, Grosz explains that the body’s limits are not 
knowable in advance (187) and that they are susceptible to being overcome: “while 
there must be some kinds of biological limit or constraint, these constraints are 
perpetually capable of being superseded … through the human body’s capacity to 
open itself up to prosthetic synthesis, to transform or rewrite its environment…” (187-
188).   
 All of this valorization of lability and difference, however, effectively flies out 
the window both times that the subject of transwomen comes up (Grosz 201, 207), and 
this is why Salamon asserts that in fact Grosz finds the body’s limit in the limit of 
sexual difference (Salamon 149).  While Grosz hesitates to state in a totalizing fashion 
what a “woman” is and notes too, in the context of a discussion of bodily fluids, that 
she is “not making claims for all gay men here… there are many ways in which gay 
men’s bodies can be lived and invested” (200), no such care is extended to 
transpeople.  Instead, transpeople are “quite literally” (Salamon 146) at the limit of 
Grosz’s theory of sexual difference: as Salamon writes, “[t]he MTF transsexual that 
Grosz invokes to conclude Volatile Bodies forms a parallel and a pair with the FTM 
who introduces ‘Experimental Desires,’ twin instances of phantom transsexuals who 
quite literally mark the limits of Grosz’s ‘corporeal feminism’” (146).  In the case of 
 170 
 
Volatile Bodies, “the transsexual” materializes in the final pages of the book as the 
limit-case that proves that the “problematic of sexual difference entails a certain 
failure of knowledge to bridge the gap, the interval, between the sexes. There remains 
something ungraspable, something outside, unpredictable, and uncontainable, about 
the other sex for each sex” (Grosz 208).  According to Grosz, “the transsexual” cannot 
bridge the gap, and, as Salamon sums up, “if it is still impossible to tell what a woman 
is, it is quite easy to determine what a woman isn’t” (152).  Salamon quotes Grosz 
extensively:  
 ‘There will always remain a kind of outsideness or alienness of the experiences 
 and lived reality of each sex for the other. Men, contrary to the fantasy of the 
 transsexual, can never, even with surgical intervention, feel or experience what 
 it is like to be, to live, as women. At best the transsexual can live out his [sic] 
 fantasy of femininity – a fantasy that in itself is usually disappointed with the 
 rather crude transformations effected by surgical and chemical intervention. 
 The transsexual may look like a woman but can never feel like or be a woman’ 
 (qtd. in Salamon 152-153).   
 
Salamon critiques Grosz’s presentation here for its “surprisingly familiar … 
stereotypical figuration of the transsexual” (153) and for its tone of utter confidence in 
describing the internal workings of transpeople (154).  This, as Salamon notes, “is a 
remarkable way to end a text that takes such care not to represent the experiences of 
women in a totalizing way” (154).    
 “How can we account, in a nonpathologizing way, for bodies that manifest sex 
in ways that exceed or confound binaries?” (Salamon 13).  This indeed would be a 
corporeal feminism.  Salamon asks at the end of “Sexual Indifference and the Problem 
of the Limit” if it would be possible “to think sexual difference as something that need 
not be located at the level of sex at all” (168), wishing to bring trans subjectivity and 
 171 
 
trans embodiment in touch with Irigaray’s understanding of sexual difference as, in 
Salamon’s words, “that which makes relationality possible” (168).  Phenomenology, 
too, offers language for thinking the import of relationality to embodiment:  
 … phenomenology, as we have seen, is a realm in which one’s own 
 perceptions retain pride of place as a means of determining truth. My own 
 phenomenological mode of embodiment – of bodily configuration or 
 comportment – is itself understood as constituting a truth. This does not mean
  that I construct the truth, whole cloth, from the cloister of my own experience, 
 nor does it provide hallucination with the stamp of legitimacy. What it does 
 mean is that my experience of my body, my sense of its extension and efficacy, 
 the ways that I endeavor to make a habitable thing of it, and the use I make of 
 it – or, in the throes of desire, perhaps the use that it makes of me – are my 
 necessary relation to whatever materiality I am. The sexual schema is rather a 
 way of becoming uncloistered in and through the body, in that it delivers my 
 own body to me through the movement of my body toward another. Thus, 
 through desire, my body is no longer a conglomeration of its various parts in 
 their expression as ‘inner phenomena,’ but is suddenly the vehicle through 
 which I am compelled into relation with the world, where it is finally only that 
 relation that gives me a body (56).   
 
Though Salamon does not herself write of the limit(s) of sexual difference or how a 
limit might make sense in the schema she is in the process of constructing, perhaps 
here is where it would be: if “the body one feels oneself to have is not necessarily the 
same body that is delimited by its exterior contours, and this is the case even for any 
normatively gendered subject” (14) – and if the body is “the vehicle through which I 
am compelled into relation with the world, where it is finally only that relation that 
gives me a body,” then the materiality that the (sexual) body would be would be 
constructed through limit encounters with other materialities, bodies and objects that 
would loom and recess, change position, sting, impress, bend in and bend out.  These 
clearly would not be unsurpassable or intractable limits, but limits like bodies, 
meaning, with holes, limits that implied porosity.  They would also be limits as 
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moving targets, both singular in and of themselves and multiple, singularly sweet and 
singularly punishing as well as any number of other things (e.g., generous, measured, 
tentative, consuming), depending on the body/bodies in question and their worlds and 
others.   
 
IV. “‘How many do you want?’”: A Logical Limit 
 
In a recent article, Copjec identifies a question she often fields in her “role as defender 
of the psychoanalytic theory of sexual difference” (“The Fable of the Stork” 63): 
“’Why are there two sexes?’” (63).  This question may well sum up the core of the 
differend between (some) gender studies’ and Lacanian perspectives on sexual 
difference.  We could shift the emphasis: Why are there two sexes?  What is this 
insurmountable, unsurpassable limit?  Is this limit unmoving?  Can it be negotiated 
with, and if not, why not?  What is the point of this limit, and what is the point of 
defending it?  For discourses such as queer theory and gender studies, born to theorize 
and resist structures of oppression, born, in a sense, out of limits (limits we also called 
norms and constraints in previous sections), a limit which brooks no disagreement 
might seem indeed to run counter to sense.  And in fact this, for Copjec, may be the 
point.  Copjec responds to the question “’Why are there two sexes?’” by writing that 
“one of the first things psychoanalysis did was to relieve me of the obligation to 
answer the question as posed by removing purpose or utility from sex. Sexual 
difference serves no purpose… Sex is ‘without why’” (71).  This seems, on the one 
hand, to leave the entire differend intact, unchallenged, and without explanation: 
Copjec explains that she does not need to explain why there “are” two sexes (even 
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though, as we will see, she goes on to do so); on the other hand, Copjec’s response 
also is, already, an answer, one which models the very limit it means to defend: sexual 
difference is itself a sort of limit, a white noise, something unfathomable, it runs “au 
contraire du sens” ‘counter to meaning’ and “à contre sens” ‘in the opposite direction’ 
(Lacan, Séminaire XX 119).   
 Part of the dispute, of course, resides in determining what is meant by this 
word “sex” in the first place.  In Read My Desire and “The Fable of the Stork,” Copjec 
plots out two quite different, but complementary, accounts of it.  The first draws on 
Kant’s accounts of the antinomies of reason and Lacan’s formulas to argue that sex is 
“the impossibility of completing meaning” (206) and that there are two distinct ways 
for language and reason to fail (213); the second draws on Freud’s “On the Sexual 
Theories of Children” to argue that sex is a question about being and that one can pose 
the question of being from either “the side of the void or the side of the symbolic” 
(72).  In both articles, Copjec insists that there is a two-ness to sex that cannot be 
negotiated with (although in the latter article, she also makes the following statement: 
“It is not that I cannot imagine ever having a thoughtful conversation about whether 
there are two or more sexes” [69]).  What are these two sexes Copjec describes?   
 In her foundational essay “Sex and the Euthanasia of Reason” in Read My 
Desire, Copjec turns to Kant’s antinomies of reason as a means of furnishing a 
“philosophical objection” (204) to Butler’s account of “sex” in the latter’s Gender 
Trouble.  Butler’s argument depends, Copjec suggests, on a certain rule of language: 
the fact that discourse is ongoing.  This rule of language embroils us in the 
contradiction with which Kant is concerned in The Critique of Pure Reason: “One 
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term acquires meaning only through its difference from all the others – ad infinitum, 
since the final term[ ] is never at hand” (Copjec 205).  The antinomy of this rule of 
language is that it 
 enjoins us not only to believe in the inexhaustibility of the process of meaning, 
 in the fact that there will always be another signifier to determine retroactively 
 the meaning of all that have come before, it also requires us to presuppose ‘all 
 the other signifiers,’ the total milieu that is necessary for the meaning of one. 
 The completeness of the system of signifiers is both demanded and precluded 
 by the same rule of language. Without the totality of the system of signifiers 
 there can be no determination of meaning, and yet this very totality would 
 prevent the successive consideration of signifiers that the rule requires (205).   
 
Copjec suggests that Butler’s mistake lies in attributing the instability of the term 
“woman” – “’woman itself is a term in a process, a becoming, a constructing that 
cannot rightfully be said to originate or end’” (Butler, qtd. in Read My Desire 204) – 
to the status of “woman as such”: “Butler concludes form the changing concepts of 
women something about the being, the existence of women” (204); she “notes merely 
that signification is always in process and then concludes from this that there is no 
stability of sex” (206).  According to Copjec, this is an error in Kantian terms for it 
“’attribut[es] objective reality to an idea which is valid only as a rule’” (Kant, qtd. in 
Read My Desire 206).   
 Copjec adds a step in order to accommodate Kant’s antinomies of reason with 
the question of sex: as she notes just after the above,  
 this is misleading, for it seems to imply that sex is something that is beyond 
 language, something that language forever fails to grasp. We can follow Kant 
 on this point only if we add the proviso that we understand the Thing-in-itself 
 to mean nothing but the impossibility of thinking – articulating – it. When we 
 speak of language’s failure with respect to sex, we speak not of its falling short 
 of a prediscursive object but of its falling into contradiction with itself. Sex 
 coincides with this failure, this inevitable contradiction. Sex is, then, the 
 impossibility of completing meaning, not (as Butler’s 
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 historicist/deconstructionist argument would have it) a meaning that is 
 incomplete, unstable (206).   
 
Where Butler’s position on sex, according to Copjec, plots out “a description of the 
effect of the inherent failure of discourse – a riot of sense in which one meaning 
constantly collides with another” (211), Copjec will attempt to think sex as the failure 
of language.  Here, then, is where Copjec finds the fundamental difference in their 
treatments of sexual difference: Butler, Copjec alleges, is interested in the effect of the 
inherent failure of discourse but not in its cause, which Copjec identifies as “the 
impossibility of saying everything in language” (211).  According to Copjec, this 
leaves Butler’s position on sex a voluntaristic one, lacking in “any proper notion of the 
unsurpassable limit” (210).  As we have seen, Butler will turn around and situate that 
limit in the constraints expressed by psychoanalysis’s own theories of sexual 
difference.   
 But, these are quite different sorts of limits.  At least, they are different in 
principle: does Copjec import signs of a normative limit into the realm of the logical?  
How would she differentiate the two?  Copjec suggests that the “the 
Kantian/psychoanalytic argument” actually goes further than Butler’s in the 
“desubstantialization of sex”: if, in Butler’s account, sex constitutes “an incomplete 
entity,” in the Kantian/psychoanalysis account, it is “a totally empty one” (207).  A 
sex which is subject to the signifier, Copjec suggests, may “communicate[ ] itself to 
others,” but when it becomes “disjoined from the signifier, it becomes that which does 
not communicate, that which marks the subject as unknowable” (207).   
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 As we know, though, the limit does not stop here: the point is not simply that 
sex renders the subject unknowable, end of story; the point is that sex renders the 
subject unknowable in either one way or the other: according to Copjec, “while the 
subject… is … free of absolute social constraint, he or she is nevertheless not free to 
be a subject any which way: within any discourse the subject can only assume either a 
male or a female position” (210).  Of course, if sex is a totally empty entity, then these 
terms – “male,” “female” – cannot be predicates: sexual difference – “male” or 
“female” for Copjec – “does not positively describe the subject… male and female, 
like being, are not predicates, which means that rather than increasing our knowledge 
of the subject, they qualify the mode of the failure of our knowledge” (212).   
 It will be the unknowability of the subject that will serve as the central trope 
for the description of sex in Copjec’s later article.  Here, Copjec is expressly 
concerned with the fall-out involved in debates between gender studies and 
psychoanalysis about how many sexes there may be.  As she remarks, speaking more 
generally to the state of the study of “theory” in various disciplines, “the disagreement 
over what constitutes a proper question is the bloodiest of all, a battle for the 
legitimacy of the terms by which one approaches the world” (65).  She turns, then, to 
children’s questions about sexuality, as presented by Freud, implicitly positing these 
as the terms by which psychoanalysis itself would approach the world.  
Psychoanalysis is different from other discourses, according to Copjec, because “[t]he 
human subject is not simply that being whose being remains a question for her; rather, 
the human subject is, as sexuated being, the being whose being raises questions for 
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her. Or: it is specifically the experience of sexuality that raises the question of being 
by rendering the subject inconspicuous, opaque to herself” (67). 
 Copjec offers a series of useful and lovely formulations in this text.  In a way, 
Copjec goes much further than Morel in describing how, “[f]or psychoanalysis, sexual 
difference is not a question of anatomy” (Morel, “Psychoanalytical Anatomy” 28).  
The sexuated body is beautifully denaturalized and defamiliarized, as for example 
when she explains the sense of Lacan’s maxim that there is no sexual relation: “The 
maxim says: the obstacle [to the sexual relation] is not extraneous to sex but part of its 
definition. What sexual obstacles reveal is a fault, a tear, in the symbolic universe; a 
void opens and thus forces the symbolic to incline or curve away from itself. This void 
gives berth to sex, which can be defined as an investment in the void” (72).  The 
homonymy of berth/birth captured here almost hearkens back to the kinds of limits I 
tried adducing to Salamon’s account of the materiality-in-relation that the sexual body 
would be; both space and construction, indent or hollow and projection, this 
birth/berth is given to sex by the void (meaning that sex both acquires berth and comes 
into “being” thanks to the void).  Instead of the language of gender, what we have here 
is something more poetic.  Another such formulation arrives as Copjec goes on to 
explain why there are two sexes:  
 If one accepts that sex divides and singularizes the subject, one needs to say 
 why one continues nevertheless to insist on the two of sexual difference. My 
 answer is this: every subject experiences the enigma of his/her divided, 
 singular, sexuated being from one or the other side of the symbolic tear, form 
 the side of the void or the side of the symbolic. The difference in these 
 positions gives rise to the distinct forms through which the enigma takes shape 
 (72).  
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 If, drawing on Copjec’s language, sex is “that which does not communicate 
itself”; if one may experience this enigma from either “the side of the void or the side 
of the symbolic”; if the positions Copjec names “male” and “female” do not describe 
the subject… does this not mean that those positions are occupied by men, women, 
and the rest of us genderqueers, intersex people, and transfolk?  That we are “sexual” 
because we desire, because of the excess of libido instituted/broken off because of the 
fact of language, and that we are “sexuated” because we can, in the unconscious, take 
one or the other stance with respect to that loss?  That there are, logically, two sexes – 
two positions within language, two different modes of jouissance, two stances with 
respect to the impossibility of saying it all, two stances with respect to the signifier of 
the subject’s lack in being – and that “men, women, and the rest of us” (Bornstein) 
occupy those sites in some way regardless of our relationship to the (ever-shifting) 
“sexual discourse” which “defines” who is a “male” and who is a “female”?  We 
might ask after the efficacy of the language Copjec uses to define the positions of the 
unknowable, sexuated subject (or the subject who is unknowable because sexuated): 
the terms “male” and “female” seem to hearken back to a mythical real, to a mythical 
“nature” where one might find oneself “at one” amongst the “males” and “females” of 
the “animal world,” where there is ostensibly no signifier.  Why not “all” and “not-
all?”  Why indeed does Lacan not narrate the formulas with a similar distance from the 
gendered language of the second register of sexuation?  To what extent does 
psychoanalysis wish to posit that the language of the second level of sexuation finds 
form or makes sense in the third?   
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Conclusion: A Different Limit 
I have argued throughout this project for an understanding of sexual difference which 
would reference not gender or “biological sex” (the “male sex” or the “female sex”) 
but a subject’s position with respect to language, and I base this understanding on a 
reading of Lacan’s formulas of sexuation.  I have been interested too in elaborating a 
theory of transgender subjectivity, and I suggested in Chapter One that we might 
understand the version of transgender subjectivity of interest to this project as a 
“hysterical,” “feminine” or “not-all” phenomenon from within the Lacanian paradigm.  
It may be important to clarify that I am not suggesting that transgender subjectivity 
consists of being, for example, “unconsciously masculine” but identifying as a 
“woman.”  I pointed in Chapter One to Lacan’s indication that any subject may line up 
under one banner or the other: “[a]ny speaking being whatsoever, as is expressly 
formulated in Freudian theory, whether provided with the attributes of masculinity – 
attributes that remain to be determined – or not, is allowed to inscribe itself in [the 
feminine position]” (Encore 80).  I did so not to plot this out as a form of “crossing” 
but to combat the idea that sexual difference would be reducible to gender.  If Lacan 
notes that one can be unconsciously feminine but identify as a man, it is to point out 
the disjunct between one’s unconscious sexuation and one’s gender identification/s.  
This indicates that we cannot necessarily determine a person’s unconscious sexuation 
based on his/her/hir gender identification.  And this last point, to my mind, further 
suggests that we cannot assume that a man, woman, transman, transwoman, or anyone 
else, is necessarily identifying “outsidesex” (Millot 135) – for example, as Millot 
writes, “aim[ing] to incarnate The Woman” (42) – on the basis of his/her/hir gender 
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identification.  This reasoning works both ways, of course: for this also means that we 
cannot assume that any transgender-identified person is necessarily 
hysterical/feminine/not-all in the Lacanian sense. 
 What we can say is that, according to psychoanalytic literature, “not-all” 
subjects oftentimes embody a subversive attitude with respect to gender 
identifications: as Lacan notes, “uncertainty about one’s sex is a common feature of 
hysteria” (“On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis” 456).  They 
are perhaps the subjects most likely to find their sexed bodies to be irreducible to any 
imaginary identification.  In this way, they raise the question of the impossibility of 
sex, finding that nothing in the social accounts for their sexed being.  Resisting the 
ready limit of the language of norms, such subjects contend otherwise with the enigma 
of sexuated being.  “Hysterical identifications are always partial,” Gherovici writes; 
“The hysterical question is thus inexhaustible: ‘Am I a man or a woman?’ has to 
remain a frustrated query” (212); but “being not-whole, [the not-all subject] has a 
supplementary jouissance compared to what the phallic function designates by way of 
jouissance” (Lacan, Encore 73).  This does not mean that transgender subjectivity is 
without limit; quite the contrary.  For one thing, it is not necessarily an enviable 
position to be in, entailing as it sometimes does a “renunciation of enjoyment” (Juliet 
Flower MacCannell 201); according to Gherovici, “[d]esire remains always as an 
enigma for the hysteric” (101).  But, ironically, transgender subjectivity may also be 
the best expression of the truth that psychoanalysis – for all its norms and failures – 
can share with students of gender theory: the idea “the body will never find in 
language a harmonious home” (Gherovici 212).   
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 It is not certain at this time that the gender binary will maintain its hold on 
imaginings about the possibilities of gendered embodiment (and if it fades from 
discourse, the not-all subject will find another way to ask the burning question of the 
failure of the sexual relation), but it is certain that, so long as it does, it will cause 
suffering; as Riki Wilchins writes in GenderQueer: Voices from Beyond the Gender 
Binary, 
 Every model of reality has margins where it begins to run out of explanatory 
 steam,  where we can see its problems and limitations. This anthology is about 
 the people at those margins and thus about those who have found their bodies 
 the target of discrimination because they transcended narrow stereotypes, 
 because they were perceived as too old, young, black, short, fat, disabled, deaf, 
 hairy, ill, butch, flamboyant, or any of a thousand other things. In short, this is 
 about all of us.    
We’re not the ones who are broken. It’s the model that’s broken. The model of 
 Western thought about bodies itself, and much more besides. So, welcome to 
 my breakdown (“Queerer Bodies” 34-35).   
 
More integrally, however, and beyond an identificatory register, what causes suffering 
is that there is a limit as such (as Wilchins notes, “this is about all of us”).  Wilchins 
might locate the limit as the point where any model of reality finds itself without 
explanation, or as the fact that such points exist around the edges of any model of 
reality; Copjec might call it the impossibility of language to say it all; Lacan states that 
it is “constituted by the fact that there are beings who speak.”  The limit is constituted 
by the fact that there are beings who speak because there is something which cannot 
be said: sexuality “render[s] the subject inconspicuous, opaque to herself” (Copjec, 
“The Fable of the Stork” 67).  In Freud’s terms, as Copjec reminds us, there is “’a 
piece of ignorance that cannot be made good’” (qtd. in “The Fable of the Stork” 67).  
Subjects may encounter that limit either from the side of the void or the side of the 
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symbolic, but those subjects who encounter it from the side of the void – feminine 
subjects, hysterical subjects, those I have been calling transgender subjects – serve to 
remind us that no sense will make up for its effects.   
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